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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, federal courts have devoted increasing resources to
adjudicating government officials' claims of immunity from constitu-
tional tort actions.' This litigation has focused primarily on the quali-
fied immunity doctrine, which protects public officials from damages
liability and, theoretically, from the burdens of pretrial litigation and
trial, as long as their alleged unconstitutional conduct "does not vio-
late clearly established.., constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.,2 This Article examines and criticizes the
1. By "constitutional torts," this Article refers to damages actions brought against public
officials in their individual capacities for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights. Such
actions against state or local officials are authorized by federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994),
as amended by Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
(110 Stat.) 3847, while federal officials may be sued directly under the Constitution. See Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (implying
Fourth Amendment cause of action for damages against federal officers). The Supreme Court
has held that the immunity doctrines should be applied identically in both § 1983 actions and
Bivens actions. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978). But cf Gary S. Gildin, Im-
munizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of
Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 369-71 (1989) (arguing that the
Court inappropriately extended qualified immunity in Bivens actions to § 1983 actions, for
which examination of congressional intent is relevant).
2. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has addressed
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Supreme Court's paradoxical approach to crafting qualified immu-
nity law, which simultaneously encourages resolution of the defense
on summary judgment and shapes the doctrine to ensure an almost
inevitable factual inquiry that precludes pretrial termination of civil
rights claims.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized that the
enforcement of constitutional norms through damages actions is an
important component of our legal system. Nonetheless, the Court
established the qualified immunity doctrine to limit officials' expo-
sure to such litigation in order to advance three policy considera-
tions. First, the Court fears that it would be unfair to require public
officials to compensate plaintiffs for all constitutional violations,
given the sometimes unclear nature of constitutional law.5 Second,
the Court speculates that public officials will be overdeterred in the
performance of their duties if they anticipate that every official action
qualified immunity issues in each of its past four terms. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct.
2100, 2108 (1997) (holding that prison guards employed by private company that operates
prisons pursuant to contract with a state are not entitled to assert qualified immunity defense to
§ 1983 claims);Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (1997) (holding that federal law does
not require state courts to permit officials whose qualified immunity claims are denied at the
trial court level to pursue an interlocutory appeal); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311-12
(1996) (holding that Court of Appeals was not deprived ofjurisdiction over defendant's second
interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity issue);Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 304 (1995)
(holding that defendant may not appeal denial of summary judgment motion based on quali-
fied immunity when order is based on existence of "genuine" issue of material fact); Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (finding appellate courts reviewing qualified immunity
cases must consider all relevant precedents and not merely those presented to or found by the
trial court). In 1995, the Court granted certiorari to hear another qualified immunity case,
Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 513 U.S. 1123 (1995), granting cert. to 17 F.3d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1994), but
ultimately vacated the case and remanded it for reconsideration in light of its holding in John-
son v.Jones. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 515 U.S. 321 (1995). The Court has again granted cer-
tiorari to review an important qualified immunity issue during its present Term. See Crawford-
El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc),cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997). As
this Article goes to print, the Crawford-El case, which is discussed extensively herein, see infra
Part IV.B, is scheduled for oral argument before the Supreme Court. The Court's decision in
that case could, of course, substantially affect the manner in which the federal courts will sub-
sequently address many of the issues discussed in this Article. Over the past six years, the Court
also has addressed absolute immunity in several different contexts. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher,
118 S. Ct. 502, 510 (1997) (holding that prosecutors are not absolutely immune from § 1983
suits when the conduct they are sued for relates to acting as a complaining witness rather than
serving a prosecutorial function); Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (addressing Presi-
dential immunity); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (concerning prosecutorial
immunity); Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (involving prosecutorial immunity). During the
current Term, the Court will review a case addressing the scope of legislative immunity. See
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997),granting cert. sub nom. to Scott-Harris v. City of Fall
River, No. 95-1950, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 (1st Cir.Jan. 15, 1997).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing individuals under jurisdiction of United States to com-
mence civil action for deprivation of constitutional or other federal law rights).
4. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96 ("Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordi-
nary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.").
5. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-22 (1975) (recognizing that fairness consid-
erations are one factor supporting extension of immunity to school board members).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW
they take may lead to a lawsuit.6 Finally, the Court believes that the
litigation of constitutional torts may impose substantial costs on indi-
vidual officials and on the government itself, even when the trial
court ultimately finds that the officials are not liable.
Although the Court still invokes fairness and overdeterrence justi-
fications for qualified immunity, its recent decisions have trans-
formed the doctrine to emphasize the primary objective of minimiz-
ing the social costs of constitutional tort litigation. It has accordingly
shaped the doctrine to facilitate early and prompt disposition of
qualified immunity claims.8 Thus, the Court insists that the central
issue of qualified immunity-whether, applying "clearly established"
law, the defendant's conduct was "reasonable" under the circum-
stances-is a question of law.9 The Court also pays close attention to
the procedural mechanisms for resolving immunity claims, directing
lower courts to adjudicate those claims on summary judgment while
cautioning against allowing much, if any, pre-summary judgment dis-
covery. Moreover, to ensure that qualified immunity is an
"immunity from suit," rather than a mere defense to liability, the
Court permits officials to pursue interlocutory appeals when trial
courts deny their immunity claims. 12 Part I of this Article explores
this doctrinal trend toward emphasizing the social costs rationale for
qualified immunity.
While the qualified immunity defense has long been recognized,
its application and administration continue to perplex courts'3 and
provoke a substantial amount of scholarly commentary. The United
6. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07 (1982) (indicating that without immunity, public officials
would be unprotected from undue interference and might not vigorously exercise their official
responsibilities).
7. See id. at 814 (identifying litigation expenses and diversion of attention from important
public concerns as costs of denying immunity).
8. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (stating that entitlement to qualified
immunity should be determined as quickly as possible).
9. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1994); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511,526 (1985); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
10. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
11. SeeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,646 n.6 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
12. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525-27 (recognizing an exception to the final judgment rule for
qualified immunity claims). But seeJohnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-17 (1995) (holding that
Mitchell rule does not apply if trial court's sole reason for denying immunity claim is the exis-
tence of a disputed factual issue).
13. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 95 F.3d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir. 1996)
(noting confusion of district court and defendant about qualified immunity standard), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997); McMillian v.Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1585 (1lth Cir. 1996) (Propst,
J., specially concurring) (acknowledging that keeping up with the law of qualified immunity is a
full time job), afJ'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997); Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057,
1062 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting ongoing confusion as to proper test when addressing qualified
immunity disputes).
14. See generally David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach
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States Supreme Court has repeatedly revisited the doctrine to clarify
critical issues surrounding its scope and application. For example, in
each of the past three terms, the Court has decided cases addressing
the scope of interlocutory appeals available to public officials who are
denied qualified immunity in the pretrial stage of constitutional tort
litigation.'5 The Court's review of these procedural issues manifests
its recognition of the rampant administrative and docket problems
that the high volume of qualified immunity claims generates in the
lower courts. Indeed, the necessity for clarity on these issues is hardly
unpredictable; in 1995 alone, the federal appellate courts decided
339 cases involving public officials' qualified immunity claims."
To any judge, practitioner, or scholar who has experience with this
area of the law, the abundance of qualified immunity appeals should
not be surprising. Despite the Court's precautions, the promise of
early termination of constitutional tort claims on summaryjudgment
remains illusory. Lower courts struggle with the doctrine's applica-
tion, finding that, at least in some circumstances, contested factual
issues preclude summary judgment. For example, the courts have
begun to understand that a factual dispute over a central element of
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court's
struggle over proper interpretive approach regarding official immunity under § 1983); Mark R.
Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen ? 79 IOwA L. REV. 273 (1994)
(commenting on Supreme Court decisions on governmental immunity); Alan K. Chen, The
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV.
261 (1995) (discussing choice between rules and standards in regard to immunity doctrine);
Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualifed Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitu-
tional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115 (1991) [hereinafter Kinports, Crystal Balls] (criticizing Supreme
Court rulings involving qualified immunity); Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1499-1506 (1996) (characterizing qualified immunity as a legal doctrine
that acknowledges the indeterminacy of law, yet serves a legitimizing function by taking a posi-
tivist approach to law that promotes predictability for public officials); David Rudovsky, The
Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitu-
tional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989) (examining qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. §
1983). The widespread confusion over the qualified immunity doctrine has even prompted
one commentator to lay out the details in a "user's manual." See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Im-
munity: A User's Manual; 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 190 (1993) [hereinafter Blum, User's Manual]
(suggesting article to be used as a "map" to guide judges and lawyers through this area of law).
15. SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (1997) (holding that federal law does not
require state courts to permit officials whose qualified immunity claims are denied at the trial
court level to pursue an interlocutory appeal); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996)
(permitting multiple appeals from pretrial orders denying summary judgment on grounds of
qualified immunity);Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1995) (holding defendant could
not appeal summary judgment order denying qualified immunity based on genuine issue of
fact).
16. Citation list on file with The American University Law Review. This figure includes both
reported and unreported decisions in which a federal appeals court resolved at least one issue
concerning the application of qualified immunity. It does not, of course, include the numer-
ous qualified immunity claims resolved by federal district courts but not appealed. See Chen,
supra note 14, at 332 nn.340-41 (citing similar statistics for 1992 and 1993).
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the plaintiffs case makes it impossible to resolve a qualified immu-
nity claim.
17
Dilemmas arising from potential factual disputes also have plagued
the courts in cases when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional viola-
tion, such as the denial of equal protection, that requires her to
prove that the defendant official acted intentionally or with some
other requisite state of mind. In these circumstances, the courts of-
ten conclude that the defendant's state of mind is a factual issue that
must be resolved at trial. 8
The courts' treatment of immunity claims involving factual dis-
putes suggests that such cases raise special or unique circumstances
distinct from the ordinary application of the qualified immunity doc-
trine, and therefore require carefully tailored exceptions to the gen-
eral structure of immunity law. That is, the complications created by
factual issues under the immunity inquiry are generally viewed by the
courts as aberrational.
This Article argues that courts and commentators alike have failed
to appreciate that factual issues are an inherent part of the qualified
immunity inquiry, notwithstanding the formal designation of quali-
fied immunity as an issue of law. Many of the dilemmas experienced
in the understanding and application of the qualified immunity doc-
trine reflect this fundamental misconception about the role of facts
under the doctrine and the possibility of resolution on summary
judgment-a misconception perpetuated by the Supreme Court's re-
luctance to acknowledge this basic conceptual problem.
Part II of this Article explains that factual disputes are inherent in
the resolution of qualified immunity because the Court has articu-
lated the qualified immunity doctrine as an open-ended
"reasonableness" standard.'9 As with any reasonableness standard, all
qualified immunity inquiries are inevitably fact-dependent, at least in
17. See infra notes 152-86 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text.
19. For general discussions concerning the conceptual distinction between bright-line
rules and open-ended standards, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991)
(exploring rule-based decision making and examining its relationship with common law). See
generally H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-41 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing how both prece-
dent and legislation play a role in judicial decisions); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (describing incompatibility of mechanical rules and"situation sen-
sitive" standards); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191 (1994) (analyzing formulation of rules and their effect on individuals); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976)
(discussing application and formulation of standards and rules in law); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (examining interplay between standards and rules in
law).
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part, because the reasonableness of a government official's conduct
must be evaluated with reference to some set of facts.0 Courts can as-
sess whether a particular act violates a "clearly established" right only
by comparing the existing case law to an undisputed description of
that act. Entitlement to qualified immunity, therefore, must be
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact.
2
'
The difficulty of resolving qualified immunity claims under this
reasonableness inquiry is compounded by the Court's increasing
tendency to define substantive constitutional doctrine by open-ended
standards or "balancing" tests, which require courts to weigh
"individual liberties (privacy, equality, speech) against government
interests (public health, social welfare, social order) in each particu-
lar case."' 2 Under such a balancing regime, the law that defines the
underlying violation of the plaintiffs rights in a constitutional tort
case is, like the immunity inquiry, highly fact-dependent and case-
specific. Applying qualified immunity in the age of constitutional
balancing tests creates "stacked" or dual reasonableness standards23
20. SeeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (explaining that in determining
reasonableness, one must evaluate facts surrounding incident).
21. For an examination of the conceptual issues involving treating issues as factual, legal,
or mixed questions, see infra notes 547-65 and accompanying text.
22. Chen, supra note 14, at 265 (noting Supreme Court's preference for standards under
substantive constitutional doctrine); infra notes 272-301 and accompanying text. This author
has argued elsewhere that the confluence of these two open-ended legal standards-the im-
munity standard and substantive constitutional standards-creates tremendous theoretical dif-
ficulties with immunity doctrine and substantive constitutional law. See Chen, supra note 14, at
267 (indicating that decisions regarding rules and standards in immunity cases affect other
elements of constitutional law). This Article, in contrast, demonstrates the tremendous practi-
cal disadvantages and doctrinal complications generated by the qualified immunity standard.
The conceptual problems that I have identified with the "stacking" problem-that is, the
theoretical and doctrinal difficulties that arise when the law incorporates a legal "standard" at
two distinct analytical levels-may now also affect federal constitutional rights as adjudicated
under federal habeas corpus law. Congress recently adopted an amendment to the federal
statutes governing habeasjurisdiction that limits a federal court's power to overturn state court
criminal convictions to circumstances where the state court's ruling "resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1). This section
appears to require that federal courts must assess the reasonableness of a state court's applica-
tion of constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court, which necessarily will also en-
tail an assessment of the underlying constitutional balancing test. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d
856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W] hen the dispute lies not in the meaning of the Constitution, but
in its application to a particular set of facts-when it is, in the standard phrase, a 'mixed ques-
tion of law and fact'-§ 2254(d) (1) restricts the grant of collateral relief to cases in which the
state's decision reflects 'an unreasonable application of' the law."), reu'd on other grounds, 117 S.
Ct. 2059 (1997). But cf. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 381, 403-07 (1996) (arguing both as a normative and descriptive matter that Congress did
not intend to adopt an official immunity model for reviewing state court criminal convictions
under § 2254(d) (1)).
23. See Chen, supra note 14, at 267, 308-09; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643-44 (noting
possibility of reasonably unreasonable conduct under qualified immunity, but disregarding
concern as semantic coincidence).
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Thus, an official's reasonableness must be examined with reference
not only to the facts, but also with respect to two conceptually distinct
legal frameworks-one grounded in substantive constitutional law,
and one derived from the law of qualified immunity. The predomi-
nance of constitutional balancing tests increases the likelihood of fac-
tual conflicts.
Part III of this Article describes how, at the same time that the
Court's qualified immunity doctrine evolved, there was a parallel
movement under federal summary judgment law to increase the
availability of pretrial termination of litigation." Specifically, the
Court has eased the burdens on parties seeking summary judgment
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most perti-
nent to a proper understanding of qualified immunity, the Court has
underscored that a critical component of summary judgment analysis
is whether the moving or non-moving party bears the burden of per-
suasion on the claim being adjudicated2s
Part IV of this Article identifies how the intersection of a fact-based
qualified immunity doctrine and summary judgment law generates
significant conceptual problems. Recognition of the inherent factual
nature of "qualified" immunity may assist courts, policymakers, and
scholars in understanding, implementing, and perhaps reforming
the doctrine. First, greater appreciation of qualified immunity's fac-
tual nature may explain the substantial doctrinal confusion about the
application of conventional summary judgment standards to the
qualified immunity defense. 6 Although the laws of summary judg-
ment and qualified immunity have similar gatekeeping objectives,
they conflict in significant, but unrecognized, ways. Instead of ac-
knowledging the conceptual incompatibility of qualified immunity
and summary judgment, the courts have expended much energy try-
ing to make them compatible. This ill-conceived effort has served
24. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (holding that courts
should evaluate motions for summaryjudgment with regard to the applicable standard of proof
on the underlying claim); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (holding ter-
mination by summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish essential ele-
ment of case after discovery was permitted).
25. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25.
26. This confusion is reflected by the Court's disagreement over the appropriate summary
judgment standard for qualified immunity claims in Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991). See
id. at 228-29 (discussing summary judgment standard in context of qualified immunity claims);
id. at 229 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with Court's assessment of
summary judgment standard); id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's as-
sessment of summary judgment standard); id. at 234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting substan-
tial disagreement among the Justices about proper summary judgment standard). For an ex-
tensive discussion relating the continuing confusion that Hunter has created, compare Act
Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1992), with id. at 879-82 (Norris,J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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only to perpetuate widespread confusion about procedural questions
critical to the application of the doctrine.
Because of its factual nature, qualified immunity is a hybrid form
of immunity that presents unique challenges in formulating a mean-
ingful procedural device for its resolution. The Court insists that
qualified immunity is an immunity from suit,27 not simply a defense
to liability. But to the extent this is the case, summary judgment is an
inappropriate procedural vehicle for advancing the qualified immu-
nity doctrine's purposes, because summary judgment can generally
provide only immunity from trial. The hybrid nature of qualified
immunity also explains why the courts have been confused about
other procedural issues related to administration of pretrial litiga-
tion, such as the availability and scope of discovery and the permissi-
ble role for the jury in assessing factual disputes underlying the im-
munity inquiry. It also illustrates why the federal courts have been
unable to formulate a coherent analytical framework for addressing
qualified immunity; the immunity doctrine simply does not comport
with the traditional understanding and operation of summary judg-
ment procedures. The confusion surrounding each of these issues
can be partly attributed to a failure to acknowledge the central role
of facts in the qualified immunity analysis.
Second, the factual element of the immunity reasonableness analy-
sis has thus far confounded the courts in their attempts to identify
which party bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of qualified
immunity for purposes of both summary judgment and trial. Neither
the Supreme Court nor the lower courts has provided a coherent ex-
planation of the parties' evidentiary burdens in the adjudication of
immunity claims."X This unfortunate omission is critical, for the ap-
plication of the summary judgment doctrine is entirely contingent
upon the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the issue being
litigated. Perhaps the allocation of the burden of persuasion to either
party can never make sense in this area of law, yet thus far the courts
have avoided even acknowledging this issue as a problem.
Finally, Part V of this Article identifies how the factual nature of
qualified immunity provides a doctrinal explanation for the increas-
ing burden facing lower federal courts that must regularly address
qualified immunity. To the extent that factual issues are inherent,
qualified immunity claims will seldom be determined on summary
27. SeeMitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985).
28. See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23
GA. L. REV. 597, 634-42 (1989) [hereinafter Kinports, Unanswered Questions].
1997]
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judgment at the earliest possible stage of the lawsuit," at least if the
courts are properly applying the Supreme Court's standard. Thus,
public official defendants may commonly undergo the burdens of
litigation, and even trial, never achieving the early and expeditious
resolution the Court has envisioned.
The open-ended nature of the immunity standard causes a para-
doxical effect. Originally designed to alleviate the social costs of con-
stitutional tort litigation, qualified immunity instead has institutional-
ized a cumbersome and costly system for resolving constitutional tort
claims. This creates the ultimate irony: a doctrine specifically de-
signed to alleviate the social costs of constitutional tort litigation may
in fact have the opposite effect. The qualified immunity doctrine
and the litigation surrounding its application may actually be increas-
ing the social costs of these cases, creating what can be called
"secondary burdens," the social costs associated with litigating immu-
nity questions themselves. Empirical evaluation of these costs may
lead the courts to reassess the doctrine's policy ramifications.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITYAS GATEKEEPER
The law generally recognizes the availability of damages relief
when a federal, state, or local public official violates a person's consti-
tutional rights. Under the Supreme Court's holding in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,s injured persons
can sue federal officials directly under the Constitution3' Those in-
jured by state or local officials may seek relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.2 Under both of these causes of action, a plaintiff may recover
for the deprivation of a wide range of constitutional rights, so long as
she can prove that the right exists,1 3 that the defendant violated the
29. See Alan K. Chen, Burns v. Reed-Narrowing the Prosecutor's Protection from Liability for
Unconstitutional Conduct, 3 POLICE MISCONDUCT & Crv. RTS. LAw REP. 121, 125-26 (1991)
("Courts are not always able to resolve summary judgment motions raising qualified immunity
claims because of factual disputes.").
30. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
31. Seeid.at389.
32. The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). For an interesting examination of whether § 1983 should even be
necessary to enforce constitutional claims, see Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-
Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995).
33. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (indicating courts must determine
"whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all"); Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (stating that § 1983 plaintiff must allege deprivation of a federal
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ight under color of governmental authority,34 and that the defen-
dant's acts proximately caused a cognizable harm.3 5
The constitutional tort remedy furthers important values by com-
pensating individuals harmed by unconstitutional official conduct
and by deterring public officials from engaging in future infrac-
tions. t It also recognizes the importance of constitutional rights and
affirms respect for moral principles.
For more than a generation, however, the Supreme Court has
struggled to balance these benefits against competing social policy
concerns implicated by the availability of monetary remedies against
public officials for constitutional injuries.&" These policy considera-
right).
34. Under § 1983, an official must have acted under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). In a Bivens action, the official must have acted under color of federal
authority. SeeBivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
35. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 638-40. But see Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477
U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (holding that damages may be awarded for deprivations of rights only if
the deprivation results in actual harm); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978) (holding
that compensable injury must result directly from denial of constitutional right).
36. The Court has focused on compensation as the principal objective of the constitu-
tional tort action. SeeFelder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1988) (describing compensation as
a main objective of § 1983 actions); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (stating that
damages relief "may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guaran-
tees") (citations omitted); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing central
role of damages in actions brought directly under the Constitution). The Court does, however,
consider the deterrent effect of both compensatory and punitive damages. See generally Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983).
37. See, e.g., PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVINJEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 42, 49-50
(1988) (describing how damage awards are one way of affirming legal rights, thereby educating
moral sentiments of community); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES
FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16 (1983) (arguing that a primary goal of constitutional tort remedies is
to "exemplify society's moral principles"); Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 5, 23-25 (1980) (indicating that § 1983's assurance of a federal forum serves important
symbolic goals about the importance of federal rights); cf. Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the
"Crists": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 766 (1987)
(arguing that tort law's primary function is not compensation or deterrence, but the affirma-
tion of norms).
38. See generally Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (asserting that qualified immunity was the "best
attainable accommodation" of the competing values at stake in constitutional tort actions);
Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1133-53 (1981)
(describing model for determining proper scope of qualified immunity in terms of balancing
deterrent function of constitutional tort liability against systemic social costs of system that
holds officials accountable for their unconstitutional conduct). Numerous commentators have
recognized that qualified immunity is premised on policy grounds, notwithstanding the Court's
attempt to characterize its decisions as an exercise in statutory interpretation or focus on his-
torical considerations. See, e.g.,Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 67 (1989) (arguing that the Court's policymak-
ing is "nowhere more clear than in the immunities area, where the early reliance on 1871
common law has given way to a body of law that can be accurately characterized as a pure fed-
eral common law of immunities"); Kinports, Crystal Balls, supra note 14, at 120-21, 197 & n.32
(arguing that the Court recognizes the qualified immunity defense as a "creature of policy"
rather than a matter of statutory interpretation); Rudovsky, supra note 14, at 36 (maintaining
that Court's "policy judgment" substantially defines qualified immunity). Nonetheless, even
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tions have led the Court to establish official immunities that substan-
tially limit plaintiffs' rights to recover under Bivens and § 1983.Y9
Immunity law arises from the Court's general fear that public officials
may be particularly susceptible to suits for constitutional violations
because the nature of their positions exposes them to frequent con-
tact with members of the public.
The Court has established two separate immunity doctrines-
absolute immunity and qualified immunity-to mitigate the potential
problems it associates with constitutional tort liability. Limited
classes of officials, such as legislators,0 prosecutors, 4 and judges,42 are
entitled to absolute immunity, which categorically bars any constitu-
tional tort action against such officials when they are sued for actions
taken in the course of their official functions. Officials entitled to ab-
solute immunity are not subject to suit for any official act, even if
done maliciously or intentionally.43  Despite the breadth of this im-
munity, the Court has categorically forbidden actions against these
classes of officials in order to prevent them from being burdened by
an onslaught of civil rights actions.4 Because of its categorical
members of the Court have moments of candor. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1992)
(Kennedy, J, concurring) (acknowledging that the Court has transformed qualified immunity
from a doctrine based on historical common law practices to one dictated by policy concerns).
39. Numerous other barriers to obtaining relief for constitutional violations exist as well.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (limiting federal habeas corpus relief to cases where the state
court adjudication of a criminal defendant's claims "resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding that habeas corpus petitioners may not seek relief based on a "new" consti-
tutional rule unless it fits one of two narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity of constitutional
rules to collateral proceedings); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (refusing to
recognize Bivens action for procedural due process violations under Social Security Act disabil-
ity provisions where Congress had created independent remedial scheme to restore benefits);
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (narrowing standing requirements for
plaintiffs seeking prospective injunctive relief against unconstitutional conduct); Monell v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that local government bodies are
liable under § 1983 only if the local official causing the constitutional harm was acting pursuant
to an official "policy or custom").
40. The Court first recognized some form of immunity for public officials in Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951) (holding that state legislators are entitled to absolute
immunity from constitutional tort actions).
41. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that prosecutors are enti-
tied to absolute immunity from civil suits under § 1983).
42. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (holding that judges are entitled to ab-
solute immunity for acts relating to their official role). Congress recently amended § 1983 to
codify judicial immunity from injunctive relief as well. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 3847 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988).
43. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
44. See id. (speculating that judges would be sued frequently in absence of immunity be-
cause of nature of their duties and inevitable dissatisfaction of losing litigants).
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nature, the absolute immunity defense is often asserted and resolved
on the pleadings.45
The vast remainder of officials, who comprise the most substantial
segment of the public sector, are entitled to a more limited
"qualified" immunity.46 Qualified immunity protects public officials
from financial liability and, theoretically, from the burdens of litiga-
tion, as long as the unconstitutional conduct they are charged with
"does not violate clearly established... constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."47 Unlike absolute immu-
nity, which establishes a categorical bar to suits against certain types
of officials, qualified immunity requires a case-by-case analysis of in-
dividual officials' actions in particular factual settings.
45. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13 ("An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so
long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity."). Factual issues concern-
ing scope of immunity do occasionally arise in absolute immunity cases. See infra note 571 and
accompanying text.
46. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Executive Official Im-
munity, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 221 (1984) (stating that"most" state and federal executive offi-
cials are covered by qualified immunity).
47. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has held that the immunity doctrines should be applied identically in both § 1983 ac-
tions and Bivens actions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978). The matter of what
sources of law to examine when determining whether a constitutional right is "clearly estab-
lished" has been the subject of some controversy, but is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
recent discussion of the different approaches courts have used and a proposal that federal
courts should also look to state court decisions in ascertaining whether law is clearly estab-
lished, see Richard B. Saphire, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases and the Role of State Deci-
sional Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 627-32, 643-59 (1993). Recent developments in two closely
related areas of law-federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and criminal civil rights prosecutions-
demonstrate an interesting contrast in this regard. In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which modified habeas corpus jurisdiction by limit-
ing a federal court's power to overturn state court criminal convictions to circumstances where
the state court's ruling "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1). The new habeas statute thus"explicitly identifies only
the Supreme Court as the font of 'clearly established' rules." Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856,
869 (7th Cir. 1996), revd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). In contrast, the Supreme
Court took a different approach in a recent decision interpreting the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1994). Section 242 makes it a federal crime for a person acting under color of law to willfully
deprive a person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 242. In United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219
(1997), a state judge who was convicted under § 242 for sexually assaulting several women ar-
gued that he lacked sufficient notice or"fair warning" that such conduct was a violation of fed-
eral constitutional law. See id. at 1223. The Court denied his claim and rejected the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision to strike down his convictions on the ground that "fair warning" for due process
purposes required that there be a decision by the United States Supreme Court that had previ-
ously declared such conduct, or very factually similar conduct, to be a constitutional violation.
See id. Analogizing to qualified immunity claims in civil rights cases, the Court held that suffi-
cient warning about the definition of constitutional rights could also be derived from lower
court decisions. See id. at 1226.
48. See Chen, supra note 14, at 291-92 (describing qualified immunity test as a context-
sensitive standard).
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Qualified immunity is premised on the notion that extensive expo-
sure to constitutional tort suits imposes several potential costs on
both the official defendants and American society. First, the Court
has relied on a fairness argument. This argument suggests that it is
unfair to punish public officials for exercising their discretionary
functions in manners that may ultimately result in financial liability,
particularly when the boundaries of constitutional law are often diffi-
cult to identify.49 Second, the Court has contended that public offi-
cials' fear of financial liability for conduct that violates the Constitu-
tion may significantly inhibit them not only from committing
unconstitutional acts, but also from lawful performance of their du-
ties. That is, public officials will second-guess their own actions in a
manner that will interfere with performance of important public
functions, such as law enforcement or school administration." Fi-
nally, the Court has speculated that subjecting public officials to con-
stitutional tort litigation will impose costs on individual officials, gov-
ernment, and consequently, all of society." This "social costs,
52
argument is premised on the Court's speculation that many constitu-
tional tort claims are frivolous. 53 Accordingly, the litigation process
itself is said to impose substantial burdens on public officials who
must defend themselves, regardless of whether those officials are ul-
timately held to be financially liable for their allegedly unconstitu-
tional conduct.
In a series of qualified immunity decisions spanning the past thirty
years, the Supreme Court has continued to formally recognize these
three independent concerns-fairness, overdeterrence, and social
costs-that it associates with constitutional tort litigation. As a brief
survey of these decisions reveals, * however, the Court has trans-
49. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-22 (1975); PiLaon, 386 U.S. at 555-57; see also
Chen, supra note 14, at 273 (noting that qualified immunity is designed to protect officials
.who are not good issue spotters").
50. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (arguing that permitting
damage suits creates risk that fear of "personal monetary liability and harassing litigation" will
unduly inhibit government officials in discharging their duties); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (stating
that fear of lawsuits would dampen willingness of officials to discharge their duties); Wood, 420
U.S. at 319-20 (stating that denying immunity to school officials would deter them from exercis-
ing independentjudgment in the best interests of the school and students).
51. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
52. Unfairly imposing financial liability on public officials and overdeterring such officials
from performing the socially beneficial aspects of their jobs could also be characterized as
"social costs." This Article uses the term "social costs" to refer primarily to costs associated with
constitutional tort litigation, as opposed to constitutional tort liability.
53. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (asserting that constitutional tort claims "frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty").
54. For more comprehensive discussions of the Supreme Court's qualified immunity
cases, see Nahmod, supra note 46, at 224-31 (describing development of qualified immunity
doctrine in the Supreme Court); Rudovsky, supra note 14, at 35-73 (discussing Supreme Court's
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formed modem qualified immunity doctrine to focus primarily on
reducing the social costs of constitutional tort litigation. In particu-
lar, the Court has paid increasing attention to procedural mecha-
nisms for early termination of constitutional tort claims and has con-
sistently avoided issues relating to the inherently factual nature of
qualified immunity.
A. The Court's Early Emphasis on Fairness and Overdeterrence
The Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence began with a focus
on the fairness and overdeterrence rationales. These justifications
had their roots in the historical basis for public officials' immunity at
common law, which, as the Court observed:
[A] pparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent ra-
tionales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith,
of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal ob-
ligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that
the threat of liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with
the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good. 5
The Court emphasized the fairness rationale in two of its early
qualified immunity decisions, Pierson v. Ray and Wood v. Strickland.
57
Pierson, the Court's first qualified immunity decision, involved civil
rights claims brought by a group of clergymen who had refused to
comply with racial segregation rules at a Mississippi bus terminal.-"
The plaintiffs were arrested and convicted under a state statute that
prohibited congregating in a public place under circumstances that
caused a breach of the peace.59 After the convictions were either
overturned or dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 suit, claiming
that the arresting officers and the trial judge had deprived them of
their constitutional rights, as well as their common law rights against
false arrest and imprisonment. The Mississippi breach of peace
statute under which the plaintiffs were convicted had since been held
facially unconstitutional in a separate case.6'
qualified immunity decisions); see also 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §§ 8.01-8.21 (3d ed. 1991) (analyzing quali-
fied immunity as an affirmative defense).
55. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
56. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
57. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
58. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 550.
61. Se id. The Court found the Mississippi code unconstitutional in Thomas v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 524,524 (1965).
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Pierson extended the common law good faith immunity for police
officers, which had previously applied to false arrest and imprison-
ment actions, to constitutional tort claims.62 The Court's principal
rationale for conferring qualified immunity to police officers was to
alleviate the tension between the officers' law enforcement duties
and their obligation to comply with the Constitution.63  The Court
emphasized the unfairness of placing police officers between the
proverbial rock and a hard place in such situations.
64
Similarly, in Wood, the Court used fairness to justify extending
qualified immunity to school board officials for decisions made in
the context of pursuing disciplinary actions against students. 65 In that
case, several students argued that the defendants expelled them
without procedural due process.66 In rejecting the students' claim on
immunity grounds, the Court held that it would be unfair to burden
school officials with liability for actions "found subsequently" to have
deprived the student of a constitutional right.67 The Court's obvious
concern in Wood was with the level of uncertainty faced by public of-
ficials in assessing whether their conduct violates constitutional law.""
The Court has relied on similar fairness arguments to extend quali-
fied immunity to public officials in several other contexts.6
In both Wood and Scheuer v. Rhodes,0 the Court expanded the policy
rationales underlying qualified immunity to include concerns about
overdeterrence 1.7  The Court focused on the overdeterrence analysis
in Scheuer, in which a state governor and other high-level state execu-
tive officials were sued for their role in ordering National Guard
62. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
63. See id. at 555.
64. See id. ("A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being
mulcted in damages if he does.").
65. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
66. Seeid.at 310.
67. See id. at 319.
68. See id. at 319-21. Nevertheless, the dissenting Justices in Wood felt that the majority's
decision was still unfair to public school officials, arguing that charging public school officials
with knowledge of the law, even reasonable knowledge of clearly settled law, would impose an
unfair burden. See id. at 329 (Powell,J., dissenting).
69. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (extending immunity to high-level
presidential aides for their discharge of a Defense Department official allegedly motivated by
the latter's disclosure of cost overruns on a defense project); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 562-66 (1978) (extending immunity to state prison officials for depriving a prisoner of
First Amendment and due process rights by allegedly interfering with his ability to send corre-
spondence); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (extending immunity to a state
hospital administrator for alleged deprivations of liberty caused by the institutionalization of a
patient).
70. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
71. The Court in Pierson discussed the chilling effect of constitutional tort liability, but
only in the context of absolute judicial immunity. SeePierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
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troops to control a student demonstration at Kent State University.2
After the troops shot and killed four students during the demonstra-
tion, the students' families filed a constitutional tort claim asserting
that the defendants' actions in authorizing the use of troops deprived
the students of their constitutional due process rights. 73 Scheuer held
that, depending on the facts, the defendants might be entitled to
qualified immunity.74 In doing so, the Court articulated the basis of
the overdeterrence argument in some detail:
Public officials... who fail to make decisions when they are
needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are
made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices.
Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute or
qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The
concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is
better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than
not to decide or act at all.75
The Court also used this reasoning in Wood, concluding that school
board members would be overdeterred in pursuing their legitimate
duties in the discipline process if immunity were not extended to
them.76 Denying immunity to school officials, the Court argued,
would deter them from exercising independent judgment in the best
interests of the school and students.7 7 Subsequent cases have invoked
the overdeterrence rationale in recognizing qualified immunity for
other types of public officials as well. 78
B. The Transformation of Qualified Immunity
In 1982, the Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, signaling a major
doctrinal shift in qualified immunity law that reflected the evolution
of the Court's policy rationales to emphasize freeing public officials
from the burdens of constitutional tort litigation. While fairness and
72. Se Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232.
73. See id. at 235.
74. See id. at 247.
75. Id. at 241-42 (internal citations omitted).
76. SemWood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975).
77. See id.
78. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (recognizing overdeterrence ra-
tionale for immunity for FBI agent executing warrantless search of a home); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1978) (extending immunity to prison officials and officers
charged with violating prisoners' First Amendment privilege to send and receive mail based on
overdeterrencejustification).
79. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow was the companion case to Nixon v. FitzgeraK, 457 U.S.
731, 757-58 (1982), in which the Court extended absolute immunity for constitutional torts to
the President, at least for actions taken within the scope of his official duties while in office. Cf
Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1639 (1997) (denying temporary litigation immunity to a sit-
ting U.S. President for unofficial actions allegedly undertaken before he took office).
19971
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
overdeterrence still play a formal role in the Court's immunity juris-
prudence, their function as the driving force behind qualified im-
munity was severely diminished after Harlow.
In Harlow, the plaintiff, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian Air Force of-
ficial, brought a Bivens action against two of President Nixon's closest
aides, Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.80 The thrust of
Fitzgerald's claim was that Harlow and Butterfield violated his First
Amendment rights when they conspired to fire him in retaliation for
his disclosure of major cost overruns on a Defense Department proj-
ect at a widely publicized congressional hearing."' Fitzgerald offered
evidence from which he argued that a conspiracy to deprive him of
his constitutional rights could reasonably be inferred.82 In response,
Harlow argued that there were legitimate reasons for terminating
Fitzgerald, that he had no reason to believe a conspiracy existed, and
that he acted in good faith . Butterfield argued that he was not in-
volved in the decision to fire Fitzgerald and that he never communi-
cated his views to any Defense Department officials who would have
been responsible for the termination.4 Both defendants argued that,
despite several years of discovery, Fitzgerald had not uncovered suffi-
cient evidence that they engaged in any constitutional violation.8 5
The trial court rejected the defendants' summary judgment mo-
tion, concluding that Fitzgerald had adequately pleaded a Bivens
claim, and that genuine issues of material fact precluded pretrial
resolution of his claims. 6 After the court of appeals dismissed the de-
fendants' appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
the extent of immunity available to high-level presidential aides. " In
its opinion, however, the Court did much more than define the
scope of qualified immunity for this class of officials. 8 Instead, it
completely reformulated the test under which all qualified immunity
claims should be examined.
80. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802-05.
81. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 733-36 (describing facts involving same conspiracy at issue in Har-
low).
82. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802-05.
83. See id. at 803-04.
84. See id. at 805.
85. See id. at 803-05.
86. See id. at 805-06.
87. See id. at 806.
88. The Court previously had examined qualified immunity in a context-specific manner
in which it accommodated several different factors depending upon the type of official in-
volved. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (defining immunity based on variable
factors such as an official's responsibilities, the scope of her discretion, and the totality of the
circumstances at the time). See generally Chen, supra note 14, at 289 (noting shift in Court's
immunity jurisprudence from a different standard for particular types of officials to a unitary
reasonableness standard).
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The Court recognized that the defendants should be entitled to as-
sert a qualified immunity defense,8 again voicing its concerns about
fairness " and overdeterrence. ' In addition, however, the Court in-
troduced and emphasized several new policy considerations associ-
ated with the litigation burdens that constitutional tort claims impose
on public officials and society.
The Court identified several general social costs likely to be in-
curred under a system that allowed unlimited exposure to constitu-
tional tort litigation: (1) an increase in the government's litigation
expenses; (2) the diversion of public officials' attention and energy
away from performing their duties and toward defending lawsuits;
and (3) the deterrence of able people willing to occupy public of-
fice.9' The Court anticipated that these costs were likely to be sub-
stantial, considering its assumption that many constitutional tort
claims lack merit." Thus, the Court noted that an important element
of the immunity doctrine must be a procedure that would alleviate
these costs by permitting "'[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly
terminated."'9 4
The Court's concern for prompt and early termination of constitu-
tional tort claims led to its reformulation of the qualified immunity
standard. Early termination would be unlikely under the test estab-
lished by the Court's earlier immunity decisions. In Wood v. Strick-
land,95 the Court had articulated a qualified immunity test that in-
cluded both a "subjective" and an "objective" component. Under the
subjective component, qualified immunity would not protect an offi-
89. The Court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to some sort of de-
rivative absolute immunity because of their close working relationship with the President. See
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807-13.
90. See id. at 818 (noting unfairness of charging officials with responsibility to know law
that has not yet been clearly decided). The fairness argument is located in the Court's discus-
sion of the justifications for the objective reasonableness standard, rather than in its list of gen-
eral policy reasons for immunity. See id. at 814.
91. See id. (noting that fear of constitutional tort suits may"'dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of
their duties.'" (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))) (alteration in
original).
92. See id. As several commentators have observed, there is no empirical basis for any of
the Court's underlying assumptions about the necessity for qualified immunity. See, e.g., Beer-
mann, supra note 38, at 94-97; Gildin, supra note 1, at 389-90 & nn.89-90 (1989); Nahmod,supra
note 46, at 221, 248; Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Courts, Congress, and the Liability of
Public Officialsfor Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 282; see also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983
and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away.?, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 21 (1985) ("1 am aware of no statistics demonstrating what percentage of § 1983 actions
are bound to be meritless.").
93. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
94. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,507-08 (1978)).
95. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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cial if she "knew" her actions violated a plaintiffs constitutional
rights, or if she acted with malicious intent to cause a constitutional
deprivation. 9 The objective component suggested that, even in the
absence of subjective knowledge or intent, an official could not claim
qualified immunity if she "reasonably should have known" that her
actions violated the Constitution.97
The Harlow Court concluded that the subjective component of the
Wood test had "proved incompatible with our admonition.., that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial."98 Substantial costs
were incurred, the Court speculated, as a result of judicial inquiries
into officials' subjective good faith, a question of fact ordinarily re-
quiring a jury's resolution." Moreover, additional "special" costs ac-
crued from the litigation of the subjective good faith issue. 00 The
Court noted that because immunity is generally available only to pub-
lic officials who are engaged in discretionary functions, such officials
would be subject to discovery concerning the exercise of their judg-
ment based on their "experiences, values, and emotions.'"'a' These
factors are so inherently variable, the Court argued, that their resolu-
tion on summary judgment would be difficult.'2 Moreover, judicial
inquiry into officials' subjective motivation would require extensive
discovery, with depositions targeting many of the officials' profes-
sional colleagues.'03 "Inquiries of this kind," the Court observed, "can
be peculiarly disruptive of effective government."
10 4
In order to limit these concerns with the costs of constitutional tort
litigation, the Harlow Court reformulated the qualified immunity
doctrine in two important ways. First, the Court eliminated the sub-
jective prong of the Wood immunity test and instead established an
"objective" test, entitling an official to qualified immunity only if, in
the performance of discretionary functions, her actions did not vio-
late "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."'0 5 By shifting to an objective
test, the Court reasoned, the qualified immunity standard would fa-
cilitate resolution of insubstantial claims on summary judgment, thus
96. See id. at 322.
97. See id.
98. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.




103. See id. at 817.
104. Id. (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 818.
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avoiding the unnecessary disruption of govemment.'06 Bare allega-
tions of the defendant's malice would no longer be sufficient to sub-
ject government officials to trial or "the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery.',
0 7
Second, in order to ensure the early termination of insubstantial
lawsuits, the Court sought to create a procedural mechanism for dis-
posing of constitutional tort cases at the earliest possible stage of liti-
gation.' This could be achieved in most cases through summary
judgment, the Court insisted, because qualified immunity is an issue
of law."' Importantly, it noted that until the threshold immunity
question was resolved, no discovery should be permitted."0
Under Harlow, the judge should evaluate the defendant's summary
judgment motion based on the currently applicable law and whether
that law was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleg-
edly unconstitutional conduct."' Because it is unreasonable to ex-
pect public officials to anticipate future legal developments, qualified
immunity would apply in situations where the law was not clearly es-
tablished at the time of the alleged violation. 12 Where the law was
clearly established, however, the immunity defense would ordinarily
fail, "because reasonably competent public officials should know the
law governing their conduct."
' 3
The Harlow Court's move from a dual subjective/objective test to a
purely objective test and adoption of streamlined summary judgment
procedures reflects an important shift in the policy concerns underly-
ing immunity. In Pierson, Scheuer, and Wood, the Court focused on the
problems associated with constitutional tort liability, but did not ex-
pressly acknowledge the social costs of constitutional tort litigation,
106. See id.
107. Id.
108, See id. at 814.
109. See id. at 818. The Court continues to insist that an official's entitlement to qualified
immunity is a question of law. SeeElder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994).
110. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
111. See id.
112. Seeid.
113. Id. at 818-19. An official may still escape liability, even if the relevant law was clearly
established, "if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can
prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." Id. at 819.
The Court emphasized, however, that the defense would still turn primarily on objective fac-
tors. Sete id. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan argued that this part of the majority opinion
left open the possibility that some subjective element remained relevant to the qualified im-
munity inquiry:
This standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the
law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been ex-
pected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well in-
formed violator of constitutional rights will not evadejust punishment for his crimes.
Id. at 821 (Brennan,J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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independent of the case's outcome. Harlow's shift to an objective
standard manifested, in part, the Court's increasing concern not so
much with the unfairness of imposing financial liability on public of-
ficials sued in constitutional tort, but with the actual burdens atten-
dant to the litigation process itself.
This is clear because immunity from pretrial processes as envi-
sioned by Harlow is not driven by fairness or overdeterrence con-
cerns. Those interests could be adequately protected by a substantive
defense to liability even after discovery and a full trial. The fairness
justification for qualified immunity, for example, centers on the un-
fairness of imposing financial liability on officials for their exercise of
discretionary authority. From a substantive standpoint, the Wood test
would theoretically account for those concerns, for fairness would
seem to be epitomized by a subjective immunity test. A subjective
test, after all, requires examination of the defendant's actual knowl-
edge or intent regarding a particular action. If a defendant did not
know she was committing a constitutional infraction and did not in-
tend to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, a fairness argu-
ment can be made that she should not be punished. The addition of
an objective component to the test, as the Wood Court recognized,
was necessary to prevent officials from deliberately remaining igno-
rant of the law in order to avoid liability.11 4 But those broader societal
concerns have nothing to do with fairness to the official.
The Court itself discussed the distinction between a substantive li-
ability defense and an immunity from pretrial litigation in Anderson v.
Creighton."5 In Anderson, a family filed a Bivens action against an FBI
agent, claiming deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights in re-
lation to a warrantless search of their home."6 The agent had been
pursuing a bank robbery suspect whom he believed was in the plain-
tiffs' home.17 The agent claimed not only that he had probable
cause, but also that exigent circumstances excused the presumptive
warrant requirement.1 8 Anderson adhered to Harlow's objective rea-
sonableness standard and held that law enforcement officers are enti-
tled to immunity when they reasonably could have believed their
conduct to be lawful."19
Justice Stevens dissented, obserying that the varying interests pro-
tected by the qualified immunity doctrine could not be equally ful-
114. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22.
115. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
116. See id. at 637.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 638.
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filled in all types of cases.' The immunity doctrine's procedural
structure for early termination of constitutional tort cases, he argued,
was designed to prevent two social harms-the burdens and distrac-
tions of civil rights litigation on busy public officials, and the unfair-
ness of holding those officials liable for actions in which no clear
constitutional principle is violated. 2' Harlow immunity may protect
both of these interests by freeing defendants from the burdens of
pretrial litigation, but only in cases when the qualified immunity de-
fense is used to attack the plaintiffs legal claim or theory in the ab-
stract.' 2 In other cases, however, the defendant's immunity claim
may be focused not on the abstract nature of the plaintiffs legal
claim, but on the character of the defendant's conduct.123
In the latter category of cases, Justice Stevens concluded, public of-
ficials might not be able to avoid the burdens of pretrial litigation
because "[t]he strength of the reasonable good-faith defense in any
specific case would, of course, vary with the trial evidence about the
facts upon which the officer had relied when he made the challenged
search or arrest.', 24 In these types of cases, Justice Stevens observed,
public officials still could argue that they should be excused from li-
ability based on the reasonableness of their conduct but could not
expect to benefit from a Harlow immunity from the pretrial litigation
process.'25 Fairness concerns could therefore be vindicated even if
the case went to trial, assuming appropriate room for mistaken
judgments could be taken into account by the fact finder.
The Anderson majority, however, responded that requiring officials
even to litigate the case presented problems. 26 In a candid acknowl-
edgment of Harlow's transformation of the law, the Court observed
that Justice Stevens's identification of a good faith immunity to be
litigated at trial "would totally abandon the concern-which was the
driving force behind Harlow's substantial reformulation of qualified-
120. See id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition to his criticism of the procedural
aspects of immunity, Justice Stevens also dissented on several substantive issues. He argued, for
instance, that applying qualified immunity in this context gave law enforcement officers addi-
tional, but unnecessary, protection from liability. See id. at 659-65. Justice Stevens also agreed
with the plaintiffs that the Fourth Amendment's substantive reasonableness standard ade-
quately protected officials for their reasonable mistakes. See id. at 663-64.
121. See id. at 649. Implicit in his discussion is that the "burdens and distractions" include
both the overdeterrence and social cost rationales discussed above.
122. See id. at 650-51.
123. See iL
124. Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
125. See id. at 652-53. Justice Stevens pointed out that such a defense, which would allow
the official to offer evidence about the reasonableness of her conduct at trial, was recognized
by the court of appeals on remand in Bivens itself. See id.
126. See id. at 638-39.
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immunity principles-that 'insubstantial claims' against government
officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if
possible."127 The majority also speculated that clever plaintiffs would
always be able to identify an "abstract clearly established right," which
would necessitate the type of development of facts that would un-
dermine the immunity from the pretrial litigation process.2 2 The
majority's analysis further illustrates that social cost, rather than fair-
ness, is the principal concern when the Court creates mechanisms for
early termination of constitutional tort claims.
Indeed, other cases reinforce the notion that fairness considera-
tions arise from the Court's concerns about the imposition of finan-
cial liability, not from the burdens of litigation.'2 In Owen v. City of
Independence3  the Court rejected a municipality's claim that local
government entities should be entitied to qualified immunity for
their employees' reasonable actions.'-" The Court observed that "the
[fairness] consideration is simply not implicated when the damages
award comes not from the official's pocket, but from the public
treasury. ,132 Yet, in a municipal liability case, the individual officials
involved in the challenged conduct would be subject to the same, if
not identical, litigation burdens as if they were sued in their individ-
ual capacities. Their time and attention would still be taken away
from their primary public duties and directed toward responding to
the litigation. Thus, the Court does not appear to consider the bur-
dens associated with the litigation itself to implicate substantial fair-
ness concerns.
Only if one conceives of subjecting officials to the burdens of liti-
gation as a source of unfairness, independent of their liability, can
early termination of constitutional tort litigation be said to advance
fairness concerns. Surely, it is in some sense unfair to subject an offi-
cial to lengthy litigation even if the official is ultimately vindicated on
immunity grounds. Litigation, after all, is an additional burden on
that official's life. Moreover, if the official bears the cost of defense,
then extensive litigation of the claim could certainly be unfair.
Nonetheless, as Justice Stevens has observed, dealing with litigation is
127. Id. at 640 n.2 (citing Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982)).
128. See id.
129. To a significant extent, meaningful assessments of the relationship between exposure
to litigation burdens (as opposed to ultimate liability) and both fairness and overdeterrence
considerations must be empirically based. Thus, in making this argument, I am vulnerable to
the same criticisms I make later in this Article concerning the lack of empirical bases for for-
mulating qualified immunity doctrine. See infra notes 601-05 and accompanying text.
130. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
131. See id. at 653-54.
132. Id.
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part of the official responsibilities of many public officials. 33 Fur-
thermore, the unfairness associated with bearing the litigation ex-
penses is eliminated if, as in many cases, those costs are borne by the
government entity."
Finally, it is possible that the fairness consideration is advanced by
eliminating the risk of financial liability that comes with extensive liti-
gation. In other words, it could be that early termination of suits al-
leviates a psychological burden on officials that would otherwise exist
if they could present a substantive reasonableness defense only at
trial. Even that concern should be relatively less significant if, as Jus-
tice Stevens suggested in his dissent in Anderson, the court and the
jury can accommodate room for official error in their liability deter-
mination. 5 The availability of a substantive defense for reasonable
mistakes should relieve officials of at least some of the psychological
burdens associated with the risk of liability.
The Court's transformation of the immunity doctrine in Harlow
also signifies a departure from the overdeterrence rationale. Again,
the emphasis on resolving immunity at the earliest possible stage ap-
pears primarily to underscore a concern about the costs of pretrial
litigation. The importance of early termination of litigation in ad-
vancing the overdeterrence consideration depends in great measure
on the impact the anticipated burdens of litigation would have on an
official's conduct.
It seems less likely that an official would be deterred from acting
merely because of the possibility of litigation, than that her conduct
would be affected by the possibility of liability. While it is reasonable
to assume that most public officials would prefer not to be dragged
through court, it is the ultimate financial responsibility that would
seem to provide the greatest disincentive to act with candor and dis-
patch while performing one's official duties. An official may hesitate
in deciding a course of action if she is haunted by the potentially sig-
nificant financial costs, but is at least less likely to second guess her
conduct merely because she may be sued unsuccessfully.
The Court's reasoning in other immunity cases is consistent with
this analysis. In Owen, for example, the majority observed that fi-
133. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that participating in
litigation is part of a law enforcement officer's job and does not represent as significant a dis-
ruption in official duties as it would for a high level official).
134. See K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is increasingly
common for government entities to indemnify their employees for damages and other ex-
penses incurred in defending constitutional tort actions).
135. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 659 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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nancial liability is the main source of the chilling effect on official
behavior.
At the heart of this [overdeterrence] justification for a qualified
immunity for the individual official is the concern that the threat of
personal monetary liability will introduce an unwarranted and un-
conscionable consideration into the decisionmaking process, thus
paralyzing the governing official's decisiveness and distorting his
judgment on matters of public policy. The inhibiting effect is sig-
nificantly reduced, if not eliminated, however, when the threat of
personal liability is removed.,
Similarly, in Pulliam v. Allen,3 7 where the Court considered the
scope of judicial immunity from claims for injunctive relief and at-
torneys' fees, the majority argued that judges would not be overde-
terred simply by the possibility of having to answer and defend in-
junctive claims."" The Court again contended that the threat of
overdeterrence comes most sharply from the threat of personal fi-
nancial liability. 9
Justice Powell, who dissented in both Owen and Pulliam, argued
that litigation, rather than liability, was a source of overdeterrence.
In Owen, he maintained that officials were as likely to be chilled by
potential judgments against the municipality as they would by fear of
personal financial loss. 40 The majority dismissed his concerns, first
noting that officials routinely make decisions that may cost their gov-
ernment employer substantial amounts of money.14 ' Moreover, the
majority argued that as a normative matter, considerations about
municipal liability should constrain public officials' decisions but were
less likely to do so than the threat of personal liability.
4 2
136. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655-56 (footnote omitted); see also Morgan, 914 F.2d at 850 (stating
that overdeterrence justification becomes "strained" when governmental entities indemnify
their employees for damages and other expenses incurred in defending constitutional tort ac-
tions).
137. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
138. See id. at 536 ("We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospec-
tive relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling effect
on judicial independence."). In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1996, in which it overruled Pulliam. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-317, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 3847 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1988).
139. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537 ("For the most part, injunctive relief against a judge raises
concerns different from those addressed by the protection of judges from damages awards.").
The Court recognized that judicial exposure to attorneys' fees awards raised more logical con-
cerns about the chilling effect, but concluded that Congress's intent to impose fee liability on
judges overrode that concern. See id. at 543. Congress has since changed its judgment on the
matter. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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In Pulliam, Justice Powell contended that the actual burden of liti-
gation, rather than the possibility of pecuniary loss, threatens judicial
independence and decisionmaking."13  The majority in Pulliam, in
contrast, maintained that there was no evidence that injunctive suits
againstjudges, which were available under common law, had affected
judicial independence in any way. 44 Moreover, it is noteworthy that
common procedures such as appeals and stays are often the func-
tional equivalent of injunctive actions against judges, yet there ap-
pears to be little concern about overdeterrence in those contexts.
Thus, the Court's focus on fairness and overdeterrence justifica-
tions seems to have diminished since its decision in Harlow. Moreo-
ver, the Court's post-Harlow immunity decisions have continued to
emphasize the early and prompt determination of immunity ques-
tions to minimize social costs. In Mitchell v. Forsyth,'5 for example,
the Court held that where a lower court denied a public official's
qualified immunity claim, the official was entitled to an interlocutory
appeal prior to the onset of potentially burdensome discovery or
trial.4 6 The Mitchell Court reasoned that much of the value of immu-
nity would be lost if an immunity claim were wrongly denied, thus
forcing the defendant to litigate the claim through discovery and trial
before vindicating her immunity argument.147 The Court emphasized
that qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability."'" In this respect, then, qualified immunity
shares an "essential attribute of absolute immunity-.., an entitle-
ment not to stand trial under certain circumstances.'
The Supreme Court's express and primary goal of early termina-
tion of civil rights claims relies on two principal premises. The first
premise is that qualified immunity is a question of law. The second
premise is that summary judgment is an appropriate and effective
procedural vehicle for resolving qualified immunity claims. In the
following sections, this Article explores and critiques each of these
premises.
143. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 554 (Powell,J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 536. It should be acknowledged that the Court's analysis in Owen and Pulliam
is not entirely analogous to circumstances where officials could advance a substantive defense
to liability without the benefit of early termination, as discussed in Justice Stevens's Anderson
dissent. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 652-53 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
Owen and Pulliam, the officials had no risk of financial liability, whereas some risk still exists
when an official can assert a substantive defense to liability, but has no protection from pretrial
litigation burdens.
145. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
146. See id. at 525-27.
147. See id. at 526.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 525.
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II. THE ROLE OF FACTS IN QUALIFIED IMMUNrIyANALYSIS
In order for qualified immunity to achieve its primary goal of limit-
ing social costs, it must be structured in a manner that will facilitate
early termination of constitutional tort claims when the defendant
has not violated a "clearly established" constitutional right. Consis-
tent with this objective, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that
qualified immunity is a question of law.5 This Part explores why, de-
spite the Court's stated objectives, the promise of early resolution of
qualified immunity claims has become illusory. Under current doc-
trine, it should be virtually impossible to adjudicate qualified immu-
nity claims before resolution of important facts by the fact finder.'5'
A. The Basic Factual Dispute
One scenario in which the courts have agreed that qualified im-
munity cannot be satisfactorily resolved in a pretrial setting is when
there exists a genuine factual dispute concerning a foundational
element of a plaintiffs claim. This is sometimes labeled the "I didn't
do it" defense. 52
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff files a § 1983 claim alleging
that a law enforcement officer conducted a warrantless search of her
home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendant files a
summary judgment motion, supporting it with an affidavit denying
that she ever entered the plaintiffs home, much less in an unreason-
able manner. The defendant officer also argues that nothing in the
record establishes her presence at the scene of the alleged violation.
With her categorical denial, the officer has fulfilled her initial sum-
mary judgment burden both by producing evidence that negates the
plaintiffs claim and by highlighting the absence of evidence to sup-
port an essential element of the plaintiffs case, thus shifting the bur-
den of production to the plaintiff'53
150. See, e.g., Elderv. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994); Mitchel4 472 U.S. at 526; Harlowv.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982).
151. This is not to say that substantial numbers of constitutional tort claims are not being
thrown out of court on qualified immunity grounds. But if that is true, the courts may not nec-
essarily be applying the doctrine correctly. It may be that, given the doctrinal difficulties de-
scribed in this Article, the courts have found other ways to dispose of constitutional tort claims
that have converted qualified immunity into more of a pleading rule. Alternatively, the doc-
trinal complexities may be confusing the courts, which may be disposing of these cases under
circumstances in which the qualified immunity defense should be rejected, at least at the pre-
trial stage. Only empirical research will help answer these questions. See infra Part V.
152. See, e.g., Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 1991).
153. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 325 (1986) (holding that initial burden on
moving party is "discharged when party shows a lack of evidence in favor of nonmoving party's
claim); see also infra notes 378-86 and accompanying text (discussing the "highlighting" burden
on the moving party as established in Celotex).
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Plaintiff then files her response, which includes: (1) an affidavit
swearing that she saw the officer enter her home and go through her
personal belongings; and (2) a photograph of an unidentified police
officer leaving her ransacked home. The plaintiff has now met her
summary judgment production burden by presenting evidence that,
taken in the light most favorable to her, could convince a reasonable
jury that she should prevail by a preponderance of the evidence'5
Even under the heightened summary judgment standards recently
imposed by the Court,'55 the plaintiff can meet her summary judg-
ment burden because she has more than a "scintilla of evidence" to
support her claim.'6 Under existing law, it generally would be
agreed that the claim must go to trial.
The same outcome must occur in a myriad of constitutional tort
claims where the defendant denies some essential element of the
plaintiff's claim. 7 Sometimes the disputed historical event will be a
specific act, such as a physical blow,5 8 the entry into a dwelling,'59 the
deprivation of or damage to property,'o or the extent of procedures
provided to a public employee before job termination. 6' Disputes
may also arise regarding whether the plaintiff has even identified and
sued the correct defendants, those responsible for the unconstitu-
tional conduct that resulted in harm.62
In other contexts, the dispute might center on the defendant's
knowledge or awareness of a specific fact. For example, in an Eighth
Amendment case involving a prisoner's claim that officials failed to
provide adequate security, a factual issue concerning whether the of-
154. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that judge must
ascertain whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence
presented); see also infra notes 391-408 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part III.
156. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
157. One other commentator has noted the substantial number of cases in which qualified
immunity claims are denied based on a disputed material fact. See Kinports, Unanswered Ques-
tions, supra note 28, at 647 n.203.
158. See, e.g., Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 343 (7th Ci'. 1991) (holding that police offi-
cers were not entitled to dismissal of excessive force claim on qualified immunity grounds be-
cause of factual dispute).
159. See, e.g., Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting qualified im-
munity where genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether defendants forcibly entered resi-
dence to conduct search), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264 (1997).
160. See, e.g., Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting genu-
ine issue of fact regarding when property damage occurred).
161. See, e.g., Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding
district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant when issues of material fact exist re-
garding whether plaintiff received due process).
162. See, e.g., Bums v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1018 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting
qualified immunity claim based on defendants' contention that they were not responsible for
firing plaintiffs, rather than on claim that if they did fire the plaintiffs it was not in violation of
clearly established rights).
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ficials knew of the substantial risk to the inmate might be present.'6
Similarly, in an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison officials'
provision of inadequate medical care, there may exist an issue con-
cerning whether a particular official knew about the plaintiff's condi-
tion or medical needs. 6' In Fourth Amendment cases, there may be
substantial factual disputes concerning what facts an official knew at
the time she decided to seize or search a plaintiff,'6 or the amount of
force used.'6 Likewise, in a case involving First Amendment em-
ployee speech, a factual issue may arise concerning whether a public
employer had knowledge of a plaintiffs statements and considered
them in taking some detrimental employment action against the
plaintiff. 67 Similarly, the employer's motive for taking action against
the employee may be in dispute.'68 In a range of other types of con-
stitutional tort cases, discussed below, the factual dispute also may
center on the defendant's state of mind. 69
Sometimes the factual dispute will focus on whether something has
occurred that would constitute an excuse for, or exception to, the
relevant constitutional rule. For example, in a Fourth Amendment
illegal search context, the defendant could claim that facts existed
that constituted "exigent circumstances" under the law.'70 In claims
that police interrogation tactics have violated the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses or the right to counsel derived
from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the defendant may dispute
163. SeeFarmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that prison official may not
be liable under Eighth Amendment unless official has knowledge of risk to inmate's safety and
disregards such risk).
164. See Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing factual dis-
pute concerning defendants' knowledge of plaintiffs medical condition).
165. See, e.g., Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding is-
sue of qualified immunity for a determination of whether material facts were in dispute).
166. Rainey v. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting qualified immunity
claim in excessive force case because of factual disputes).
167. See, e.g., Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1128-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that em-
ployer should have known speech was protected by First Amendment, and rejecting qualified
immunity claim because of material fact issues regarding content of plaintiffs speech), vacated,
511 U.S. 661 (1994).
168. See, e.g., Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding mate-
rial fact concerning defendant's reason for discharge to be in dispute where defendant claims
plaintiff was discharged for "insubordination" and plaintiff questions defendant's motive);
Gorman v. Robinson, 977 F.2d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting genuine fact issue regarding
employer's motive for firing employee).
169. See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (noting
that unreasonable search or seizure claims "will often turn on whether the defendant was in
possession of facts that would have led a reasonable officer to suppose he had probable cause
or exigent circumstances"), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997); see also Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (noting that qualified immunity claim regarding exigent circum-
stances is "fact-specific" and may involve issue of officer's knowledge of specific information).
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the factual circumstances of the questioning or assert facts that sug-
gest that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by official questioning out-
side the presence of counsel.'7
The factual denial defense carries with it not only the practical
problem that pretrial termination is unlikely, if not impossible, but
also the more fundamental conceptual problem of categorizing this
type of defense. For in the cases described, courts should recognize
that the qualified immunity defense really has no meaning. When-
ever the defense is predicated on the denial of some crucial element
of the plaintiff's case, the issue may better be framed as a defense on
the merits.73
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged this point in Elliott v. Thomas. 74
In Elliott, the plaintiff alleged that defendants used excessive force
during an arrest, puncturing plaintiff's eardrum in the process.'75
The officers denied that they had caused any physical injury to the
plaintiff.'76 As Judge Easterbrook correctly observed,
[t]his legal debate [over the clarity of the constitutional right at
stake] has nothing to do with their defense-that they did not in-
jure Elliott at all. If they punctured Elliott's eardrum without
provocation, as Elliott contends, then Elliott recovers under any
standard; if the defendants did nothing, as they say, then they pre-
vail under any standard.
7 7
171. See, e.g., Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1258 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting qualified immu-
nity defense to substantive due process claim based on factual dispute about intimidation dur-
ing interrogation).
172. See Cinelli v. City of Revere, 820 F.2d 474, 477 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that quali-
fied immunity defense must be rejected on Sixth Amendment claim when genuine fact issue
exists regarding whether plaintiff suffered prejudice). There is substantial controversy over
whether constitutional tort actions for such claims are cognizable when they are based on the
Fifth Amendment. Compare Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(recognizing plaintiff's § 1983 action for violation of Fifth Amendment counsel rights during
custodial interrogation for failure to provide Miranda warnings), with Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1246
(characterizing dissentingjudges' position in Cooper that Fifth Amendment right is not violated
until evidence is admitted to be "persuasive"). For a broad discussion of this issue, see Martin
R. Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interrogation,
30 AM. CuM. L. REv. 1277 (1993) (arguing that no § 1983 action ought to be available to en-
force Miranda rights, but that such rights should be enforced through the exclusionary rule);
Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights
Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 434-48 (1994) (describing how the courts' narrow interpreta-
tions of Miranda, coupled with doctrinal developments under § 1983, have severely limited the
enforcement of Miranda rights).
173. SeeBlum, User's Manual, supra note 14, at 214 (noting that the "I didn't do it" defense
clearly goes to the merits of the case).
174. 937 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 1991).
175. See id. at 340.
176. See id. at 343.
177. Id.; cf.Johnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1995) (rejecting interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction on qualified immunity claim when central dispute was factual issue of whether de-
fendants even touched plaintiff). Of course, an official could plead alternative defenses, claim-
ing that she didn't do anything, but that even assuming she did, she is immune.
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In Burns v. County of Cambria,178 the Third Circuit addressed a com-
parable argument. The plaintiffs in Burns were deputy sheriffs and
other officials who claimed they had been fired for failing to support
the sheriff in an election, or because they had supported his oppo-
nent, or for both reasons.'79 One group of defendants asserted quali-
fied immunity, denying that they were responsible for firing the
plaintiffs. I0 The ,court rejected their defense and observed that their
claims
were that they were not responsible for firing the plaintiffs. They
did not claim that even if they had fired the plaintiffs, that action
would not have violated the plaintiffs' clearly established constitu-
tional rights. Only the latter contention would have invoked the
qualified immunity defense. The former statement is simply the "I
didn't do it" defense and therefore not cognizable as an assertion of
qualified immunity."1
It was the complications associated with evaluating factual ques-
tions in these types of cases that led the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Jones to narrow the scope of interlocutory appeals from the denial of
qualified immunity. 2 In Johnson, the Court concluded that if the
trial court bases its rejection of a qualified immunity claim on the
presence of genuine issues of fact concerning a principal element of
the plaintiffs case, the defendant may not pursue an interlocutory
appeal on immunity.'8 3 Such appeals are ordinarily permissible un-
der the Court's holding in Mitchell v. Forsyth.84 The Johnson Court
held, however, that in the context of the "I didn't do it" defense, the
claims do not fit within the exceptions to the final order rule because
they do not resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action.' 85 In such cases, the Court concluded, no sepa-
rate question exists that is "significantly different from the fact-
related legal issues that likely underlie the plaintiffs claim on the
merits., 18 6 Thus, claims that involve central factual disputes are in-
178. 971 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1992).
179. See id. at 1017-18.
180. See id. at 1019.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.
183. See id.
184. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding that district court's order denying public official's mo-
tion for summaryjudgment is immediately appealable if issue is a matter of law).
185. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316-17.
186. See id at 314. Prior to Johnson, many federal appellate courts had made it clear that
summary judgment would be an inappropriate mechanism to resolve such disputes, and simi-
larly denied interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to officials whose qualified immunity claims
were denied by the trial court on summaryjudgment. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 340-
41 (7th Cir. 1991); Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1991); Boulos v. Wilson,
834 F.2d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 1987).
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separable from claims on the merits, and pretrial adjudication of
such disputes must follow the course of ordinary summary judgment
motions.
B. The Inherently Fact-Based Nature of the Qualified Immunity
"Reasonableness" Standard
Summary judgment might still be an effective device for screening
out weaker cases and facilitating the goal of minimizing the social
costs of civil rights litigation if the legal doctrine were structured to
limit irresolvable qualified immunity claims to those with factual dis-
putes concerning the basic elements of the plaintiff's case. A more
general argument about the factual nature of qualified immunity
may be derived, however, from the Court's articulation of the quali-
fied immunity standard itself.
In cases prior to its recent fixation on the early termination of con-
stitutional tort claims, the Court recognized that factual inquiry
would be an important aspect of qualified immunity. Tracing the de-
velopment of the qualified immunity standard reveals the inherently
factual nature of the "clearly established rights" or "reasonableness"
inquiry.
As described above, the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald 8 7 transformed
the qualified immunity doctrine in two important ways in order to fa-
cilitate prompt pretrial adjudication. First, the Court eliminated the
subjective prong of the immunity analysis in order to inhibit plaintiffs
from conducting extensive discovery that would interfere with the ef-
fective administration of government.'8' Second, the Court proposed
summary resolution under Rule 56, stating that entitlement to quali-
fied immunity is a question of law.' 89 In decisions since Harlow, while
the Court has hedged on its formal adherence to these doctrinal
principles, it has not specifically recanted them either. This uncer-
tainty has led to a great deal of confusion among lower courts and
academic commentators.
The central difficulty with Harlow's approach is that it obscures the
inherent role that facts play in all qualified immunity claims, not
simply those involving an inquiry into subjective good faith. Long
before Harlow, the Court recognized that development of facts would
often be necessary in order to evaluate the defendant's assertion of
qualified immunity. These decisions reflected the Court's under-
standing that the immunity inquiry must be related not only to the
187. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
188. See id. at 815-17.
189. See id. at 818.
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official's objective reasonableness, but also to the assessment of that
belief in relation to the particular facts before her. In Scheuer v. Rho-
des, for example, the Court noted that "[i] f the immunity is qualified,
not absolute, the scope of that immunity will necessarily be related to
facts as yet not established either by affidavits, admissions, or a trial
record."190
Similarly, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,9 the Court examined a quali-
fied immunity claim asserted by a state mental hospital administrator
who was sued for unconstitutionally depriving the plaintiff of his
physical liberty when he authorized the plaintiff's civil commitment
and continued institutionalization for fifteen years. 92 Although the
trial court had instructed the jury that the defendant could not be
held liable if he had a reasonable and good faith belief that his ac-
tions were proper, the Court remanded the case for consideration in
light of Wood, which had not yet been decided at the time of the
trial.'9 In doing so, the Court unequivocally stated that the question
the jury must answer is whether the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that his actions violated the plaintiffs constitu-
tional rights.'94 At least one contemporary pre-Harlow commentator
understood qualified immunity to have a necessary factual compo-
nent as well.' 95
These early references to factual issues could be attributed, in part,
to the necessity of examining the officials' intentions under the sub-
jective prong of the Wood test. Indeed, it was this precise concern
that led the Harlow Court to abandon the subjective component of
the analysis, arguing that "substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials."'96
190. Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1974) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court
remanded the cases after concluding that "in their present posture, [these cases] present no
occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive offi-
cials nor, because of the absence of a factual record, do they permit a determination as to the
applicability of the foregoing principles to the respondents here." Id. at 249.
191. 422 U.S. 563 (1974).
192. See id. at 564-65.
193. See id. at 576-77. The Court also remanded because the trial court had refused the de-
fendant's proposed jury instruction stating that he could be excused if he acted in reliance on
existing state law, and it directed the lower court to consider whether that omission rendered
the otherjury instructions invalid. See id.
194. See id. at 577 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1995)).
195. See Kathryn Dix Sowle, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of
the Conditions For Its Use and the Burden of Persuasion, 55 TUL. L. R-v. 326, 340 (1981) (arguing
that the Court erred in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), by applying qualified im-
munity to the defendants "despite the absence in the record of the factual predicate for its use
required by previous immunity decisions") (footnote omitted).
196. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). The Court argued that the experience
of the lower courts applying the Wood test supported this concern. It noted that "an official's
subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have re-
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But eradication of the subjective good faith component of the
qualified immunity analysis should not have changed the Court's
view of the need for factual records. In Scheuer, the Court explicitly
acknowledged the need for factual development to resolve the objec-
tive component of the claim as well. 97 The Court made clear that
in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers .... 198
The reference to "reasonable grounds" formed "in light of all the cir-
cumstances" unequivocally recognizes the need for development of a
record to evaluate the objective component of the qualified immu-
nity test.'" Indeed, after holding that state executive officials are en-
tiled to qualified immunity, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings, "either by way of summaryjudgment or by trial on the
m erits.
,, 200
Justice Stevens has, on several occasions, pointed out the need for
factual development of qualified immunity issues. In Procunier v.
Navarette,0' for example, the plaintiff claimed that prison officials had
violated his First Amendment and due process rights by intentionally
or negligently interfering with his ability to send mail to legal assis-
tance groups, law students, news media, inmates in other prisons, and
friends.20 The Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendants based on qualified immu-
nity.20 3 In his dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the majority's de-
cision overlooked the critical importance of the factual basis for the
garded as inherently requiring resolution by ajury." Id. (footnote omitted).
197. SeeScheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1974).
198. Id. at 247-48 (emphasis added). The contrast was acknowledged by the Court in one
of its absolute immunity opinions as well. In Imblerv. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Court
observed that
[t] he procedural difference between the absolute and the qualified immunities is im-
portant. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's ac-
tions were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified
immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as estab-
lished by the evidence at trial.
Id. at 419 n.13 (citations omitted).
199. See Imber, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13.
200. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 250.
201. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
202. See id. at 557.
203. See id. at 566.
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immunity defense." 4 He pointed out that contradictory affidavits
supported both the plaintiffs and defendants' versions of the facts,
and that as the nonmoving party, the plaintiff was entitled to have the
courts accept his version of the facts on summary judgment."5 The
majority, he argued, should not have resolved the immunity claim as
a matter of law when the plaintiff had never had an opportunity to
develop a factual record, since these questions "could be better an-
swered after, rather than before, trial. 206
While the Court has continued to declare that qualified immunity
is a question of law, language from its post-Harlow decisions betrays
its ambivalence about this proposition. In Mitchell v. Forsyth,2°7 for ex-
ample, the Court described qualified immunity as an "essentially le-
gal question" in defining the scope of permissible interlocutory ap-
peals.2 8 Likewise, in Hunter v. Bryant,209 the Court criticized a lower
federal court for reserving resolution of the basis of defendants'
qualified immunity claims for a jury.1 In so doing, the Court firmly
asserted that qualified immunity should ordinarily be decided by a
court and should not routinely be placed in a jury's hands.21 ' Even
more recently, in Behrens v. Pelletier" the Court reasoned that more
than one pretrial appeal may be necessary because the legally rele-
vant factors bearing on the immunity issue may change throughout
the pretrial proceedings as the factual record is developed further.21 3
These equivocal characterizations of the immunity issue reflect at
least some recognition that a factual component is necessary when
evaluating an immunity claim.
The Court's approach to the scope of available discovery on im-
munity claims provides further evidence of its reluctant acceptance
that facts play an important role in qualified immunity analysis. In
Harlow, the Court admonished lower courts to examine at the sum-
mary judgment stage the question of whether the relevant federal law
204. See id. at 569 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 574.
207. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
208. See id. at 526. Nonetheless, the Court later had to acknowledge that at least some im-
munity inquiries are factually oriented. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1995)
(holding that defendants may not file interlocutory appeals when trial court's sole basis for de-
nying their immunity claim is existence of a disputed issue of material fact).
209. 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
210. See id. at 228.
211. See id. For an insightful examination of the necessity for factual inquiries under quali-
fied immunity even after Hunter, see Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 874-83 (9th Cir.
1993) (Norris,J, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
212. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
213. See id. at 309.
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was clearly established. 4  It emphatically stated that "[u]ntil this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be al-
lowed. ' 5 Later, in Anderson v. Creighton,16 the Court was compelled
to acknowledge that such limitations on discovery could not always
be imposed, even under the objective Harlow standard.2 7 In Ander-
son, the plaintiffs alleged that law enforcement agents violated their
Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home without a warrant
or other sufficient legal justification.2 8 Although the parties offered
substantially differing accounts both of what happened during the
search and of the information on which the agents based their deci-
sion to perform the search, the Court extended qualified immunity
to the agents. 2 9 In articulating the relevant legal standard, the Ander-
son Court stated that qualified immunity requires an inquiry into the
"objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer
could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in
light of clearly established law and the information the searching of-
ficers possessed."0 Although this would not entail an inquiry into
the official's subjective motivation, it might necessarily require a
court to examine the relevant information possessed by the searching
officials.2'
While recognizing the defendants' potential entitlement to quali-
fied immunity, the Court remanded the case for proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion.2 In a footnote, the Court provided some guid-
ance to the lower courts in parsing out the factual component of
qualified immunity. m The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to
discovery before a proper examination of the immunity question
could be conducted. The Court noted, however, that such a rule
would undermine the policies driving Harlow's reformulation of im-
munity law. 4 Accordingly, the Court offered the following solution:
[O]n remand, it should first be determined whether the actions
the Creightons allege Anderson to have taken are actions that a rea-
sonable officer could have believed lawful. If they are, then Ander-
son is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. If they are not, and if
214. SeeHarlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
215. Id.
216. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
217. See id. at 635-36.
218. Seeid. at637.
219. See id. at 640, 646.
220. Id. at 641.
221. See id.
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the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the
Creightons allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could
have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Ander-
son's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds can be resolved. Of course, any such discovery should be
tailored specifically to the question of Anderson's qualified immu-
nity.'
Thus, the Court acknowledged that a factual analysis might preclude
early termination, or at least pre-discovery termination, of constitu-
tional tort claims.
More than ten years have passed since Anderson. While courts22
6
and observers27 alike have acknowledged that facts may on occasion
play a role in qualified immunity decisions, they have not compre-
hended the breadth of this problem, largely limiting their discussions
to the "I didn't do it" situation described above. 8 Their analysis is
dependent upon characterizing qualified immunity as a two-part in-
quiry.2m First, the qualified immunity test is said to inquire whether
the law concerning the alleged violation was "clearly established" at
225. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
226. See supra notes 152-86 and accompanying text (outlining the degree to which factual
inquiries affect decisions concerning qualified immunity and summaryjudgment proceedings).
227. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 9.25, at 569 (2d ed. 1991) (describing factual component of qualified
immunity analysis); HenkJ. Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1051-56 (1990) (noting procedural
problems that arise when qualified immunity determination is partially fact-based); Cristine
Kuhn, Note, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Can The Supreme Court Rescue the Inimical Qualified Im-
munity Doctrine?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 681, 687 (1995) (recognizing that Anderson made the quali-
fied immunity more factually oriented).
228. See generally SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 227, § 9.25 (focusing on factual conflicts
associated with officials' denial that they engaged in conduct underlying plaintiffs suit).
229. It could be argued that the Court's decision in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991),
establishes an even earlier analytical step that requires inquiry into whether the plaintiff has
asserted the violation of an existing constitutional right. Siegert was originally before the Court
to review the propriety of a heightened pleading standard in cases asserting intent-based consti-
tutional torts. See infra notes 494-512 and accompanying text (noting lower court treatment of
heightened pleading standards). Rather than resolving that issue, however, the Court held that
the plaintiff's claim failed "at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry into qualified immu-
nity" because he failed to allege the violation of any constitutional right, much less a clearly es-
tablished one. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233. Applying its holding in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), the Court concluded that because Siegert had alleged nothing more than a reputa-
tional injury, there was no constitutionally protected liberty interest at stake. See Siegert, 500
U.S. at 233-34. Scholarly commentary seems to agree that Siegert altered the order in which
immunity analysis is to be conducted. See Blum, User's Manua supra note 14, at 190 (stating
that Siegert created "a new structure of analysis" for qualified immunity questions); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433, 2448 (1993) (citingSiegert to illustrate
that no advisory opinion problems exist that would prevent courts from addressing the merits
of a constitutional claim in a case in which immunity precludes a remedy). This author has
argued that this view of Siegert is not conceptually sound. See Chen, supra note 14, at 279 &
n.107.
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the time of the defendant's conduct.20 Conventional wisdom sug-
gests that the first part of the qualified immunity inquiry is a pure le-
gal question, suitable for resolution by the courts.2' The second part
of the inquiry is characterized as whether a reasonable official could
have believed that her particular actions violated a clearly established
right.22 Although some dispute exists, many courts and commenta-
tors have viewed this last issue as at least embodying some factual
component.2s3 It is only under this last question that the problems
arising from the "I didn't do it" defense occur2" The courts appear
to have dissected the immunity inquiry into these two distinct issues
in order to accommodate the Supreme Court's continuing insistence
that qualified immunity is a purely legal question.2" This formalistic
dichotomy permits courts to argue that the dilemma that arises from
factual disputes is an uncommon one.
But this cannot be the case. The nature of the first inquiry-
whether a constitutional right is "clearly established" at any given
point-cannot be understood to be a purely legal question, at least
not in most cases. In actuality, the concept of a clearly established
right cannot be sufficiently distinguished from the question of
whether a reasonable official would have known that a particular act
violated that right.23 These parts of the qualified immunity inquiry
cannot be separated because, whether articulated broadly or nar-
rowly, rights may be understood only in context.2
7
230. See, e.g., Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Alexander v.
County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315,1319 (9th Cir. 1995)).
231. See, e.g., Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.
1995) (citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993)).
232. See, e.g., Carlo, 105 F.3d at 493 (citing Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1994)); Sinaloa, 70 F.3d at 1099 (citing Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 871).
233. See Sinaloa, 70 F.3d at 1099 (noting that second prong of test is mixed question of law
and fact).
234. Se SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 227, § 9.25, at 518-19 (noting that factual disputes
may arise in cases where defendant denies participation in any wrongful act).
235. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1991) (emphasizing that questions of
immunity should be in the hand of ajudge); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-29 (1985)
(emphasizing that court should decide immunity questions long before trial). In the early
stages of the qualified immunity doctrine's development, even the issue of whether the law was
clearly established was treated as a factual, or quasi-factual issue. As one commentator points
out, at least one court's assessment of the clearly established rights standard in that period was
guided by the expert testimony of a law professor concerning the question of what the law was
at the time of the defendant's conduct. SeeJoseph Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on
the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damages Actions, 30 VAND. L. REv. 941, 986 (1977)
(citing Laverne v. Coming, 376 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.
1975)). The Laverne court then submitted the issues concerning the objective prong of the
immunity test to thejury. See Laverne, 376 F. Supp. at 836.
236. See Sinaloa, 70 F.3d at 1099 (emphasizing that jury should decide issues of reasonable-
ness of clearly established right).
237. See id. (noting that issues cannot be separated because historical facts relating to offi-
cial's conduct can only be understood in their specific context rather than abstractly).
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Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Anderson explicitly recog-
nized the intertwined nature of these two inquiries. In defining what
constitutes a clearly established right, Justice Scalia observed that the
qualified immunity standard "depends substantially upon the level of
generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified." If
the appropriate constitutional provision is stated at a broad level of
abstraction, such as the right to due process or to free speech, then
the rule must always be understood to be clearly established.29 If that
were the case, however, qualified immunity would never be justified
because all public officials can reasonably be expected to know the
law at this broad level of generality.2 40 Thus, Justice Scalia argued,
something more must be necessary. The legal right "must have been
'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more rele-
vant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right."241 In order for a court to assess whether a right is clearly
established, then, it must first understand what the official has done
and what she knew when she did it. Those factors, in turn, are issues
of historical fact.
In his dissent in Anderson, Justice Stevens underscored the impor-
tance of a factual inquiry. He noted that the Court did not "consider
the possibility that the 'objective reasonableness' of the officer's con-
duct may depend on the resolution of a factual dispute. 2 42 This was
particularly likely to occur in circumstances where the relevant con-
stitutional provision was stated at a high level of generality.243 He ob-
served that Harlow did not address the extent, if any, of immunity:
when the official concedes that the constitutional right he is charged
with violating was deeply etched in ourjurisprudence, but argues that
he reasonably believed that his particular actions comported with the
constitutional command.
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, Harlow immunity was not appli-
cable to such claims. 245 Although the capacity for factual conflicts in
such cases would preclude the possibility of early termination on
238. SeeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 640.
242. Id. at 655 rr.10 (StevensJ, dissenting).
243. See id. at 648.
244. Id. at 655. As argued below, because of the nature of modem constitutional doctrine,
this encompasses most cases. See infra Part II.C.I.
245. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 655 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
[Vol. 47:1
BURDENS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
summary judgment, he pointed out that officials could still pursue
immunity claims at trial if their conduct was objectively reasonable.246
Applying this reasoning to Anderson, then, required a proper un-
derstanding of the nature of the dispute. 47 Under the plaintiffs'
characterization, the agent conducted an unlawful, warrantless
search without probable cause and there was a clear rule of law pro-
hibiting warrantless searches of homes without probable cause.248 If
they were correct, and could establish the same at trial, it did not
matter whether there were exigent circumstances-the search would
still have been unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.249 The
agent, on the other hand, contended that not only was there prob-
able cause, but also there were exigent circumstances that excused
the warrant requirement, and that a reasonable officer might have
concluded that there was both probable cause and exigent circum-
stances.2" Justice Stevens observed that the factual predicate for that
argument was found in the agent's affidavits filed in support of his
summary judgment motion2'1 Accordingly, no resolution of the im-
munity claim could possibly occur until the plaintiffs had an oppor-
tunity to conduct discovery on these factual assertions. 2
Lower federal courts occasionally have recognized the necessity for
factual development, even in the post-Harlow world. The highly fact-
sensitive nature of the reasonableness inquiry has been a signal to
some courts that, in many circumstances, facts are critical to the im-
munity question. As the Seventh Circuit articulated in Elliott v. Tho-
mas, "[i]t is impossible to know which 'clearly established' rules of
law to consult unless you know what is going on. '' s Likewise, an ear-
lier district court decision observed that the Harlow standard works
"better in theory than in practice.., because it often will be impossi-
ble to assess the objective reasonableness of the defendant's conduct
without a resolution of the factual disputes surrounding the incident
from which the action arises. '' 5
246. See id. at 655 n.10.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 656.
249. See id. at 657.
250. See id. at 657-58.
251. See id. at 658.
252. See id.
253. Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted);see also Act
Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that determination of
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment requires factual inquiry).
254. McGaugheyv. City of Chicago, 664 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1987),vacated in part,
690 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The author was a law clerk to the judge who wrote the origi-
nal McGaughey opinion at the time it was decided. See ScHwARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 227,
§ 9.25 (citing McGaughey and concluding that "there are often sharp factual issues between the
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The only context in which the issue of the clearly established na-
ture of the legal rights at stake can be considered to be a pure ques-
tion of law is when the Court truly breaks new ground and develops,
in common-law fashion, an entirely new constitutional doctrine.
That is, the basic policies underlying qualified immunity surely can
be understood to support immunity when it is unclear that the law
governs an area of governmental action. In his dissent in Anderson,
Justice Stevens asserted that Harlow must necessarily be limited in
scope to precisely these situations, where immunity is warranted
"based on the tentativeness or nonexistence of the constitutional rule
allegedly violated by the officer.... ,"5 Thus, for example, were a
constitutional tort plaintiff to assert that a government official vio-
lated her constitutional right to "happiness," qualified immunity
would protect the official from liability. Moreover, because the new-
ness or originality of such a claim would appear on the face of the
complaint, the defendant would also be able to avoid the burdens of
litigation. In most cases, however, qualified immunity arises not be-
cause an entirely new area of law is emerging but because the conse-
quences of applying existing constitutional principles to a particular
set of facts are unclear.256
Perhaps concern about the burdens generated by the factual com-
ponent of qualified immunity has prompted the Supreme Court's re-
cent attention to the scope of interlocutory appeals of qualified im-
munity denials. In Johnson v. Jones, 7 the Court held that defendants
may not take interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immu-
nity claims if the trial court's sole reason for rejecting the claim is the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.258 In contrast, in Behrens
v. Pelletiers the Court held that in cases in which the qualified immu-
nity appeal is not based on a factual dispute, a defendant may assert
the defense in multiple interlocutory appeals,26 thus eradicating de-
parties, the resolution of which are necessary to determine whether the defendant official vio-
lated clearly established federal law").
255. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 659 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 535 n.12 (1985)).
256. Of course, the distinction between a purely new rule and the application of a clearly
established rule to different circumstances is itself a blurry one. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407, 412-13 (1990) (recognizing that in context of determining whether habeas corpus peti-
tioner has asserted a new rule for jurisdictional purposes, the federal courts' inquiries will be
more difficult in cases where the new legal rule has developed based on an extension of rea-
soning from earlier cases); id. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because constitutional inter-
pretation is an evolutionary process, the analytical distinction between legal rules 'prevailing' at
the time of conviction and 'new' legal rules is far from sharp.").
257. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
258. See id. at 317-20.
259. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
260. See id. at 313. The Behrens decision also resolved previously open issues regarding in-
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cisions, adopted by some federal circuits, that limited defendants to
one interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity claims.2 6' Finally, the
Court recently decided that federal law does not require state appel-
late courts to provide interlocutory appeals from the denial of quali-
fied immunity defenses.' 2 What is noteworthy about these decisions
is not their alteration of qualified immunity law, but their reflection
of the continuing burdens facing the federal court system in imple-
menting this fact-based doctrine.
C. The Confluence of the Qualified Immunity Standard with Substantive
Constitutional Law
In addition to the factual nature of the basic reasonableness in-
quiry imposed by the qualified immunity standard, another aspect of
the qualified immunity doctrine ensures that facts will play an impor-
tant role in the resolution of most immunity inquiries. Under the
Harlow standard, courts not only must evaluate the reasonableness of
the defendant official's conduct with reference to some set of facts,
but also must measure those facts against the substantive constitu-
tional law existing at the time of that conduct. Thus, even if there is
some agreement about what factual scenario existed at the time the
defendant acted, courts must assess whether a reasonable official
would have understood that conduct to be unconstitutional.
Some commentators have observed that qualified immunity claims
are more likely to generate factual disputes that cannot be resolved
on summary judgment in certain substantive areas of constitutional
law that are particularly susceptible to highly fact-specific inquiries.26'
terlocutory appeals of the denial of qualified immunity in cases in which the plaintiffs com-
plaint combines claims for equitable relief and damages and in cases in which the denial of
qualified immunity concerns only one of a set of multiple damage claims. See generallyJody
Beal, Qualified Immunity and the Right to Immediate Appeal, 63 UMKC L. REV. 229, 246-48 (1994)
(arguing pre-Behrens for expansion of interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials, even
in circumstances in which appealable and nonappealable issues are combined).
261. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that government official cannot pursue repeated interlocutory appeals on qualified
immunity claim), rev'd sub nom. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996); Abel v. Miller, 904
F.2d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1990) (limiting official defendants to one interlocutory appeal of deni-
als of qualified immunity); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 132 n.5 (1st Cir. 1988) (same).
262. SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 117S. Ct. 1800, 1802 (1997).
263. See David J. Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and Issues for
the Trier of Fact, 30 CAL. W. L. REv. 201, 202 (1994) (arguing that in claims against police offi-
cers under Fourth Amendment and against prison officials under Fourteenth Amendment,
"the standard for determining liability is vague enough that... [defendants] often are not able
to obtain a pretrial determination of their immunity"); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Stan-
dards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Exces-
sive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 96-114 (1989) (contending that qualified immunity standard
does not operate well in conjunction with claims of excessive force by law enforcement officers
because Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard duplicates qualified immunity reason-
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Other commentators,264 and many lower courts,26 have also found
special problems associated with factual disputes in cases in which the
plaintiff must prove as an element of the underlying constitutional
violation that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind. As
argued below, however, the factual nature of qualified immunity is
nearly universal because the modem Supreme Court increasingly has
chosen to articulate substantive constitutional law in the form of
open-ended standards or "balancing" tests. 2M In conjunction with the
qualified immunity reasonableness standard, constitutional balancing
tests heighten the opportunities for factual conflicts on immunity
claims.
1. Qualified immunity and constitutional standards
In the modem constitutional era, the Court defines the scope of
substantive constitutional law by articulating balancing tests-broad,
open-ended standards that define the scope of most individual con-
stitutional rights. 267 Rather than providing a set of bright-line rules
ableness standard).
264. See Karen M. Blum, Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U. L.
REV. 59, 60-61 (1994) [hereinafter Blum, Heightened Pleading] (detailing lower federal courts'
disparate treatment of special pleading requirements when state of mind is at issue); Stephanie
E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional
Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE LJ. 126, 127 (1985) (arguing that qualified immunity
standard must be restructured to separate legal question of official's immunity from state of
mind inquiry).
265. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring plaintiff to
meet heightened pleading standard in response to qualified immunity claim where proof of
constitutional violation depends on official's state of mind); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789,
793 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same), vacated on other grounds, 515 U.S. 321 (1995); Whitacre v. Davey,
890 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same).
266. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining expansion of balancing tests).
267. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(explaining that drug and alcohol testing should be judged using the Fourth Amendment spe-
cial needs test, which entails balancing individual privacy against government interest in test-
ing); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that procedural due process
analysis requires balancing of the private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest, and the government's interest). Commentators have observed the Court's shift
from categorical rules to standards incorporating balancing tests. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 951-52 (1987) (explaining Supreme
Court's shift toward balancing approach in mid-twentieth century); David L. Faigman, Madi-
sonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 642-43 (1994)
(explaining Supreme Court's increasing reliance on balancing methodology, but offering cri-
tique of its methodology). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-
Foreword: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 60, 69-70 (1992) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Foreword] (arguing that categorical approaches have not been completely replaced by
balancing tests, as evidenced by the rules/standards debates of the 1991 Supreme Court term,
and that the Court instead moves between categorical and balancing approaches depending
upon the individual Justices' jurisprudential philosophies); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal
Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 295 (1992)
(explaining that "categorical and balancing approaches oscillate"). Professor Sullivan does
concede, however, that balancing has "been in ascendancy." Id. at 296. There are counter-
examples of the balancing trend as well. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
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divining predetermined results for particular types of government
conduct or regulation, balancing tests identify general criteria for
constitutional decisionmaking, but leave great discretion to the deci-
sionmaker to apply these criteria to the individual circumstances of
each case.' When it creates balancing tests, the Court instructs
lower courts to explicitly "weigh" individual rights (e.g., privacy,
equality, speech) against governmental interests (e.g., public health,
social welfare, social order) .26 The balancing metaphor symbolizes
the evaluation of the relative substantive importance of these often
competing values. Balancing tests, like all legal standards, necessitate
individualized, context-specific determinations of constitutional
rights because the quantum of interests may vary substantially from
case to case, even under the same constitutional provision. In each
case, the decisionmaker determines the outcome by evaluating which
interest or value is "weightier.
2 7 1
As some have observed, balancing tests have become the predomi-
nant mode of articulating substantive constitutional doctrine in the
modern era.272 The Court has extended them to the broad range of
constitutional rights that can be raised in constitutional tort cases to• •. 1 • 273
which qualified immunity applies. Indeed, constitutional balancing
tests pervade the substantive constitutional landscape.
In many areas of Fourth Amendment law, the Court has estab-
lished various balancing tests that dictate the outcome of individual
cases.2  A prime example of balancing is the Court's definition of
the "reasonableness" of official conduct that may violate the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. In
particular, under the "special needs" doctrine, the Court has estab-
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (stating that balancing of interests not required under Takings Clause
when government regulation denies landowner all "economically beneficial or productive use
of land"); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990) (holding that balancing of
interests is not required when party seeks religious exemption from generally applicable crimi-
nal prohibition under First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause). Professor Aleinikoff's seminal
work in the area of constitutional balancing provides a more complete account of balancing as
a form of constitutional decisionmaking. See generally Aleinikoff, supra, at 943-1005.
268. See Sullivan, Foreword, supra note 267, at 58-59 (providing detailed account of constitu-
tional balancing process); see also Chen, supra note 14, at 298-302 (comparing constitutional
rules with balancing tests).
269. SeeAleinikoff, supra note 267, at 946-47 (explaining interest balancing); see also Chen,
supra note 14, at 302 (same).
270. See Chen, supra note 14, at 302 (explaining balancing in general)
271. See Aleinikoff, supra note 267, at 946 (discussing the scales metaphor).
272. See id. at 944 (noting rise and spread of balancing tests); Faigman, supra note 267, at
642 (noting Supreme Court's increased reliance on balancing).
273. SeeChen, supra note 14, at 317 (discussing balancing in constitutional tort cases).
274. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1178-84 (1988)
(discussing Court's adoption of various balancing tests in Fourth Amendment context).
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lished a balancing test to evaluate the reasonableness of warrantless
government searches that are not for criminal law enforcement pur-
poses.275 Examples of such searches include government employers
conducting urine testing of employees and job applicants to detect
the presence of drug metabolites, and school officials looking
through lockers and desks for various forms of contraband. In such
cases, the Court has directed that the constitutionality of the search
should be measured by weighing the government's interests in con-
ducting the search with neither a warrant nor probable cause against
the intrusion on the individual's privacy.276 The "reasonableness" of a
search, according to Fourth Amendment case law, must take into ac-
count "'all of the circumstances surrounding the search or sei-
zure .... ",277 This requires the decisionmaker in a given case to pre-
cisely weigh the government interests against the privacy interests of
the person searched.
Balancing tests have spread into many other areas of constitutional
doctrine beyond the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standard.
Under the free speech doctrine, for instance, the Court has adopted
balancing tests to define the extent to which a government employer
violates the First Amendment rights of employees when it takes ad-
verse action against an employee based on her speech.2 7 8 While gov-
ernment employees have a right to engage in speech on "'matters of
public concern,"' the Court has established that this right must be
weighed against the government's interest in maintaining an effi-
ciently operating workplace.2
Moreover, in Waters v. Churchil4280 the Court recently added an-
other layer to the reasonableness inquiry in employee speech cases.
The Court held that when a public employee alleges that she was
275. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (noting that
Court will balance governmental and private interests in special needs cases).
276. See id. For an excellent discussion of the transformation of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence from a rule-based decisionmaking model to a particularized interest-balancing
model based on pragmatist theory, see Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principls in
Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 223-68 (1993). For a critical view of the imple-
mentation of rules under the Fourth Amendment, see Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and
the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 231 (1984) (arguing that bright-line rules for
regulating police conduct may lead to disregard of important values and may, ironically, con-
fuse rather than clarify the law).
277. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531,537 (1985)).
278. See Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (stating that there must be bal-
ancing of interests between employee and employer).
279. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quotingPickering, 391 U.S. at 568); see
also Chen, supra note 14, at 304 (describing how balancing under the Connick/Pickering doctrine
is used both to evaluate whether employee's speech is constitutionally protected and, if it is,
whether government's interest outweighs the speech interest).
280. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
[Vol. 47:1
BURDENS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
terminated or otherwise punished for engaging in protected speech,
but the government employer's knowledge of the content of the
speech is disputed, the employer's knowledge must be evaluated by
the facts "as the employer reasonably found them to be.28' Under
existing law, a public employer who mistakenly fires an employee af-
ter concluding that she made a disruptive or insubordinate statement
may violate the employee's First Amendment rights if her statement
was about a matter of public concern.r But under Waters, the em-
ployer may evade liability if she reasonably, but erroneously, believed
that the employee's speech was not protected speech about a matter
of public concern.
Case law interpreting the Eighth Amendment284 provides another
example of the pervasiveness of constitutional reasonableness stan-
dards. In Farmer v. Brennan,2Y5 the Supreme Court was called upon to
clarify the scope of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" provision. The plaintiff was a transsexual who claimed that
prison officials failed to adequately protect him when they either
transferred him or placed him in the general prison population of a
penitentiary despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite knowledge
that the plaintiff would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by
other inmates because of his transsexual status.2* The Court had
previously held that a prisoner who made such a claim must prove
that the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the
prisoner's safety or other security needs.287
The central issue in Farmer was whether the existing deliberate in-
difference standard was subjective or objective. 288 The plaintiff
claimed that the test should be objective, so that he need prove only
that the defendants either knew or reasonably should have known of
the danger presented by the prison environment. 2 As the Court
noted, this standard mirrors the general civil law standard for reck-
lessness.2" The Court rejected that argument, however, adopting in-
stead the government's position that a prisoner must prove that a
281. Id. at 677.
282. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
283. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 677.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
285. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
286. See id. at 830-31.
287. SeeEstelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
288. SeeFarmer, 511 U.S. at837.
289. See id. at 837 & n.5.
290. See id. at 837.
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prison official knew of and disregarded "an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety" in order to establish an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.29' In a portion of the opinion clarifying the scope of this new
standard, the Farner Court observed that even prison officials who
subjectively know of a substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety
may not be in violation of the Eighth Amendment "if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." 9
The Court went on to explain that "[w]hether one puts it in terms of
duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably
cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause."' 3
Thus, the Court often invokes a substantive reasonableness stan-
dard as a metric for unconstitutional behavior. What is more, the
substantive constitutional standard need not formally be phrased in
the form of a "reasonableness" test for balancing to occur. The
Court acknowledged this point in Anderson v. Creighton."4 In Ander-
son, a dispute arose concerning whether law enforcement officers
should be entitled to claim qualified immunity, or if they were al-
ready sufficiently protected by the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" standard.29 The plaintiffs argued that qualified
immunity should not be available to officers accused of such viola-
tions because the Constitution already allows for reasonable, but mis-• 296
taken, judgments about government officers' searches and seizures.
To permit the defendant to assert qualified immunity, they argued,
would be to create a logically impossible category of actions that are
"reasonably unreasonable," in that they are unreasonable in terms of
substantive Fourth Amendment law, but are reasonable violations of
that law for purposes of qualified immunity.27 The majority quickly
disposed of the plaintiffs' argument, noting that the Court already
recognized the applicability of qualified immunity to Fourth
Amendment cases, and dismissing the double reasonableness stan-
dard as a semantic coincidence.2" In rejecting the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that a public official cannot be reasonably unreasonable,Justice
Scalia asserted that similar arguments could be made concerning vir-
tually all individual constitutional rights.
291. See id.
292. Id. at 844.
293. Id. at 845.
294. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
295. See id. at 642-43.
296. See id. at 643.
297. See idL
298. See id. at 643-44.
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The fact is that, regardless of the terminology used, the precise content
of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an
assessment of what accommodation between governmental need
and individual freedom is reasonable, so that the Creightons' objec-
tion, if it has any substance, applies to the application of Harlow
generally.2"
Justice Scalia correctly recognized that all balancing tests, however
characterized, ultimately rest on a determination of the reasonable-
ness of the government actor's conduct. But his point proves too
much. He fails to recognize that the argument against applying the
qualified immunity reasonableness standard to substantive constitu-
tional standards has wide, if not universal, application . 3
Indeed, Justice Stevens acknowledged this form of constitutional
directive in his dissent in Anderson. Criticizing the majority's applica-
tion of the qualified immunity doctrine to a Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" claim, Justice Stevens observed that Harlow immu-
nity claims may not be applicable if an official's conduct is not sus-
ceptible to a determination that it violated clearly established law be-
cause it is stated at a high level of abstraction:
[A]n official's conduct is not susceptible to a determination that it
violated clearly established law because it is regulated by an ex-
tremely general and deeply entrenched norm, such as the com-
mand of due process or probable cause. The principle is clearly es-
tablished, but whether it would brand the official's planned
conduct as illegal often cannot be ascertained without reference to
facts that may be in dispute. 3'
Justice Stevens's proposition is correct, but it does not go far enough.
Under modern constitutional doctrine, commands such as "due
process" and "probable cause" are the rule, not the exception. Thus,
under the balancing tests regime, the constitutional right at stake in
any given case will be stated as a broad general principle, and at the
same time will be subject to infinite factual variations.
Accordingly, the central problem with the application of qualified
299. IdL (emphasis added). For a critical view of Justice Scalia's statement that reasonable-
ness standards predominate in constitutional doctrine, see Urbonya, supra note 263, at 88 &
n.201 (arguing that the Court's generalization about constitutional reasonableness standards is
"flawed" and is inconsistent with the Court's "tradition of carefully defining and distinguishing
the standards for liability under various amendments").
300. See Chen, supra note 14, at 315 (arguing that Justice Scalia's opinion suggests that all
constitutional doctrines are essentially premised on government officials' reasonableness).
301. Andnon, 483 U.S. at 656 n.12 (StevensJ, dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Ste-
vens similarly argued that Harlor's reasoning did not necessarily extend to cases "in which both
the constitutional command and an exception to the rule for conduct that responds to a nar-
rowly defined category of factual situations are clearly established, and the dispute is whether
the situation that the officer confronted fits within the category." Id. at 651 n.3.
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immunity to constitutional tort claims when the underlying violation
is defined by a balancing test is that specific facts will almost always be
necessary to make an immunity ruling. This undermines the pur-
poses of the qualified immunity doctrine because it creates a wide
range of cases in which disputes center on the application of the
general framework of constitutional law to an unclear set of facts.
2. Qualified immunity and constitutional rules
The factual nature of qualified immunity might not be as critical if
the doctrine could be applied more coherently to clear constitutional
rules. But for two reasons, immunity doctrine does not work in this
context either. First, as just discussed, there are few clear constitu-
tional rules in the modern era. Because most substantive constitu-
tional doctrine is now articulated as standards or balancing tests,"
the application of qualified immunity to cases asserting clear consti-
tutional rules should be of limited interest or concern. Second,
when clear constitutional rules are applicable, the qualified immunity
doctrine has no logical application anyway.03 The clearer the consti-
tutional rule in a given situation, the less likely it is that a reasonable
official could mistakenly violate such a ruleY. Furthermore, even in
the limited circumstances when qualified immunity is logically rele-
vant to such claims, factual disputes are as likely to arise as they are
when immunity is applied to a constitutional standard °.'
The problem can best be understood by considering some simple
examples. A fairly clear constitutional rule exists under the Fourth
Amendment. s 6 In Payton v. New York, 07 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that police officers may not enter a suspect's home to make an
arrest unless they have a valid arrest warrantY6 A warrantless entry to
execute an in-home arrest is in most circumstances unconstitutional,
as is any search conducted incident to such an arrest. Although ex-
ceptions to the Payton rule exist, it is applicable in many situations. If
confronted with such a situation, an officer can hardly claim that a
302. This point has been exhaustively explored by numerous scholars. See, e.g., Aleinikoff,
supra note 267, at 995-96; Chen, supra note 14, at 324; Faigman, supra note 267, at 642-43; Sulli-
van, Foreword, supra note 267, at 60-62.
303. See Chen, supra note 14, at 308 (explaining that only when there are "unclear excep-
tions to or limitations on the rule's application does qualified immunity make sense").
304. See id.
305. See id. at 308-09 (explaining that courts must consider the factual circumstances that
"constitute reasonableness and unreasonableness" in context).
306. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
307. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
308. See id. at 589-90.
309. See id. at 598-601.
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mistaken warrantless entry to execute an in-home arrest is reasonable
for qualified immunity purposes because the rule is so clear and or-
dinarily it should be easy to understand when it applies' 0
Qualified immunity is similarly illogical in the context of bright-
line constitutional rules involving intentional misconduct by public
officials."' Because neither § 1983 nor Bivens contains a state of
mind element, state of mind requirements are derived from the un-
derlying substantive constitutional doctrine.' 2 Thus, while a Fourth
Amendment claim is usually evaluated in terms of a law enforcement
officer's "reasonableness,01 3 a claim of racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause must be supported by evidence of the
314defendant's intent to discriminate because of the victim's race.
Certain First Amendment claims also turn on intent,3 5 and many
other constitutional doctrines embody a state of mind element.
3 6
The overlay of qualified immunity adds a conceptually problematic
dimension to constitutional tort claims with state of mind issues. The
qualified immunity standard suggests that courts should evaluate a
defendant's conduct against a hypothetical official's reasonableness.
The problem with asserting the defense when the underlying consti-
tutional tort includes an intent element is that the "objective" quali-
fied immunity test doesn't make much sense. Suppose that a public
official is alleged to have demoted an employee on the basis of race.
The employee sues under § 1983, claiming a denial of equal protec-
tion of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment (or, if the situation
involves a federal employee, she would allege a Fifth Amendment
equal protection violation under Bivens). As required under current
equal protection doctrine, the employee alleges facts that suggest the
310. See Chen, supra note 14, at 325-26 (making a similar argument about the application of
qualified immunity to a clear First Amendment rule forbidding government discrimination
based on the content of speech).
311. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
312. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (implicitly recognizing that the un-
derlying constitutional standard defines requisite state of mind in Bivens actions); Parratt v. Tay-
lor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981) (holding that § 1983 has no state of mind requirement),overruled
on othergrounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
313. See, e.g., NewJerseyv. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,337 (1985).
314. SerWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
315. SeeKimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 515
U.S. 321 (1995).
316. Se,, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (requiring that plaintiff suing for imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment demonstrate that defendant acted
with "deliberate indifference," meaning that she had subjective knowledge that a substantial
risk of serious harm to plaintiff existed, but disregarded that risk). See. generally 10A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2732.2, at 340-53 (2d ed. 1983)
(explaining that courts deny summary judgment in cases involving constitutional doctrines
when a necessary element of the claim for relief is a determination of state of mind).
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official made the decision to demote her because of her race.317
The defendant's summary judgment motion in such a case would
argue that, even if the public official violated the Equal Protection
Clause, no reasonable official in the same position would have un-
derstood that such treatment of the plaintiff violated a clearly estab-
lished right. Conceptually, this makes no sense. When a clear intent-
based rule is in place, the outcome of a case is entirely dependent
upon the truth of the historical fact of the defendant's state of mind.
If the defendant acted with the intent to harm the plaintiff because of
her race, no court would find that a reasonable official could believe
that there might be some circumstance that made such an act per-
missible under established law. If the defendant did not have the
requisite intent at the time of her act, she has not committed a sub-
stantive equal protection violation, and immunity is not even an is-
sue. Thus, immunity here becomes nothing more than a variation
on the "I didn't do it defense" (or, perhaps, the "I didn't think it" de-
fense), which is highly susceptible to a basic factual dispute that is ir-
resolvable without trial. Indeed, at least one lower court has recog-
nized the incompatibility of qualified immunity in cases when
similarly clear rules are applicable.3 8
In any event, to the limited extent that the qualified immunity rea-
sonableness standard could logically be applied to an intent-based
constitutional violation, it would likely lead to some sort of factual
dispute. First, the very nature of the underlying issue is highly likely
to raise disputes over the historical fact of the defendant's state of
mind. In his dissent in Anderson, Justice Stevens observed that Harlow
immunity might be inapplicable in state of mind cases because such
cases would necessarily turn on an inquiry into the official's state of
mind, thus making summary judgment difficult, if not impossible"'
This scenario is highly probable. In most cases of this sort, the de-
fendant will deny the requisite intent and, providing there is some
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, a genuine factual
320issue would arise.
317. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
318. See Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1457 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Any police chief who
thought he could demote and promote only along allegedly clear racial lines could not be a
reasonable police chief.").
319. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 656 n.12 (1987) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
320. The problem associated with qualified immunity in the context of bright-line constitu-
tional rules explains in part the difficulty courts have had in enforcing the doctrine in the con-
text of constitutional tort claims in which state of mind is an element of the plaintiffs claim.
The state of mind element from constitutional law imports the very inquiry into motivation that
the Harlow Court sought to avoid. Arguments concerning a party's state of mind may be diffi-
cult to resolve without substantial discovery. Even after discovery, irresolvable disputes might
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Second, even under conventional summary judgment doctrine, not
incorporating the additional complication of qualified immunity,
claims involving a party's state of mind are generally disfavored on
summary resolution because the defendant's credibility is often an
issue. 2 ' In the qualified immunity context, the potential for state of
mind disputes also may preclude summary resolution. In fact, Harlow
explicitly eliminated the "subjective" component of qualified immu-
nity in order to rid the doctrine of fact-specific, discovery-
exist over evidence concerning a party's state of mind because the outcome may depend on
witness credibility. Because discovery and extensive motion practice arguably undermine the
goal of early disposition of constitutional tort claims, some federal appellate courts have
adopted "heightened pleading" requirements in such cases, requiring plaintiffs to plead facts
concerning the defendant's state of mind with greater specificity than would ordinarily be re-
quired to survive a motion to dismiss under federal pleading rules. See, e.g., Elliott v. Perez, 751
F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993),va-
cated on other grounds, 515 U.S. 321 (1995).
The Supreme Court has twice granted certiorari to address the heightened pleading rule,
but has resolved both cases on other grounds, thus leaving lower courts without guidance as to
the propriety of imposing this additional burden on civil rights plaintiffs. Compare Kimberlin v.
Quinlan, 513 U.S. 1123 (1995) (granting certiorari), with Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 515 U.S. 321
(1995) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of Johnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304
(1995)); Siegert v. Gilley, 498 U.S. 918 (1990) (granting certiorari),with Siegert v. Gilley, 500
U.S. 226, 232-35 (1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege the violation of any constitutional
right). For a novel approach regarding the heightened pleading standard in qualified immu-
nity cases, see Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining
that while a reply normally is not required under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, in some cases (such as this one) the court may order the plaintiff to reply to the defense
of qualified immunity when it would be helpful to test the sufficiency of the claim).
Academic commentary is beginning to address this highly problematic area of qualified im-
munity law. See, e.g., Blum, Heightened Pleading, supra note 264, at 92-94 (arguing that a special
pleading burden should not be instituted); Balcerzak, supra note 264, at 146-47 (proposing a
restructuring of the qualified immunity inquiry); Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes A Look at
Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coor-
dination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1085, 1085-86 (1994) (maintaining that courts should resort to
.summary judgment and discovery control" rather than heightened pleading standards); Gary
T. Lester, Comment, Schultea II-Fifth Circuit's Answer To Leatherman-Rule 7 Reply: More Ques-
tions Than Answers In Civil Rights Cases?, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 413, 474-75 (1996) (noting that the
reasons for requiring heightened pleading may be persuasive, but that courts must function
under the Rules as they exist today).
321. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (stating that summary
judgment should be used "sparingly" in cases where motive and intent "play leading roles" be-
cause credibility can be appraised only upon cross-examination). For a general discussion of
problems associated with the application of summary judgment law to disputes over state of
mind, see David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A
Better Approach, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 774, 786-95 (1983) (noting the difficulties in determining
whether such cases merit "special treatment" under summary judgment law). While many
modem courts often cite the general rule that summary judgment is inappropriate for resolu-
tion of state of mind issues, others have criticized the blanket presumption that state of mind
issues cannot be resolved in such a manner. See id. at 794 (explaining that some courts apply
the summary judgment rule to any factual matter in the same way, even when it is applied to
state of mind issues). One commentator, however, has pointed out that concerns over the use
of summary judgment in resolving state of mind issues should not excuse a plaintiff from iden-
tifying evidence, after discovery, that would create a genuine issue of fact on the intent issue.
See id. at 788-90.
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necessitating, state of mind disputes'2
The only time that qualified immunity makes sense in the context
of bright-line constitutional rules is when an official can argue that it
was not clear whether the relevant rule was applicable.3 2 For in-
stance, in the equal protection example, an official could argue that
a reasonable official would not have understood that her conduct
constituted state action, and therefore would not have understood
that the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable to that conduct.2 In
other contexts, an official could argue that a reasonable official
might have believed an exception to the bright-line rule was applica-
ble.a5 Moreover, in a case implicating the legal standards regarding
mixed motives, at least one court has found that qualified immunity
may protect an official who has both legitimate and invidious motives
for causing a particular deprivation. 326
In the above examples, however, the analysis simply revolves back
to the problem of the fact-based nature of qualified immunity, but in
the context of standard-like exceptions to clear constitutional rules. 27
Accordingly, when questions concerning the applicability of a clear
rule are at issue, the same problems discussed earlier regarding con-
stitutional standards arise, and the qualified immunity claim is as in-
herently fact-based as if the underlying constitutional directive were a
balancing test. 1
8
322. SeeHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982).
323. See Chen, supra note 14, at 326 (arguing that although a government official cannot
successfully contend that a reasonable official would have been ignorant of a constitutional
rule, she may be able to argue that a reasonable official would have been confused about the
rule's applicability).
324. See, e.g., Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting officials' claim that
they were entitled to qualified immunity because it was unclear whether they were acting in an
official capacity when they harmed the plaintiff), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1546 (1996); Luria Bros.
& Co. v. Allen, 469 F. Supp. 575, 578 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (denying private defendant's qualified
immunity defense, which asserted that it was unclear whether a private individual could violate
the Constitution by seizure of property pursuant to a state landlord/tenant statute). For a gen-
eral discussion of the applicability of qualified immunity to constitutional rules, and an expla-
nation of the impact of the defense on the decision to adopt a clear rule, see Chen, supra note
14, at 324-32.
325. See Chen, supra note 14, at 326 (noting that an official might argue that she mistakenly
believed that certain speech fell under an obscenity exception to a rule against content dis-
crimination).
326. See Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that court may
grant qualified immunity when the summary judgment record showed both lawful and dis-
criminatory motive may have been present).
327. See generally Chen, supra note 14, at 320-24 (describing how constitutional rules can
turn into standard-like directives when the Court adopts open-ended standards to define the
circumstances in which the rule is to be applied, the scope of the rule's application, or the ex-
ceptions to the rule's application).
328. See supra notes 267-301 and accompanying text.
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III. SUMMARYJUDGMENT AS GATEKEEPER
At roughly the same time the Court was transforming qualified
immunity to limit the social costs of constitutional tort litigation, it
was also modifying the law of summary judgment, the procedural ve-
hicle designated for adjudicating the immunity defense. Modern
federal pleading rules require only that the pleadings contain a
"short and plain statement of the claim,"'2 and be legally sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 ° Widely known as
"notice" pleading, this regime was ushered in by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which were specifically designed to deemphasize
technical pleading disputes, to direct federal litigation toward discov-
ery, and to focus attention on the merits?1' Given these relatively le-
nient pleading rules, many claims survive the preliminary stages of
the federal claim-screening process even when the parties asserting
them may not be able to prevail at trial.332 As a partial accommoda-
tion to account for the new pleadings rules, the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules adopted the summary judgment device to filter out insub-
stantial and unmeritorious claims that survived the pleading stage.
329. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2). The Rules establish exceptions to this general pleading rule
for specific substantive claims such as fraud, see FED. R. CIV. P. 9, but do not permit any other
exceptions. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that the heightened pleading standard is not permissible in
§ 1983 civil rights claims against municipalities, which are not among those that Rule 9 excepts
from the general pleading rules).
330. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). See generally Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984) (stating that a motion to dismiss may not be granted unless "it is clear that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations");
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (explaining that a complaint should not be dis-
missed unless it appears "that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim").
331. SeeEDWARDJ. BRUNETETAL., SUMMARYJUDGMENT: FEDERALLAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01,
at 2 (1994) (explaining that the shift to notice pleading resulted from the system's new empha-
sis on the discovery process and other post-pleading procedures).
332. See id. For a contrary and persuasive argument that the courts have reintroduced
higher pleading standards in certain areas of the law, in spite of the relatively lenient pleading
standards under the Federal Rules, see Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fat Pleading Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444-51 (1986).
333. See Marcus, supra note 332, at 484 (citation omitted) (explaining that summary judg-
ment allows a court to determine if claims are supported by enough evidence to go to trial).
See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (observing that, with the advent
of notice pleading, summary judgment functions as a tool to screen out factually insufficient
claims and to prevent them from going to trial). The basic understanding and operation of the
summary judgment device has long been the topic of scholarly scrutiny, generating disputes
about the purposes of summary judgment, its application and use as a screening device in fed-
eral civil litigation, and problems that arise in its administration by trial courts. This section of
the Article does not attempt to revisit these disputes, but only to introduce some basic concepts
about summary judgment that may be helpful in evaluating its intersection with qualified im-
munity. The academic literature is rich with insightful discussions of such problems. See, e.g.,
RICHARD L. MARCUS Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 399-440 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing nature of summary judgment, concept of burden shifting, and appropriate stan-
dards for determining burden of production); William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and
Decision of SummaryJudgsnent Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 445 (1991) [hereinafter Schwarzer et al.,
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Summary judgment, the preferred method for adjudicating quali-
fied immunity claims, is one tool within the arsenal of federal trial
judges to screen all types of legal claims at different stages of the liti-
gation process.334 As a general rule, summary judgment's purpose "is
to discover whether the parties have enough evidence to justify the
time and expense of a trial."'3 5 This promotes several efficiency ob-
jectives, such as the preservation of scarce judicial resources, the
minimization of litigation expenses, the encouragement of settling
claims, and the narrowing of issues to be raised at trial if one is still
necessary after the motion is resolved.336
For years, however, in the view of many litigators, judges, and
commentators, the promise of summary judgment as an effective
gatekeeper to federal trials proved elusive.337 In its earlier stages,
summary judgment was not favored. Trial judges were reluctant to
employ summary judgment, particularly in complex cases, partly out
of concern for being reversed on appeal. 3ss Others raised concerns
about summary judgment's interference with access to the courts and
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.3 9 Still others worried
that wide availability of summary judgment motions might encourage
harassment of parties.30 These observers speculated that parties
might file unfounded summary judgment motions to drive up the
opposing party's litigation costs, to obtain a preview of the party's
case, and to gain leverage for favorable settlements. 4'
In addition to these policy considerations, many attributed the dif-
ficulty in obtaining summary judgment to the courts' interpretation
of Rule 56.342 Under the Federal Rules, a party may obtain summary
Summary Judgment Motions] (explaining Rule 56 and its application); David P. Currie, Thoughts
on Directed Verdicts and Summary judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 72, 76-79 (1977) (explaining how
to clarify and improve upon the summary judgment device); Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 746 (1974) (isolating "the factors which
account for the inadequacy of present summary judgment procedure" in order to encourage
modest reform).
334. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, § 1.01, at 2-6 (discussing the availability of proce-
dural devices such as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, directed verdicts, judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, pretrial orders, and motions in limine).
335. Currie, supra note 333, at 78.
336. See Schwarzer et al., Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 333, at 451.
337. See id. at 450 ("As Rule 56 approached its fiftieth anniversary, it was encumbered by
ambiguities, an overlay of restrictive interpretations, and considerable judicial aversion.").
338. See id.
339. See generally id. at 448, 474 & n.184.
340. See id. at 450.
341. See id.
342. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 775-76 (1988) (explaining that substantial
emphasis was placed on the question of whether the moving party "sufficiently established the
non-existence of any material fact" and that this interpretation of Rule 56 limited the use of
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judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits [submitted on
summary judgment], if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.' ' 13 The mechanics of applying this standard have
presented a central difficulty with the doctrine.
Two important and much-debated aspects of summary judgment
are particularly relevant when examining the intersection of sum-
mary judgment and qualified immunity. First, significant dispute has
arisen over what procedural burden the moving party must meet to
shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party. The law
governing this standard has changed significantly since the adoption
of the Federal Rules, and is now understood to depend upon which
party, the moving party or nonmoving party, bears the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion at trial on the issue for which summary judgment is
sought."44 A second, and closely related issue, is what quantum of
evidence the nonmoving party must produce in order to defeat the
summary judgment motion. The answer to that question also de-
pends heavily upon which party bears the burden of persuasion. 345
Before exploring the burden of persuasion, it is worth identifying
the multiple meanings the word "burden" is assigned in the summary
judgment context. First, there is the moving party's initial burden in
supporting her summaryjudgment motion. The moving party must
meet this initial burden before the nonmoving party is required to
respond. While this initial burden is sometimes described as a bur-
den of production, it can actually entail either a traditional produc-
tion burden or the simple process of pointing out or highlighting the
absence of sufficient evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case. "4 6  This Article characterizes the latter method as a
summary judgment); Sonenshein, supra note 321, at 780 (noting that the "absence of clear
guidelines governing the application of Rule 56" led to the courts' limited use of the summary
judgment device).
343. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Similar summary judgment rules are in place in many state court
systems, where constitutional tort claims may also be litigated. See, e.g., CAL. Cw. PROC. CODE §
437c (West 1973 & Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1005 (West 1992 & Supp.
1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3212 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997).
344. For an excellent introduction to the relevant burdens in the summary judgment con-
text, see MARCUS ET AL., supra note 333, at 400-02.
345. See id. (discussing interrelation between burden of persuasion and burden of produc-
tion within summaryjudgment).
346. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing moving party's burden as a burden of production); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary
Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIALADVOC. 433, 462-64 (1987) (same). Pro-
fessor Louis contended that the moving party could meet its initial burden in one of two ways.
First, he suggested that the moving party could review the nonmoving party's evidence and
demonstrate that such evidence would not be sufficient to meet the nonmoving party's burden
1997]
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"highlighting" burden. Second, there is the nonmoving party's bur-
den of production, the burden to produce evidence responding to
the contention that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fi-
nally, the burden of persuasion is the burden to prove to the fact
finder, under the relevant standard, that a particular party's version
of the facts is true.
A. The Allocation of Burdens When the Nonmoving Party Bears the
Burden of Persuasion
1. The moving party's initial burdens
The widely recognized turning point for the summary judgment
doctrine was the 1986 trilogy of Supreme Court decisions in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett,347 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,48 and Matsushita Elec-
tric Industry v. Zenith Radio Corp.149 These cases reflect the Court's de-
sire to enhance judges' use of summary judgment in eliminating
claims before trial, and have arguably led to a greater capacity for re-
solving cases in this manner."O
In Celotex, the Court dramatically refined, if not overruled, the
moving party's burden as defined by its earlier decision in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress,;s' the bite noire of summary judgment advocates. In Adickes,
the Court appeared to impose a fairly high burden on parties moving
for summary judgment. The case involved a civil rights claim by an
anti-segregation protester who violated racial segregation rules by
seeking service at a department store lunch counter.352  After store
of production at trial on an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Louis, supra
note 333, at 750. This burden is consistent with this Article's characterization of a
"highlighting" burden and with the Celotex majority's articulation of the initial burden. See Ce-
lotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Second, the moving party could point to its own proof, such as affidavits,
to show the nonexistence of an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. See Louis, su-
pra, at 750. This latter burden could be described more fairly as a burden of production.
347. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
348. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
349. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
350. The trilogy has been the subject of substantial scholarly commentary. Se, e.g.,
Schwarzer et al., SummaryJudgment Motions, supra note 333, at 450-52; Friedenthal, supra note
342, at 775-87; Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE LJ. 73, 76-94 (1990); John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling
Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv. LITIG.
227 (1987); Mullenix, supra note 346, at 449-66; Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 53 (1988); D. Michael Risinger, Another
Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary
Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 35 (1988); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror. The Supreme
Court's Shimmering View of SummaryJudgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO
ST. LJ. 95, 100-08 (1988).
351. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
352. See id. at 146.
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employees refused her service, she left the premises and was arrested
by local police for violating local vagrancy laws.353 A fundamental
element of her § 1983 damages claim was that the police and store
owners conspired to deprive her of her equal protection rights.'
5
The government defendants moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show any evidence of such a
conspiracy.
55
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants on
the conspiracy claim because the plaintiff had failed to allege any
facts from which a conspiracy could be inferred.6 After the appel-
late court affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that thp
defendants had failed to carry their initial burden of "showing the
absence of any genuine issue of fact."57 To meet such a burden, the
Court held, the defendants needed to submit evidence, such as affi-
davits, denying that the police officers were in the store at the rele-
vant time.S The Court required this even though, as Professor Cur-
rie has noted, "there was no evidence before the Court suggesting a
policeman was in the store. '' 5 Because the plaintiff would have the
burden of production and persuasion on the conspiracy issue at trial,
a similar motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence would have re-
quired a directed verdict for the defendant. 3  Nonetheless, the
Court rejected summary judgment for the Adickes defendants.
The decision turned on the Court's interpretation of what was re-
quired to "show" the absence of a material fact within the meaning of
Rule 56(c). 36' Adickes appeared to require that, even in the absence
of evidence presented by the nonmoving party, the moving party
needed to make an evidentiary showing to prove a negative-that the
nonmoving party had not established a fact on which she would have
the burden of persuading the fact finder at trial. 2 Adickes has long
been criticized for placing too high a burden on summary judgment
353. See id.
354. See id. at 147.
355. See id. at 153.
356. See id. at 147-48 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 252 F. Supp. 140, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
357. Id. at 153.
358. See id. at 160.
359. Currie, supra note 333, at 78 (emphasis added).
360. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 153 (stating that the district court used this reasoning when it
granted summaryjudgment on the conspiracy issue).
361. See id. at 159 (asserting that 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e) was not intended to mod-
ify the burden of the moving party under Rule 56(c); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (stating that
summary judgment will be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law").
362. SeeAdickes, 398 U.S. at 160.
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movants who do not bear the burden of persuasion on a trial issue. "o
One commentator has argued that the result in Adickes undermines
the very purpose of Rule 56, which is to discover whether the parties
have sufficient evidence to justify the resource consumption necessi-
tated by a trial.64 Indeed, "[t]aken at face value, the Adickes opinion
would severely, and unnecessarily cripple the use of summary judg-
ment."3 65
On the other hand, other authors have pointed out that permitting
the moving party to cavalierly force the nonmoving party to come
forward with specific evidence supporting her claim may lead to har-
assment, even in cases when it is clear that the nonmoving party will
be able to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute. Moreover, the
actual process of summary judgment litigation, some have acknowl-
edged, consumes judicial and litigant resources, sometimes without a
pretrial resolution.367
In Celotex,36 the Court responded to these concerns. In that case, a
woman who was the administratrix of her husband's estate sued sev-
eral companies concerning her husband's exposure to asbestos
products allegedly manufactured by them.36 A year after the suit was
filed, Celotex filed a summary judgment motion asserting that the
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that her husband had been
exposed to asbestos it had manufactured.7  Celotex argued that the
plaintiff had failed to identify any witnesses who could testify about
the decedent's exposure to its asbestos products. In her response,
the plaintiff submitted three documents that she argued supported
her claim that her late husband had been exposed to Celotex-
manufactured asbestos in Chicago during, 1970-71: (1) a transcript of
the decedent's deposition; (2) a letter from one of decedent's former
employers whom the plaintiff intended to call as a trial witness; and
(3) a letter from an insurance company to plaintiff s attorney.a7 Ce-
363. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 333, at 76.
364. See id.
365. Friedenthal, supra note 342, at 779. From an alternative, Realist perspective, Dean
Friedenthal has argued that Adickes "can be explained in that it was an important civil rights
case that the Court did not want to dispose of without trial. The discussion of summary judg-
ment was simply a means of masking a difficult substantive issue." Id.
366. See id. at 776-77; Louis, supra note 333, at 753-60.
367. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, § 3.02; William W. Schwarzer, SummaryJudgmen Un-
der the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 483 (1983)
[hereinafter Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules].
368. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
369. Seeid. at319.
370. See id. at 319-20.
371. See id. at 320.
372. See id.
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lotex argued that none of the three established a genuine issue of
fact because they were all inadmissible hearsay, and therefore could
not be considered on summaryjudgment. 373
The trial court agreed with Celotex, but the court of appeals re-
versed, relying on the language of Rule 56(e) 374 and on Adickes 375 to
find that Celotex had not met its initial burden of establishing with
any evidence that the decedent had not been exposed to its prod-
ucts.37 6 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.3 7  It held that, as-
suming adequate time for discovery has passed and a motion has
been made, Rule 56(c) required summary judgment to be entered
"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.."3 78 The majority clari-
fied this proposition by stating that, while the moving party bears the
burden of "informing" the trial court of the basis for its motion, it
need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidentiary mate-
rials negating the nonmoving party's claim. 79 This is what I have re-
ferred to as the "highlighting" burden."' Indeed, the Court ob-
served, the language of Rule 56 itself suggests that the drafters
contemplated that not all summary judgment motions would be sup-
ported by evidentiary matter.38' The Court indicated that in cases
when the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion on a
dispositive issue at trial, summary judgment may be based "solely on
the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file.""'3 "
373. See id.
374. Rule 56(e) states, in part, that
[w] hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his plead-
ing, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
375. Adickes read Rule 56(e) to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party only
after the moving party has adequately supported her motion with evidentiary matter. See
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970) (citing Advisory Committee Note on
1963 Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
376. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rv'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
377. See CGeotex 477 U.S. at 319.
378. Id. at 322.
379. See id. at 323.
380. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
381. See Ceotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (noting that Rule 56(c) refers to"'the affidavits, if any,'" and
that Rules 56(a) and (b) provide that moving parties may move for summary judgment "'with
or without supporting affidavits'" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c))).
382. Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
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In response to the appellate court's reliance on Adickes,3 the Court
in Celotex concluded that Adickes did not stand for the proposition
that the moving party was required to submit evidence to show the
absence of a genuine factual issue.3 8 4 In explaining this, the Court
stated that Adickes should not
be construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for
summary judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on
which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Instead, as
we have explained, the burden on the moving party may be dis-
charged by "showing"-that is, pointing out to the district court-that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's585
case.
In other words, to meet her initial burden, the moving party need
only comprehensively evaluate the record produced on discovery and
highlight the absence of facts supporting the nonmoving party's legal
claim. The Court concluded that Celotex met its initial burden, but
remanded the case to the lower court to evaluate whether the plain-
tiff had met her responsive burden of establishing a genuine issue of
fact by showing that she had sufficient evidence of the decedent's ex-
posure to Celotex-manufactured asbestos tojustify a trial.8
In clarifying the duty of the moving party to discharge its initial
burden under summary judgment rules, the Court unequivocally en-
dorsed the employment of summary judgment as a procedure to iso-
late factually insufficient claims or defenses and prevent them from
going to trial . 87 The Court noted that as long as trial courts ensure
adequate opportunities for discovery, expanded use of the summary
judgment motion will not result in unfair and premature resolution
of nonmoving parties' claims.m Celotex has been widely interpreted
to have substantially altered the existing standard for evaluating the
moving party's initial burden on summary judgment, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it did not formally overrule Adickes.' Although
383. SeeAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
384. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
385. Id. (emphasis added).
386. See id. at 326-27. In doing so, however, the Court indicated that the nonmoving party
does not necessarily need to meet its burden with evidence "in a form that would be admissible
at trial." Id. at 324. Thus, the hearsay nature of the plaintiff's evidence would not necessarily
preclude her from defeating Celotex's motion. See id.
387. See id. at 327.
388. See id. at 326.
389. See id. at 334 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority's general approach
to burden shifting and with its contention that Adickes and Celotex are not inconsistent); see also
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, § 2.06 (noting that the Court in Celotex substantially altered the
approach to burden shifting under summary judgment "without admitting that it was doing
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there has been some dispute about the scope of the Court's holding,
commentators have agreed that the decision signaled the Court's en-
dorsement of the widespread employment of summary judgment to
limit trials in the federal judicial system.Y By carefully defining the
moving party's burdens on summary judgment, Celotex is highly rele-
vant to the adjudication of public officials' claims of qualified immu-
nity.
2. The nonmovingparty's burden of production and the quantum of
evidence necessary to meet the burden
Under Adickes and Celotex, once a moving party has met her initial
burden (her highlighting burden or production burden), the bur-
den of production shifts to the nonmoving party, who must respond
with sufficient evidence such that a reasonable fact finder could find
for her at trial. 9' The deference accorded to nonmoving parties with
regard to satisfying this responsive burden is another perceived limi-
tation to the utility of traditional summaryjudgment doctrine. First,
it is widely understood that on summary judgment the evidence must
be viewed "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion."-'9 Second, federal courts have, to some degree, relied on the
so-called "slightest doubt" standard derived from the oft-cited case of
Arnstein v. Porter"9 Under the slightest doubt standard, even if the
nonmoving party has not presented evidence to rebut the summary
judgment motion, summaryjudgment may not be granted if there is
the slightest doubt that a genuine issue of material fact existsY9' Al-
though courts have recently abandoned, or at least limited, the
slightest doubt standard,395 that standard has long symbolized the
frustration of those who value summary judgment as an effective
gatekeeping device.
In the two other cases that comprise the summary judgment tril-
so"); Kennedy, supra note 350, at 246-48 (arguing that Adickes and Celotex can be reconciled by
alternative interpretations of the Court's reasoning). But see BRUNET ET AL., supra, § 2.06 n.66
(characterizing Professor Kennedy's attempt to reconcile the two cases as "largely unsuccess-
ful").
390. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 342, at 776; Nelken, supra note 350, at 75 n.106.
391. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970). If
the moving party fails even to meet her initial burden, the motion should be dismissed whether
or not the nonmoving party responds. See id.; Louis, supra note 333, at 750.
392. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,655 (1962), cited inAdickes, 398 U.S. at 158-
59.
393. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
394. See id. at 468.
395. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, § 3.03, at 73-74 (discussing cases that reject or limit
the "slightest doubt" standard).
396. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 350, at 107.
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ogy, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 7 and Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 98 the Court made it more difficult for a
nonmoving party with the burden of persuasion to meet its burden of
production on summary judgment. In Liberty Lobby, a publisher and
author moved for summary judgment on a libel suit brought against
them by a non-profit organization. 0 In Matsushita, the defendants in
a civil antitrust case moved for summary judgment against the plain-
tiffs, who had alleged that the defendants had engaged in a predatory
40pricing conspiracy.
These cases clarified the burdens that nonmoving parties must
meet in order to defeat a summary judgment motion, assuming that
these parties will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. In Liberty
Lobby, the Court rejected the notion that the nonmoving party could
meet its burden simply by showing the mere existence of "some" fac-
tual dispute between the parties.40' Rather, the nonmoving party
must identify a factual dispute that is genuine and involves a material
issue.0 Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the
suit; materiality, therefore, is a function of the underlying substantive
law, rather than of summaryjudgment law.03
The Court also underscored the fact that not all evidentiary con-
flicts constitute "genuine" disputes of fact.40 4 Nonmoving parties can
establish a genuine issue of fact by producing evidence that is suffi-
cient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party.405 Thus, for the first time, the Court equated the test
for determining whether a genuine factual dispute exists with the test
for granting a directed verdict at trial.400 Closely related to this char-
acterization was the Court's conclusion that this issue must be as-
sessed in light of the evidentiary burden established by the substan-
tive law. 7 Thus, in an ordinary civil case, the judge must ask whether
a fair-minded, reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff has proven
397. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
398. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
399. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 245.
400. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78.
401. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48.




406. See id. at 251; see also Currie, supra note 333, at 79 ("The purpose of rule 56 requires
that summary judgment be granted if and only if the evidence before the court would justify a
directed verdict if presented at trial.") (footnote omitted). These procedural devices are now
known as motions forjudgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Cv. P. 50.
407. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
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her case by a preponderance of the evidence."' The Court main-
tained that this procedure did not supplant the role of the jury.4" It
warned, for example, that it would be inappropriate for the trial
court to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or
draw legitimate inferences from the facts in a summary judgment
proceeding.1
Finally, in both Liberty Lobby and Matsushita, the Court rejected any
idea that the "slightest doubt" standard retains any viability in mod-
em procedure law."' In Liberty Lobby, for instance, the Court stated
that "[t] he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient .... ,42 Similarly, in Matsushita,
the Court stated that in order to establish a genuine issue for trial,
the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." 3
Even in light of these new standards, however, it should be noted
408. See id. at 252. A major issue in Liberty Lobby was whether trial courts were obligated to
take into account heightened evidentiary burdens in applying this standard. The Court held
that the judge must incorporate the proof standard in evaluating whether summaryjudgment is
appropriate. See id. at 252-54. Accordingly, in a public figure defamation case, the judge must
decide whether the evidence presented by the nonmoving party would allow a reasonable jury
to conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. See id. at 254. In
assessing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court instructed the trial judge
to "bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability." Id
Thus, according to the majority, if the nonmoving party's affidavits present evidence that"is of
insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence," there can be no genuine issue of fact. See id. The dissents criticized
this approach. See id. at 266 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's suggestion
that trial courts must assess and weigh evidence in order to fulfill the Court's mandate, as that is
not the traditional province of trial judges on summary judgment); id. at 273 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court has created a standard that is different from the standard tradition-
ally applied in summary judgment motions without even hinting as to how its new standard will
be applied to particular cases."). The relevance of this aspect of the Liberty Lobby opinion to
qualified immunity remains to be seen. See generally Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 815
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that in constitutional tort cases where defendant is a gov-
ernment official who asserts qualified immunity, and where state of mind is an element of
plaintiff's claim, plaintiff must prove her case by clear and convincing evidence), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997).
409. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
410. See id. at 255. The Court's Liberty Lobby opinion has generated a great deal of academic
commentary and perhaps even more confusion in its application. Although Liberty Lobby's im-
pact could have been limited because of the unusual nature of First Amendment/defamation
law, several commentators have characterized the Court's opinion as a watershed for summary
judgment advocates. See, e.g., BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, §§ 3.04, 3.06 (arguing that Liberty
Lobby and Matsushita have substantially increased judicial receptiveness to summary judgment);
Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 350, at 75 (contending that the Court's summary judg-
ment trilogy may have adversely affected the ability of parties to settle cases and fundamentally
altered the balance of power between litigants by raising the costs and risks to plaintiffs while
decreasing the same for defendants).
411. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 331, § 3.04 (contending that the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of "metaphysical doubt" effectively repudiated the slightest doubt standard).
412. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
413. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted).
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that a nonmoving party in an ordinary case may delay having to meet
her burden of production if she successfully contends pursuant to
Rule 56(f) that she cannot present facts essential to oppose the mo-
tion.4  The trial court may then either deny the summaryjudgment
motion or continue it until further discovery can be conducted" 5
This rule may have significant implications for plaintiffs responding
to summary judgment on qualified immunity claims.1
B. The Allocation of Burdens When the Moving Party Bears the
Burden of Persuasion
When the moving party would bear the burden of persuasion on
the trial issue to be adjudicated on summary judgment, the Court has
established quite different standards. Here, the stakes are different,
as the moving party must establish a strong enough case to justify
finding in its favor without a trial and denying the nonmoving party
her opportunity to put on a defense. The treatment of this issue in
judicial decisions and academic literature is much less extensive than
the previous issues, perhaps because summaryjudgment motions are
more commonly filed by parties who do not bear the burden of per-
suasion.1
The clearest statement about the standards for granting summary
judgment to a party who bears the burden of persuasion is in Justice
Brennan's Celotex dissent. In clarifying the structure of summary
judgment adjudication, Justice Brennan wrote:
If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that
party must support its motion with credible evidence-using any of
the materials specified in Rule 56(c)-that would entitle it to a di-
rected verdict if not controverted at trial. Such an affirmative
showing shifts the burden of production to the party opposing the
motion and requires that party either to produce evidentiary mate-
rials that demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue" for trial or
to submit an affidavit requesting additional time for discovery.41
414. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (stating that a court"may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just").
415. See id.
416. See infra note 538 and accompanying text.
417. SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVILPROCEDURE 445-46 (2d ed. 1993) (observing that
in most summary judgment cases it is the nonmoving party who bears burden of persuasion at
trial); see also William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 441 (1977) (asserting that summary judgment is a device used primarily by
defendants); infra note 426 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that defendants may
bear the burden of persuasion if the issue on which they seek summary judgment is an affirma-
tive defense).
418. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal
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The directed verdict standard, in turn, raises a significant barrier
for the party with the burden of persuasion. "The party seeking a di-
rected verdict must make a stronger showing of evidence if he bears
the burden of persuasion., 4' 9 That party must meet a "strict" stan-
dard, showing "through 'testimony that the jury is not at liberty to
disbelieve' '4 20 that, even after "viewing 'evidence and reasonable in-
ferences' in a light most favorable to [the nonmoving party], [the
evidence] nonetheless 'could lead reasonable men to but one con-
clusion'-in his favor." 2' Likewise, on summary judgment, the mov-
ing party's case must be so substantial that, on all essential elements
of her claim, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party,
even after considering the latter's responsive materials.4 =
This is, and should be, a difficult standard to meet at the summary
judgment stage. The nonmoving party may have many ways to defeat
the moving party's case at trial. For example, the nonmoving party
might simply try to challenge the credibility of the moving party's
trial witnesses through cross-examination. 42 Notwithstanding that le-
gitimate trial strategy, a nonmoving party cannot defeat the motion
simply by stating her intention to challenge the credibility of the
moving party's witnesses.424 The nonmoving party needs to provide at
least some evidence to support its claim on the merits or to establish
citations omitted); see also Winnacunnet Coop. Sch. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 84
F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that under Celotex standard, where party that bears burden
of proof moves for summary judgment and meets its initial burden, nonmoving party must re-
spond with evidence or seek additional time for discovery); National State Bank v. Federal Re-
serve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). SeegenerallySchwarzer et al., Sum-
maryJudgment Motions, supra note 333, at 477-78, which states:
When the moving party bears the burden of persuasion on the issue at trial, its show-
ing must sustain that burden as well as demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute.
Thus, it must satisfy both the initial burden of production on the summary judgment
motion-by showing that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact-and the
ultimate burden of persuasion on the claim by showing that it would be entitled to a
directed verdict at trial.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
419. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 733
n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir.
1977)); seeJuhnke v. EIG Corp., 444 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a directed
verdict for party with burden of proof could be granted only if the court could determine there
is only one possible interpretation of evidence, and that interpretation favors the moving
party).
420. Jordan v. United States Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Service
Auto Supply Co. v. Harte & Co., 533 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1976)).
421. Id. (quoting Curreri v. Local 251, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 722 F.2d 6, 8 (1st
Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)).
422. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11 th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
423. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 417, § 9.3, at 447; see also FLEMINGJAMES, JR. ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.15, at 341 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that testimony usually raises credibility
questions).
424. SeeFRIEDENTHALETAL., supra note 417, § 9.03, at 446-47.
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a reason for doubting the credibility of the moving party's potential
witnesses.s While the summary judgment burdens of parties with
the burden of persuasion at trial are ordinarily a concern for plain-
tiffs, these procedural burdens would also be relevant, of course, to a
party moving for summary judgment on the basis of a defense on
which she would bear the burden of persuasion.426
A central aspect of understanding the operation of qualified im-
munity is how these universal summary judgment standards, includ-
ing the allocation of procedural, evidentiary, and proof burdens, ap-
ply to the resolution of qualified immunity claims.427 As the next
section discusses, the intersection of qualified immunity and sum-
mary judgment generates unanticipated complexities that have
plagued the lower courts as they regularly administer and apply the
doctrine to public officials' immunity claims.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNrIY'S FACTUAL NATURE
The adjudication of qualified immunity presents the confluence of
qualified immunity and summary judgment, two doctrines designed
to screen claims prior to trial. While one would intuitively think that
these two gatekeepers would work well together based on their com-
mon underlying goals, the following discussion illustrates that their
intersection actually creates substantial doctrinal obstacles to the
resolution of constitutional tort claims-or at least it should if courts
are properly implementing the two doctrines.
The complexities of evaluating the qualified immunity defense un-
der traditional summary judgment law have not gone entirely unno-
ticed. Some commentators have attempted to reconcile the two doc-
trines and assist courts and other scholars to gain a greater
understanding of the law.428 These attempts, however, have been
largely unsuccessful because the two doctrines cannot be harmonized
satisfactorily without substantially altering the meaning and purpose
425. See id.
426. See Stutz Motor Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (C.D.
Cal. 1995), aff'd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11877 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 1997).
427. SeeBRUNETETAI.., supra note 331, § 6.10 (investigating qualified immunity defense and
its relationship to summaryjudgment).
428. See id. (noting special problems associated with application of summary judgment to
qualified immunity defense); see also MARCUS ET AL., supra note 333, at 435-36 (examining the
two doctrines); Ignall, supra note 263, at 201 (outlining problems with using summary judg-
ment motion to raise qualified immunity defense); Mary A. McKenzie, Note, The Doctrine of
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions: Resolution of the Immunity Issue on Summary Judgment,
25 SUFFOLK U. L. RE;V. 673, 699-700 (1991) (examining whether qualified immunity defense
can be decided as a matter of law).
[Vol. 47:1
BURDENS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
of one or the other. Summary judgment, which is designed to elimi-
nate unnecessary trials, operates quite differently from qualified im-
munity, which is designed to protect officials from all pre-trial litiga-
tion processes, including summary judgment. Thus, the Court's
articulation of the immunity doctrine to include an inherent, or at
least predominant, factual component has greatly complicated both
the law of qualified immunity and the law of summary judgment. As
this section explains, proper consideration of this factual component
is essential to understanding and explaining the substantial concep-
tual confusion surrounding the doctrine's application. 42 It might
also provide a foundation for reforming qualified immunity.
The principal, but surprisingly unrecognized, doctrinal conse-
quence of the Court's current approach is that the factual aspect has
made qualified immunity conceptually irreconcilable with traditional
summary judgment doctrine. The Supreme Court has assumed that
summary judgment is an effective device for adjudicating qualified
immunity claims because it insists that qualified immunity is a ques-
tion of law.4  It seems intuitive that summary judgment could prop-
erly serve the function envisioned by the Court, because it is a proce-
dural device designed to facilitate summary resolution of legal claims
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the parties are
unlikely to generate one even if they went to trial. Moreover, the two
doctrines have compatible objectives; both are consciously designed
to filter legal claims at some point prior to trial.
Due to the significance of factual questions, however, their conflu-
ence has generated doctrinal and conceptual confusion that has
manifested itself in three ways. First, qualified immunity's factual
component may explain a great deal about the difficulty the Su-
preme Court has had articulating the precise standard to be applied
to qualified immunity claims raised on summary judgment.3' Sec-
ond, factual complexities have provoked the lower federal courts to
substantially alter or modify the detailed burdens under summary
judgment in manners that conflict with the Court's summary judg-
ment trilogy. Finally, the factual analysis embedded into qualified
immunity doctrine explains why the courts have never been able to
sort out a critical, but unresolved, question-which party bears the
429. See, e.g., Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1994) ("(T]he difficulty
for all judges with qualified immunity has not been articulation of the rule, but rather the ap-
plication of it.").
430. See Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
431. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (indicating
substantial disagreement among Supreme Court Justices about the proper summary judgment
standards to be applied to qualified immunity claims).
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burden of persuasion on the qualified immunity defense. Until this
last question is answered, if indeed it can be, the courts will be un-
able to appropriately articulate the summary judgment standards
necessary to provide guidance to parties, trial courts, and scholars
who wish to better understand this area of the law.
A. Ascertaining the Elusive Summaiy Judgment Standard for
"Qualified" Immunity
Three recurring and related issues under the qualified immunity
doctrine are the articulation of the proper summary judgment stan-
dard to be applied, the scope of discovery permissible, and the role,
if any, of juries. The capacity for significant disputes about the fac-
tual basis of an immunity defense creates difficult conceptual issues
in each of these areas.
Much of the confusion relates to the hybrid nature of a "qualified"
immunity. Immunities can serve three independent functions. First,
an immunity may protect defendants from the burdens of extensive
pretrial discovery and motions practice ("pretrial litigation immu-
nity"). Second, even if the defendants must undergo discovery and
pretrial motions practice, immunity may still protect defendants from
trial ("trial immunity"). Finally, an immunity may operate as a bar-
rier to liability, even in cases where a defendant must undergo dis-
covery, pretrial proceedings, and a trial ("liability immunity").
In order to facilitate the distinct protection each of these immuni-
ties offers, a different procedural device is necessary. Pretrial litiga-
tion immunity can generally be protected by procedural mechanisms
that permit certain types of claims to be screened out on the plead-
ings. The goal of trial immunity can be accomplished by devices for
adjudicating claims short of trial, such as summary judgment. Fi-
nally, liability immunity can be protected by substantive defenses that
can be asserted at trial, and which may add a layer of protection from
liability, if not from the burdens of litigation.
IMMUNITY TYPE PROCEDURAL VEHICLE
From Pretrial Litigation Pleading Motions
(Suit)
From Trial SummaryJudgment Motion
From Liability Substantive Defense
Since its inception, the qualified immunity doctrine has defied
classification along these lines, partly because the Court has created a
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hybrid of this simplified model. The Court's immunity decisions
have variously characterized qualified immunity as a liability immu-
nity, a trial immunity, and a pretrial litigation immunity (or immu-
nity from suit). This hybridization, in turn, has confused understand-
ing about the proper legal standards under the qualified immunity
doctrine.
The confusion began in Harlow v. Fitzgerald ,32 when the Court set
out procedural guidelines for administering the defense. In describ-
ing how qualified immunity claims should be resolved, the majority
sent out mixed signals. Initially, the Court indicated that trial court
judges should first examine whether the defendant's conduct, as al-
leged by the plaintiff, violated clearly established constitutional
rights. 43 This ruling reflects the Court's understanding that trial
courts could evaluate the merits of a qualified immunity defense on
the pleadings, rather than after development of the factual record.
Indeed, the Court originally insisted that no discovery take place un-
til the immunity claim was resolved, further revealing its belief that
qualified immunity was a device to screen out claims on the plead-
ings.' At the same time, however, the Court conveyed a conflicting
message by indicating that the preferred procedural device for adju-
dicating qualified immunity was summary judgment.45
Similarly, in Anderson v. Creighton,3 6 the Court acknowledged tlat
the initial evaluation of the defense must take place on the plead-
ings. 37 The majority indicated that trial courts should first evaluate
whether the defendant's conduct, as alleged, violated a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right.4s Consistent with this understanding, Jus-
tice Stevens's dissent observed that the relevant focus under Harlow
for evaluating whether a right was clearly established is "the rule on
which the plaintiff relies. '439 In other words, both opinions appear to
recognize that the proper administration of Harlow was dependent
upon it being understood as a pleading rule. Nonetheless, the ma-
jority again emphasized that summaryjudgment was the proper pro-
cedural vehicle for resolving qualified immunity claims, and even
432. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
433. See id. at 818.
434. Se, id
435. See id.
436. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
437. See id. at 646 n.6.
438. See id.
439. Id. at 657-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens made this
point in the context of arguing that summary judgment on Anderson's qualified immunity
claim was inappropriate and required the development of additional facts. See id.
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softened Harlow by recognizing that if factual disputes surrounding
440the plaintiffs allegations arose, discovery might be necessary.
Once the Anderson Court acknowledged that discovery might be
necessary to sort through a qualified immunity defense, it substan-
tially undermined the idea that qualified immunity might be an ef-
fective device for screening constitutional tort claims in order to pro-
tect officials from the typical burdens of pretrial litigation, such as
discovery. Indeed, the Third Circuit recently observed that Ander-
son's articulation of the qualified immunity standard was "[i]n strong
tension" with the idea of resolving qualified immunity claims as early
in the case as possible.4 Moreover, as discussed above, it will be dif-
ficult for courts to assess the clearly established law standard in light
of the pleadings because of the inherently factual nature of the im-
munity "reasonableness" test, as well as the increasingly factual nature
of substantive constitutional law under the now-predominant balanc-
ing regime. If the qualified immunity claim reaches the discovery
stage, as authorized by Anderson, disputes over historical facts, or per-
haps over the inferences to be drawn from those facts, are highly
likely to arise.
Thus, so long as it remains "qualified," or fact dependent, immu-
nity can never be entirely successful (and perhaps not successful at
all) in acting as a barrier to trial or pretrial discovery. Only an abso-
lute immunity, less susceptible to extensive factual nuances, can op-
erate as a trial and pretrial litigation immunity with any measurable
success.4 12 Indeed, much of the reasoning the Court uses to justify
early termination in its qualified immunity analysis is drawn from its
absolute immunity cases, even though the two doctrines operate
quite differently. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove45 the Court
440. See id. at 646 n.6. The Court cautioned, however, that discovery should be limited in
scope to the specific question of entitlement to immunity. See id.
441. SeeGrant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996). That is not to say, how-
ever, that summary judgment cannot be an effective device for eliminatingsome pretrial litiga-
tion burdens. If summary judgment is available on a relatively expedited basis with narrowly
circumscribed discovery, it could partially accomplish the objectives of qualified immunity by
limiting, rather than eliminating, pretrial litigation burdens. The extent to which this is true in
actual constitutional tort litigation is unknown.
442. That is not to say that factual conflicts that preclude early termination of suits under
the absolute immunity doctrine never occur. For example, under current law, whether a
prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends upon whether she was performing a
.prosecutorial" or "investigative" function, a distinction that may well be fact-dependent. See
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (explaining that determining which role a
prosecutor has played depends on the facts of each case). As a practical matter, however, the
courts have been better able to evaluate absolute immunity claims on the pleadings. See Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) (asserting that absolute immunity may overcome a
suit in its initial stages when the official's actions are within the boundaries of immunity).
443. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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declared state legislators absolutely immune from constitutional tort
liability.4 44 In Tenney, the Court emphasized the importance of resolv-
ing immunity claims at the outset of a case.445 Immunity, the Court
observed, "would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected
to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a con-
clusion of the pleader. 44' Similarly, in Barr v. Matteo,447 which held
that certain federal officials were immune from defamation actions,
Justice Harlan's plurality opinion stressed the Court's concern that
official immunity should prevent lawsuits, which "consume time and
energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental serv-
ice.
'4 1
The problem with the Court's extension of policy reasoning from
those decisions to the qualified immunity doctrine is that the goal of
eliminating pretrial burdens can be effectively advanced only with an
absolute immunity; absolute immunity claims, after all, are suscepti-
ble in many cases to resolution based on the pleadings.44 ' Thus, the
barriers to early termination of qualified immunity claims, customar-
ily associated with the now-abandoned "subjective" prong of the in-
quiry and more recently with the assertion of qualified immunity
claims when the underlying constitutional violation embodies a state
of mind requirement, are actually associated with the "qualified" na-
ture of the immunity doctrine itself. Harlow's transformation of a
fact-based qualified immunity into a trial and pretrial litigation im-
munity was like fitting a square peg into a round hole.
This explains in large measure the difficulty the courts have had in
defining the appropriate standard for resolving qualified immunity
claims on summary judgment, in sorting out the extent to which dis-
covery should be permitted on qualified immunity claims, and in de-
444. See id. at 379.
445. See id. at 377.
446. Id&; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 522 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that without absolute immunity, mere allegation of unconstitutional conduct will lead
to litigation burdens that immunity seeks to relieve).
447. 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion).
448. Id. at 571.
449. Although this author has called for more rule-like approaches to immunity law, I do
not advocate complete conversion of qualified immunity into absolute immunity for all public
officials. See Chen, supra note 14, at 346. Rather, I have argued for a reassessment of immunity
in more categorical terms such that some officials or some official functions would be pro-
tected by absolute immunity and all other officials would have to defend constitutional tort
claims on the merits. e id. Moreover, I have maintained, as have others, that any expansion
of absolute immunity categories be coupled with a reexamination of expanding governmental
liability. See id. at 338 & nn.360-62 (referencing SCHUCK, supra note 37, at 100; Schuck, supra
note 92, at 346-51; Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions
Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and ItsProgeny: A CriticalAnalysis, 22U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 249, 276-
79 (1989); John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Stan-
dard, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 462, 485-88 (1990)).
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ciding what role, if any, juries may play in the evaluation of qualified
immunity. As a formal matter, none of these procedural problems
should arise if qualified immunity operated as an effective device to
protect officials not only from liability, but also from the burdens of
trial and pretrial litigation. Complications in these areas occur, how-
ever, once it is recognized that qualified immunity claims cannot be
evaluated without reference to some set of facts.
For example, the courts' confusion about the scope of available
discovery on the immunity claim itself reflects the hybrid nature of
qualified immunity. Once the Supreme Court acknowledged in An-
derson that discovery would be necessary to adjudicate some qualified
immunity claims, it laid the groundwork for substantial confusion
among the lower courts.4 50 Discovery, after all, is the most significant
pretrial litigation burden that the qualified immunity defense was de-
signed to avoid.
Even when courts acknowledge that evaluation of facts is necessary
to decide the qualified immunity issue, however, they generally at-
tempt to isolate the factual issues in a manner that suggests that
qualified immunity can effectively protect officials from substantial
pretrial litigation. It has been suggested, for example, that the
goals of qualified immunity can be achieved even when discovery is
permitted if trial courts carefully limit discovery only to issues neces-
sary to the adjudication of the immunity question.45'2 It is unclear how
discovery could be meaningfully limited, however, because the sub-
stantive constitutional law inquiry and the qualified immunity inquiry
are intertwined. The facts relevant to the immunity issue will be pre-
cisely the same facts necessary for the evaluation of liability. For ex-
ample, to determine whether a police officer made a reasonable mis-
take as to whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless
search, the parties and the court would have to explore the same ba-
sic facts concerning the officer's knowledge of exigent circumstances
to adjudicate both the plaintiffs claim and the officer's qualified
immunity defense.
Further support that qualified immunity has become a hybrid im-
munity comes from the judiciary's treatment of the role of juries in
assessing qualified immunity. Notwithstanding its function as gate-
keeper, qualified immunity can be asserted at many different stages
450. SeeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
451. See id.
452. See id.;seealsoBRUNET ET AL.,supra note 331, § 6.10 (noting that the Court in Anderson
required that discovery be particularly geared to the question of the defendant's qualified im-
munity).
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of the litigation process, including at, or even after, trial.4 3 When
cases reach a jury, courts have had trouble defining what role juries
should play in forming the court's legal judgment about whether the
defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights.454 Some
courts have addressed the issue by giving the jury "special interroga-
tories," which require it to make specific factual findings.45 These
findings are then used by the court as a basis for making the "legal"
determination of whether the defendant violated clearly established
law. 456
The very fact that courts must occasionally address the role of ju-
ries in qualified immunity analysis underscores the hybrid nature of
the defense. Since qualified immunity is supposed to be a question
of law, the jury's role should be irrelevant. At least one court has
recognized, however, that courts can only determine whether a
clearly established right has been compromised if they know what
happened; they must know the historical facts of the incident.47 Yet,
at the same time, the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Bryant admon-
ished the Ninth Circuit for an analysis that "routinely places the ques-
tion of immunity in the hands of the jury."459 This curious phrasing is
itself evidence of qualified immunity's paradoxical qualities. The
Court's language reflects some ambivalence, suggesting that there
may exist some non-routine cases in which qualified immunity, a mat-
ter of law, would be placed in the jury's hands.4a
Most seriously, the Court's creation of this "hybrid" immunity has
severely complicated the task of defining the appropriate summary
judgment standard for assessing qualified immunity claims. In
Hunter, a divided Court could not agree on the correct standard.46'
That case involved a plaintiff who sued two FBI agents after they ar-
453. See, e.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing defendants to assert
their claims of qualified immunity at trial).
454. See, e.g., Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1992) (overruling lower court's
understanding of jury's role in qualified immunity determination). For an analysis of how
courts have allocated different aspects of the qualified immunity determination to the judge
and the jury and suggestions for how these decisions should be made, see Brands, supra note
227, at 1051-64.
455. See, e.g., Warick, 969 F.2d at 305.
456. Sfw, e.g., id.; Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
457. SeeElliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 1991).
458. 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
459. Id. at 228. The Court asserted that the Ninth Circuit disregarded the significance of
Supreme Court cases that stressed resolving questions of immunity at the preliminary stages of
litigation. See id.
460. See id. (explaining that immunity should normally be determined before trial, thus
leaving open the possibility that the determination may be made by ajury at trial in unusual
circumstances).
461. See id. at 235 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (describing Court's disagreement on the proper
summaryjudgment standard).
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rested him in his home, allegedly without probable cause.462 The
agents inferred that the plaintiff, Bryant, made a threat to the Presi-
dent when he appeared on a university campus carrying a rambling
letter claiming that an unidentified "Mr. Image" was going to assassi-
nate President Reagan. 463 A witness told the agents that Bryant had
also said that he [presumably the President] "should have been assas-
sinated in Bonn," and that Bryant made various statements about
"bloody coups," "assassination," and said something about "across the
throat" while moving his hand horizontally across his throat to simu-
late a cutting action.44 After interviewing Bryant and searching his
apartment with his consent, the agents arrested him under a federal
statute making it a crime to threaten the President by knowingly or
willfully depositing a letter or other document in the mail.ss Bryant
was arraigned and held without bond for two weeks, after which the
government dismissed the charges.
Bryant then filed a Bivens action against the two agents, raising sev-
eral claims. The trial court dismissed all of Bryant's claims except his
contentions that the agents violated his rights because they arrested
him without a warrant or probable cause.467 The court denied the de-
fendants' summary judgment motion for qualified immunity on
those two claims.'64 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the agents' immunity claim only with respect to Bryant's contention
that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him
without probable cause.469 The court concluded that the agents had
failed to sustain their "burden" of establishing qualified immunity.470
The agents claimed that they had probable cause, or a reasonable be-
lief that there was probable cause, because they believed that "Mr.
Image" referred to Bryant himself.47' The court disagreed, conclud-
ing that the agents' interpretation was not the most reasonable read-
462. See id. at 226.
463. See id. at 225.
464. See id.
465. See 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994). It is not clear how the agents understood the plaintiff to
have violated the mailing element of the statute, but that was not an issue in the case. See
Hunter, 502 U.S. at 225.
466. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 226.
467. See id.
468. See id.
469. See Bryant v. United States Treasury Dep't, 903 F.2d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 1990),rev'd sub
nom. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991). The Ninth Circuit held that the agents were enti-
fled to qualified immunity on the warrantless arrest claim because it was not clearly established
whether a person who consented to the entry of his home could be arrested without a warrant.
See id. The general rule requires law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant in order to enter
a person's home to arrest her. See Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
470. See Bryant, 903 F.2d at 722.
471. See id.
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ing of Bryant's letter." The court felt that it was more reasonable for
the police to conclude that Bryant's letter was providing a warning. 3
Moreover, the court concluded that the qualified immunity issue,
whether a reasonable officer could have believed she had probable
cause, should be resolved by the trier of fact, and that further factual
development was necessary before such a determination could be
made.4
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit framed its holding in an unclear
manner. On one hand, the court accurately stated the conventional
svmmary judgment standard as established in Liberty Lobby.475 The
court held that the agents, as moving parties, could prevail on sum-
mary judgment only if the jury could reach but "one reasonable con-
clusion.'17' This is simply the converse of stating that summary judg-
ment must be denied if the nonmoving party presents evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party.47 7 A rea-
sonable jury could find that no reasonable officer could have be-
lieved probable cause to arrest Bryant existed in this case. On the
other hand, the court went too far when it concluded that a "more
reasonable" interpretation of Bryant's letter was possible.4'78
Focusing on the latter conclusion, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed.'79 The Court held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the law
of qualified immunity when it denied summary judgment to the
agents on the basis of a genuine dispute of material fact that required
ajury to assess "whether a reasonable officer could have believed he
had probable cause."48 ° The Court held that the proper inquiry
should be "whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in
the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reason-
able, interpretation of the events can be constructed five years after
the fact.'"' Thus, the Court concluded that the undisputed facts
were sufficient to demonstrate that, at the very least, the agents made
a reasonable conclusion that probable cause existed.4 2
472. See id.
473. See id.
474. Seeid. at 721.
475. See id. at 719.
476. Id. at 721. Of course, this is the proper standard only assuming that the plaintiff bears
the burden of persuasion on the qualified immunity defense. It is not clear under current law
whether that is the case. See infra notes 566-91 and accompanying text.
477. Sep Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (explaining when sum-
mary judgment will be granted).
478. See Bryant, 903 F.2d at 722.
479. Se Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991).
480. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Bryant, 903 F.2d at 721).
481. Id. at 228.
482. See id. at 228-29. The Court also criticized the Ninth Circuit's statement of the sum-
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The Court was sharply divided on the appropriate summary judg-
ment standard. Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed
that the Ninth Circuit had applied an incorrect standard. 83 He be-
lieved that the Ninth Circuit had identified the correct standard, but
applied it incorrectly, although he did not elaborate on the specifics
of that standard.4 4
Justice Stevens dissented because, although he believed the Ninth
Circuit employed the appropriate standard, he also believed the ap-
pellate court correctly applied the standard in denying summary
judgment.485 Consistent with his dissent in Anderson, Justice Stevens
agreed with the court of appeals that summary judgment for the de-
fendants was not appropriate in this procedural posture. He agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the agents' reasonableness
was a question for the trier of fact, and that summary judgment
would be proper "only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a
jury could reach." 86 Justice Stevens concluded that while the officers
may have had some evidence that Bryant was mentally unstable or de-
lusional, they did not have sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause that he had actually threatened the President. Because, un-
der summary judgment rules, the facts must be read in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party (in this case, Bryant), Justice Ste-
vens argued that the defendants should not have prevailed in their
contention that a reasonable officer could have concluded that there
was a sufficient basis for probable cause.4ss
Noting the substantial disagreement on the Court concerning the
appropriate standard to be applied to summary judgment motions on
qualified immunity grounds, Justice Kennedy dissented from the
Court's summary resolution.489 Justice Kennedy was concerned that
the Court's opinion provided insufficient guidance to lower courts
and government officials.49 He also expressed doubt about the
Ninth Circuit's holding, stating that the majority opinion below did
mary judgment standard because "it routinely places the question of immunity in the hands of
the jury," whereas immunity issues should "ordinarily" be decided by the court long before
trial. See id. at 228.
483. See id. at 229 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
484. See id.
485. See id. at 229, 234 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
486. Id. at 233 (internal citations omitted).
487. See id. at 230-32.
488. See id. at 234.
489. See id. at 234-35 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
490. See id. at 235.
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not appear to consider all the facts on which the agents based their
probable cause determination. 9'
Given its inartful explanation of the law, the Hunter decision has
left lower courts in a quandary regarding the proper application of
conventional summary judgment doctrine to qualified immunity
claims. The direction these courts have taken, however, indicates
that they recognize that factual issues often complicate, or even make
impossible, the evaluation of qualified immunity under ordinary
summary judgment standards.
B. Lower Courts' Responses to the Hybrid Nature of Qualified Immunity-
Contextual Alteration of SummatyJudgment Doctrine
The substantial factual component that is built into qualified im-
munity analysis has created problems in establishing a coherent ana-
lytical approach to adjudicating the defense. Specifically, as the
Court's decision in Hunter highlights, these factual issues have made
it more difficult to evaluate qualified immunity under the conven-
tional framework of federal summary judgment law. Richard Marcus
has argued that courts have responded to the unavailability or diffi-
culty of obtaining summary judgment, particularly in areas of law
such as antitrust, securities, and civil rights that raise complex factual
issues or turn on the parties' state of mind, with a corresponding
"revival of fact pleading." 91 In other words, the courts have re-
sponded to the ineffectiveness of summary judgment in filtering such
claims by heightening the pleading standards and dismissing cases at
an earlier stage of litigation. 3
A similar pattern has emerged in response to the lower courts'
problems administering the fact-based qualified immunity defense.
The burden of adjudicating qualified immunity under the present
analytical regime has generated two responses. First, some federal
circuits have moved toward heightened pleading requirements, at
least in cases in which the defendant's state of mind is an element of
the alleged constitutional violation. Second, other lower courts have
modified traditional summary judgment analysis in the context of
qualified immunity claims.
491. Se id. Justice Kennedy also thought the proper interpretation of the criminal statute,
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994), was an important question that likewise deserved full adjudication.
See id. at 234-35.
492. Marcus, supra note 332, at 436.
493. See id. Courts have implemented heightened pleading requirements most often in the
above mentioned areas of law, which the courts have perceived as contributing to the
"litigation boom" burdening the federal court dockets. See id.
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Several circuits have required plaintiffs to meet heightened plead-
ing standards when qualified immunity is asserted. In Elliott v. Perez,
494
the Fifth Circuit adopted a heightened pleading requirement for all
constitutional tort claims against officials who claim absolute or
qualified immunity.4 15 Allowing such cases to go forward with discov-
ery, the court argued, would reintroduce the same barriers to pretrial
resolution that existed before Harlow and would undermine the very
purpose of immunity by requiring the defendants to participate in
potentially burdensome pretrial litigation.499 Perez held that in consti-
tutional tort cases, trial courts must require a plaintiff to file "a de-
tailed complaint alleging with particularity all material facts on which
he contends he will establish his right to recovery, which will include
detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity
cannot be sustained."4 97  Thus, notwithstanding ordinary notice
pleading requirements, plaintiffs must anticipate and plead around
the affirmative defense of immunity.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar heightened pleading re-
quirement, but it has generally limited this requirement to cases in
which the plaintiff asserts that the defendant acted with subjective in-
tent to violate plaintiffs rights (or with some other requisite state of
mind) .4"' Decisions in this Circuit have reasoned that in the absence
of higher pleading burdens, plaintiffs in state of mind cases would be
able to avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds be-
cause state of mind issues often cannot be resolved without a trial.41
Thus, for the same reasons that the Supreme Court eliminated the
subjective component of qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit re-
quires the plaintiff to assert some facts, based on either direct or cir-
494. 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
495. See id. at 1473. Although many lower federal courts also have imposed heightened
pleading requirements for all civil rights claims, not just those in which qualified immunity was
an issue, that topic is beyond the scope of this Article. For general discussions of heightened
pleading requirements in civil rights cases, see Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application
of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. Ri-wV. 935, 990
(1990) (concluding that heightened pleading for civil rights cases is not consistent with current
structure of federal civil procedure); Blum, Heightened Pleading, supra note 264, at 62-63
(criticizing heightened pleading requirements and arguing for application of ordinary sum-
mary judgment procedures); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints:
A Step Forward ora Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677, 693 (1984) (arguing against stricter pleading
standard in civil rights cases).
496. See Perez, 751 F.2d at 1477-79.
497. Id. at 1482. As discussed below, the Fifth Circuit has replaced the Perez rule with a dif-
ferent procedural structure. See infra notes 506-07 and accompanying text.
498. SeeBranch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit also had a
strict heightened pleading requirement, but recently overruled its decisions imposing that re-
quirement, replacing it with a new procedural structure. See infra notes 521-26 and accompany-
ing text.
499. See Branch, 937 F.2d at 1386.
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cumstantial evidence, suggesting that the defendant had the requisite
state of mind.i
The Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,50' however, casts doubt upon
the imposition of heightened pleading requirements. In Leatherman,
the Court held that federal courts could not impose heightened
pleading standards in § 1983 civil rights claims asserting municipal
liability because such claims were not among those that Rule 9(b)0 2
excepts from the general pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) .5 3 The
Court did not rule whether courts could adopt heightened pleading
requirements under qualified immunity.
5 4
Since the Court decided Leatherman, most circuits have continued
to adhere to their earlier decisions requiring plaintiffs to meet a
more substantial pleading burden."5 In response to Leatherman,
however, two circuits have modified their approaches to the height-
ened pleading issue. In Schultea v. Wood,506 the Fifth Circuit removed
the Perez heightened pleading requirement and announced that it
would "no longer insist that plaintiff fully anticipate the defense in
his complaint at the risk of dismissal under Rule 12.'' Although the
court denied that Leatherman controlled its decision, it adopted a new
procedural requirement to guide trial courts in processing qualified
immunity claims. 8
Schultea held that once a defendant asserts a qualified immunity
defense, the trial court may, in its discretion, order plaintiffs to file a
reply under Rule 7(a) that responds to the defense with detailed,
fact-specific assertions.5l0 The court observed that it could impose
500. See id. at 1386-87.
501. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
502. Rule 9(b) requires more particularized pleadings regarding allegations of fraud or
mistake than for other matters. See FED. 1L Civ. P. 9(b).
503. Se, Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. Rule 8(a) (2) merely requires "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).
504. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166-67.
505. See Blum, Heightened Pleading, supra note 264, at 75-87 (examining circuit court height-
ened pleading requirements after Leatherman).
506. 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). For an analysis endorsing the Fifth Circuit's
approach in Schultea, based on policy considerations, but arguing that the Federal Rules must
be amended in order to fully implement a reply requirement for qualified immunity claims,
see Eric Kugler, Note, A 1983 Hurdle: J-ilteringMeritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage,
15 REv. LrrlG. 551,559, 564-65 (1996).
507. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
508. Se, id.
509. SeFED. I. CIv. P. 7(a). Rule 7(a) defines the allowable forms of pleading, which in-
clude a "reply to a counterclaim denominated as such." Id
510. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432-34. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar approach, al-
though it has not formally cast it in terms of a Rule 7 reply. SeeVeney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917,
922 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion to
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such a requirement because the "short and plain statement" re-
quirements of Rule 8 do not govern Rule 7 replies. 5' It also empha-
sized that the new rule was intended to narrow trial courts' discretion
in ordering such replies.12 As with its decision in Perez, the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not limit its new procedural requirement to constitutional
tort claims in which the defendant's state of mind was an issue.5 1 3 By
adopting this approach, the court avoided addressing the tension be-
tween the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) and the policy
rationale of limiting the burdens of pretrial litigation under qualified
immunity.
Schultea, however, continued the improper focus on pleading rules
as the appropriate procedural vehicle for vetting qualified immunity
claims. 4 In contrast, in Elliott v. Thomas,'s the Seventh Circuit articu-
lated a heightened evidentiary burden for constitutional tort plain-
tiffs who seek to defeat qualified immunity claims where the defen-
dant's state of mind is an element of the underlying constitutional
violation.5'6 The court observed that it was misleading to characterize
additional burdens on plaintiffs in responding to qualified immunity
claims as pleading requirements. 7  Instead, the court properly ad-
dressed the plaintiffs burden as involving "the minimum quantum of
proof required to defeat the initial motion for summary judgment."'s
Although the court properly understood this issue as an evidentiary
and not a pleading requirement, it nonetheless drew on Justice Ken-
nedy's concurring opinion in Siegert v. Gilley.5"9 The court in Elliott
stated that the plaintiff would be required to "produce 'specific, non-
conclusory factual allegations which establish [the necessary mental
state], or face dismissal.'- 52
0
dismiss, the plaintiff must amend her complaint to include specific, non-conclusory allegations
of fact that will enable the trial court to determine whether those facts, if proved, would over-
come the qualified immunity defense).
511. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
512. See id. at 1434.
513. See id. at 1431.
514. See id. at 1432-33.
515. 937 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991).
516. See id. at 345.
517. See id.
518. Id.
519. Seid. (citing Siegertv. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy,J., concurring)).
520. Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236
(Kennedy,J., concurring)). Other courts have since adopted a similar approach. See Sheppard
v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting requirement that when defendant
moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the underlying constitutional
claim requires a showing of improper motive, plaintiff must proffer particularized evidence of
direct or circumstantial facts supporting motive claim); Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535
(10th Cir. 1995) (adopting requirement that plaintiff must respond to summary judgment mo-
tion for qualified immunity by establishing legal motivation with specific and concrete evi-
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In Crawford-El v. Britton,521 the D.C. Circuit went even further, hold-
ing that there should be a heightened standard of proof for plaintiffs
in state of mind cases. 2 The court's earlier decisions not only had
imposed a heightened pleading requirement for state of mind cases,
but also had required the plaintiff to plead direct evidence of the de-
fendant's state of mind in order to survive a pleading motion2 In
Crawford-El, the D.C. Circuit replaced the direct evidence pleading
standard with a heightened evidentiary standard for defeating a de-
fendant's summary judgment motion. 4 First, it held that "[a] plain-
tiff cannot defeat a summary judgment motion unless, prior to dis-
covery, he offers specific, non-conclusory assertions of evidence, in
affidavits or other materials suitable for summary judgment, from
which a fact finder could infer the forbidden motive. ' ?" Thus, the
Crawford-El rule forbids any discovery prior to plaintiffs response to
the defendant's summary judgment motion on qualified immunity.
Second, the court imposed a heightened evidentiary standard that
requires the plaintiff, both at trial and on summary judgment, to
carry the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind in depriving the
plaintiff of her constitutional rights.5 26
As argued above, however, the problems associated with factual
disputes under qualified immunity are in no way limited to constitu-
tional tort claims involving the defendant's state of mind. At least
one other court has articulated a summary judgment standard for the
qualified immunity defense in all contexts, thus making it more diffi-
cult for a constitutional tort plaintiff to survive summary judgment
than for other plaintiffs. In Ellis v. Wynalda,52 7 the Seventh Circuit
clearly laid out the precise burdens that plaintiffs responding to
qualified immunity claims must meet. The case involved a § 1983
claim brought by a burglary suspect against a police officer who shot
dence).
521. 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997).
522. e id. at 815.
523. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that a plaintiff
charging a government official for constitutional deprivation must provide direct evidence of
intent in the pleadings when the outcome depends on defendant's state of mind), vacated on
other grounds, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
524. See Crawford-E 93 F.3d at 815.
525. Id. at 819.
526. See id. at 821-23. This unprecedented heightening of the evidentiary burden for civil
rights plaintiffs appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's general presumption that
the preponderance of evidence standard applies in most civil actions. See. Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (stating that presumption is that preponderance of evidence standard
applies unless "'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.'" (quoting
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,389-90 (1983))).
527. 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1993).
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him in the back during an arrest."' Although the court rejected the
officer's qualified immunity claim, it elaborated its understanding of
the burdens associated with defeating that claim in important dicta.
The [qualified immunity] doctrine is valuable in order to describe
the unusual "burden" on the non-moving party at the summary
judgment stage. While ordinarily a court grants summary judg-
ment only if no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party, a court grants summary judgment based on qualified immu-
nity if a reasonable officer could find the defendant's actions justi-
fied. When reasonable minds could differ, in the typical summary judg-
ment decision the balance tips in favor of the nonmovant while in the
qualified immunity context the balance favors the movant.
529
This rather bold statement of the law acknowledges quite explicitly
that the qualified immunity doctrine, at least in the Seventh Circuit,
has not only transformed constitutional tort law, but also has re-
shaped the summary judgment doctrine.
Elliott, Crawford-El, and Ellis represent extraordinary transforma-
tions of summary judgment law to accommodate the unique factual
nature of qualified immunity claims. To the credit of those courts,
however, they do acknowledge the evidentiary component of the
summary judgment standard for qualified immunity. To that end,
they at least begin to approach the issue from an analytically coher-
ent perspective (or at least from the most analytically coherent per-
spective possible).
At the same time, these decisions radically transform summary
judgment law in a manner that substantially affects plaintiffs' rights to
adjudicate constitutional tort claims. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in
Crawford-El severely limits plaintiffs' opportunities to pursue ordinary
discovery to collect evidence that will support their opposition to
summary judgment 30 This seems at least partly inconsistent with
Rule 56(f),53' which affords trial courts discretion to permit some dis-
528. See id. at 245-46.
529. Id. at 246 n.2 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
530. See Crawford-E; 93 F.3d at 819-23.
531. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(0. What is more, the Crawford-El rule appears to be inconsistent
with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires mandatory disclosure of
basic discovery information. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Indeed, several of the reforms from the
1993 amendments to the Federal Rules may affect the manner in which the Court structures
qualified immunity doctrine in future cases. For example, the presumptive limits on interroga-
tories and depositions, see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (2) (A) and FED. R. CIv. P. 33(a), may streamline
the process and minimize some of the relevant pretrial litigation burdens that have driven the
Court's development of qualified immunity law. At the same time, Rule 26(a)'s mandatory dis-
closure requirements may ameliorate the harsh effects of the lower courts' responses to quali-
fied immunity's factual nature by providing plaintiffs with some information that may allow
them to respond meaningfully to a summary judgment motion. I am indebted to Steve Green-
berger for pointing out to me the potential implications of the new discovery rules on qualified
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covery before a summary judgment motion is adjudicated. The deci-
sion also dramatically heightened the burden of persuasion for con-
stitutional tort plaintiffs in state of mind cases in an unprecedented
manner.
Even these harsh transformations, however, cannot completely
eliminate the fact-based nature of the qualified immunity inquiry.
Critically, the Crawford-El court distinguished discovery concerning
an official's knowledge from discovery regarding that official's in-
tent.53 2 Discovery of the former, the court concluded, continues to be
permissible under Anderson. 3 Under the current doctrinal formula-
tion of qualified immunity, however, factual disputes regarding the
official's knowledge are as likely to exist as those surrounding her
state of mind.134 Thus, these courts' efforts to expedite resolution of
qualified immunity claims may not be entirely successful.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Ellis represents an equally alarm-
ing departure from ordinary summary judgment practice. The
court's decision completely alters the burdens so carefully laid out in
the Supreme Court's summary judgment trilogy. Under Liberty Lobby,
if the defendant shifts the burden of production to the plaintiff
(assuming the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion on this issue),
the plaintiff may meet this burden by producing evidence sufficient
to convince a reasonable jury to rule in her favor.515 But Ellis suggests
that if reasonable minds could differ about the meaning of the evi-
dence, a situation that typically would be regarded as suited for a
trier of fact, then the defendant should prevail before trial, and the
judge should dismiss the case.536
The consequences of such a rule, if widely accepted, would be as-
tounding. The Ellis language implies that in order to overcome a de-
fendant's summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds, the plaintiff must show that no reasonable jury could find
for the defendant on the qualified immunity defense. 57 This com-
pletely turns the tables on plaintiffs. Ellis converts the burden on a
plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, from simply responding with evi-
immunity law.
532. Ser Crawford-4 93 F.3d at 820-21; see also Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873
& n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that determination of whether genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists requires examination of facts regarding an official's conduct and knowledge, but not her
intent).
533. See, Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 820 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41
(1987)).
534. Sevsupra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
535. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
536. Ser Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993).
537. See id.
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dence that could lead a jury to return a verdict for her, to meeting
the higher burden of a moving party who has the burden of persua-
sion at trial on the particular issue. Assuming that the plaintiff need
only prove her case-in-chief by a preponderance of the evidence
(which remains the general rule even after Crawford-El), the Ellis lan-
guage requires the plaintiff to meet a higher burden just to survive a
summary judgment motion than she would have to meet at trial to
win the case on the merits.53
These developments reflect the complicated interpretive moves the
lower courts must make in response to the hybrid nature of a fact-
based immunity analysis that is intended to resolve claims at the ear-
liest stage of litigation. It is odd that these cases are modifying sum-
mary judgment procedure in a manner that may often preclude dis-
covery on qualified immunity. This arguably conflicts with Rule
56(f), which provides trial courts with discretion to deny a summary
judgment motion when the nonmoving party has not had an ade-
quate opportunity for discovery.39 Moreover, these decisions alter
the general understanding of summary judgment burdens, at least in
this specific substantive context.50 As Judge Edwards contended in
his concurring opinion in Crawford-El, the D.C. Circuit's adoption of
special rules for constitutional torts with state of mind issues is "in
complete defiance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, inventing
evidentiary standards out of whole cloth and overlaying them onto
538. One district court has made a similar observation about the requirement in some cir-
cuits that the plaintiff come forward with direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence of the
defendant's illegal motivation in order to survive a summary judgment motion on qualified
immunity. See Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 199 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting direct evi-
dence standard for state of mind cases on ground that it would be illogical to require plaintiff
to meet a higher burden in response to a summary judgment motion than she would need to
show at trial), affd, 79 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1996).
539. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 56(0. Rule 56(0, in part, states: "[T]he court may refuse the appli-
cation for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or deposi-
tions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make any such other order as isjust." Id.
540. A great deal of discussion surrounds the question of whether summary judgment and
similar procedural rules should be transsubstantive, applied equally to all substantive areas of
law. For a general discussion of the transsubstantive nature of summary judgment, see BRUNET
ET AL., supra note 331, § 6.01. Nonetheless, a large body of summary judgment literature has
questioned whether different standards may be necessary for certain areas of law that pose par-
ticular difficulties and policy concerns regarding pretrial resolution of claims. See, e.g., Robert
Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-39
(1975) (exploring the tension between a transsubstantitive code and the need to address a par-
ticular substantive objective);Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 494, 512 (1986) ("With a single paradigm, it is easier to overlook the saliency of
the distinctions among various kinds of cases and hence to underestimate the need for rule-
making to take variation into account."). If courts deem qualified immunity to be an area of
law that should be treated with different summary judgment rules, discourse regarding the
benefits and costs of such a transformation ought to be broader and more explicit.
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the established procedures for adjudicating lawsuits in our federal
courts.5 4 '
Some courts have offered a specific justification for their interfer-
ence with federal civil procedure rules for the purpose of facilitating
summary resolution of qualified immunity claims. While recognizing
that their decisions alter procedural rules of general applicability,
these courts have concluded that to do otherwise would allow the
rules of civil procedure to alter public officials' substantive right of
qualified immunity, which would violate the Rules Enabling Act.542
On this view, courts have empowered themselves to tailor exceptions
to the Federal Rules to ensure protection of qualified immunity
rights.
But in enabling summary resolution of qualified immunity claims,
the courts are also conceivably altering both constitutional tort doc-
trine and substantive constitutional law. Indeed, perhaps a better ar-
gument could be made that the right to remedial relief for constitu-
tional violations, explicitly recognized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and by
Bivens, is a substantive one, and that a right not to be tried on a pos-
sible constitutional tort claim is procedural. 43 Surprisingly, however,
the courts have not addressed whether these judicially-created excep-
tions to the ordinary course of civil procedure might violate the Rules
Enabling Act by altering the substantive rights of civil rights plaintiffs
to enforce important constitutional rights.
Moreover, even accepting the lower courts' tinkering with sum-
mary judgment procedure to accommodate the policies underlying
qualified immunity as legitimate, it is not altogether clear that such
procedures offer much promise in facilitating early termination of
civil rights claims. Ample opportunities for factual disputes remain.
Even the D.C. Circuit in Crawford-El recognized that pretrial discovery
may be necessary to explore what the official knew at the time of her
actions. 44 The Supreme Court's decision in Hunter also acknowl-
edged that the factual circumstances facing the defendant are rele-
541. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Edwards,J., con-
curring), ceri. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997).
542. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"); see Crawford-E4 93 F.3d at 820 (concluding
that the federal rules cannot be read to trump official's right to immunity); Schultea v. Wood,
47 F.3d 1427, 1436 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (same).
543. SeElliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) (" It is hard to depict a 'right
not to be tried' as substantive; it sounds distinctly procedural.").
544. See Crawford-E4 93 F.3d at 819-20; see also Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873
& n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that it may be necessary to inquire into the officer's knowl-
edge of the facts and circumstances in order to evaluate reasonable suspicion or probable
cause).
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vant to the immunity inquiry.45 This is merely a different form of
state of mind inquiry than one directed at motive.
These multifaceted efforts to refine the procedural details of liti-
gating qualified immunity reflect the lower courts' frustration with
the Supreme Court's inability to adequately articulate how to assign
the various summary judgment burdens. Conceivably, what may be
occurring without explicit discussion is that federal courts now view
entitlement to qualified immunity not as a pure matter of law, but as
a question of "ultimate fact." 45
Rather than following a strict dichotomy, a continuum exists be-
tween "pure" questions of law at one extreme and questions of
"historical" fact at the other.547 Courts can resolve pure questions of
law by the application of legal principles to a set of undisputed
facts.5 48 For example, issues involving the meaning of a particular• • • 549
word in a statute or the Constitution are legal issues. If no disputed
facts exist, the assessment of whether a necessary element of a claim
or defense has been met is a purely legal one.55 In contrast, a
"historical" fact is "a thing done, an action performed, or an event or
occurrence,"55' such as a trigger pulled, a fist swung, or a word spo-
ken. The trier of fact has the responsibility of resolving disputes over
historical facts, or concerning reasonable inferences to be drawn
from such facts. 5'2
The middle area of this continuum presents the most difficult ana-
lytical problems, but that may be where qualified immunity lies.
Many litigated disputes center on the application of a legal rule or
standard to a set of historical facts that are disputed. In some con-
texts, this hybrid question is characterized as a "mixed question of
law and fact," which generally requires resolution of the historical
fact issues before the legal issues.54 AsJudge Schwarzer has observed,
"[c]onstitutional issues, though generally questions of law, may be
mixed questions when they turn on factual determinations."555
545. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1991).
546. See Schwarzer et al., Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 333, at 456-57 (describing
.ultimate fact" as one that is "derived by reasoning or inference from evidence").
547. See id. at 454-55.
548. See id. at 455-56.
549. See id.
550. See id. at 455.
551. Id.
552. See id.
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Another type of law/fact hybrid is what are often described as
questions of "ultimate fact." Ultimate facts also involve the applica-
tion of standards of law to particular facts, but have a decidedly more
law-like aspect to them.
Ultimate facts present a different kind of "factual" inquiry, one in-
volving a process that "implies the application of standards of law."
Like some historical facts, ultimate facts are derived by reasoning
or inference from evidence, but, like issues of law, they incorporate
legal principles or policies that give them independent legal sig-
nificance. They often involve the characterization of historical facts,
and their resolution is generally outcome-determinative. 56
Ultimate facts can be more "factual" (e.g., whether a driver recklessly
or negligently operated an automobile), or more "legal" (e.g.,
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure for First Amendment
purposes) ."
The determination of whether the jury or the court should resolve
a question of ultimate fact is a functional one. If the resolution of
the question requires "an assessment of human behavior and expec-
tations within the common experience" of the average person, then a
jury should decide the issue.5 8 The judge should resolve ultimate
fact questions that relate to matters of law and policy and disputes in-
volving technical issues underlying the legal scheme, as long as no
evidentiary dispute exists. 55 Legally-laden ultimate fact issues are
those in which "[t]he administration of the rules under which they
arise benefits from consistency, uniformity, and predictability. ''56° In
other words, strong policy reasons suggest that the wiser course is for
legal "experts" to resolve these questions. 1
Although no court has made this assertion, one could argue that
qualified immunity should be a question of ultimate fact because of
its decided policy-orientation. In this manner, courts could more
explicitly treat qualified immunity claims, even ones with factual
complexities, as legal policy matters. 2 Courts may already be follow-
556. Id. at 456-57 (internal citations omitted).




561. See id. at 459; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 501 n.17 (1984) (asserting that in cases "[r]egarding certain largely factual questions in
some areas of the law, the stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are
too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact").
562. Judge Schwarzer has discussed this proposition briefly. See Schwarzer et al., Summary
Judgment Motions, supra note 333, at 460 (suggesting that Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987), can be understood as characterizing qualified immunity as a policy-based issued to be
decided by courts).
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ing this course, whether consciously or not. Some courts have at least
acknowledged that this analysis is conceptually possible. For exam-
ple, Judge Posner wrote that "[i]t is unresolved whether the official
can ask the district judge to find the facts, if they are contested,
rather than letting the factual issues that bear on immunity be re-
solved by the jury (if there is ajury) along with the merits."' Sound
criticisms of this approach are also worth considering'i"' Indeed, un-
der ordinary summary judgment law, a judge is not permitted to
"find" facts, a role properly left exclusively for the jury.56
If courts are undertaking a sub silentio movement toward reconcep-
tualizing qualified immunity as an ultimate fact question, it is unclear
whether they comprehend what they are doing or the implications of
their actions. Moreover, this transformation may be occurring with-
out explicit recognition of or a proper appreciation for the source of
the complications-the factual component of qualified immunity-
or for the serious policy ramifications of such a change. In addition,
as Judge Norris has observed, the procedural complexities of admin-
istering a rule that treats at least some aspects of qualified immunity
as ultimate fact questions need to be fully contemplated."" It is in-
cumbent upon the courts to explicitly discuss this issue and to engage
in a public dialogue about the necessity for and implications of such
a dramatic transformation in the conventional understanding of both
qualified immunity and summary judgment.
C. Understanding Burdens of Persuasion on a Legally-Based
Affirmative Defense
It is noteworthy that while the lower courts have struggled to mod-
ify summary judgment procedures to fit the special case of qualified
immunity, they have failed to address a foundational question at the
563. Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d
1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1992);Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1988)). The
Seventh Circuit, without discussion, has once referred to qualified immunity as a question of
ultimate fact, but has not undertaken an explicit evaluation of this issue. See Egger v. Phillips,
669 F.2d 497,504 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1976)),
vacated on reh'g, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Moreover, Egger suggested that the ul-
timate fact issue of qualified immunity should be resolved by ajury, see id., which is in conflict
with the general understanding of the concept. For a general discussion of how courts have
decided these issues should be allocated between the judge and the jury, see Brands, supra note
227, at 1051-56.
564. SeeAct Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris,J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc) (observing that allowing judges a role in determining
the "fact-bound" issue of reasonableness will create "procedural nightmares").
565. SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
566. See Act up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 875 (Norris,J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
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heart of summary judgment: where and how to allocate the burden
of persuasion on a qualified immunity defense. A major controversy
within summary judgment doctrine concerns the initial burdens on
the party moving for summary judgment and the responsive burdens
of the nonmoving party. Both issues are entirely dependent upon
which party bears the burden of persuasion on the particular issue on
which summary judgment is sought. Before courts may apply sum-
mary judgment procedure to a particular claim, therefore, they must
first determine which party bears the burden of persuasion.
The Supreme Court has never clarified whether the plaintiff or the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion on the defense of qualified
immunity.6 In Gomez v. Toledo,s the Court held that qualified im-
munity is an affirmative defense, and therefore, must be asserted by
the defendant or waived. 569 The Court specifically reserved the bur-
den of persuasion issue, however, and has never returned to answer
this critical question. °
While several commentators have observed the lack of a clear bur-
den of persuasion under qualified immunity, they have generally
failed to address the conceptual difficulty with the issue. 7' Rather
than acknowledge that a burden of persuasion on a question of law
may be nonsensical, courts and commentators have attempted in-
stead to dissect factual elements of the claim and propose assign-
ments of the burdens of persuasion with respect to these different
elements. 2
The Court's failure to identify evidentiary burdens on the qualified
immunity defense has left lower courts in the unenviable position of
attempting to articulate the relevant burdens on summary judgment.
The lower federal courts have struggled with this issue for years,
never satisfactorily resolving the problem.5" The courts' attempts at
567. See Kinports, Unanswered Questions, supra note 28, at 634.
568. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
569. See id. at 640.
570. See id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (basing concurrence on understanding that
the Court did not decide the burden of persuasion issue); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815 n.24 (1982) (noting that Gomezdid not decide burden of proof for qualified immunity
claims).
571. See, e.g., Ignall, supra note 263, at 207 (noting unclear law on burden on persuasion for
qualified immunity); Kinports, Unanswered Questions, supra note 28, at 634-42 (discussing how
the Court in Harlow failed to make clear which party bears the burden of proof on the qualified
immunity defense); A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity in Section 1983 & Bivens Actions,
71 TEx. L. R.EN 123, 165-68 (1992) (noting confusion about burden of persuasion for qualified
immunity).
572. See Kattan, supra note 235, at 986-89 (discussing burden of proof before Harlow);
McKenzie, supra note 427, at 694-95 (attempting to delineate the various burdens of persuasion
derived from Harlow).
573. See, e.g., Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff
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clarifying procedural and evidentiary burdens have been poorly con-
ceived and betray a misunderstanding of the basic concepts of proof
burdens on affirmative defenses. Even sophisticated federal appel-
late courts routinely demonstrate their lack of comprehension on
this issue 74
Some federal courts of appeal, for example, have taken the posi-
tion that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that constitutional
rights she asserts the defendant violated were "clearly established. 575
Some courts assign to the defendant the initial "burden" of proving
that she was engaged in a "discretionary function. '76 Others require
the plaintiff to not only "prove" that the law was clearly established,
but also that the defendants' conduct violated that clearly established
law.577 In contrast, some courts assign the defendant the burden of
proving, or "demonstrating," that her actions were objectively rea-
sonable. 578 Other courts make that determination by analyzing the
"bears the burden of proof," an evidentiary burden, on the issue of qualified immunity, but
citing cases in which courts conclude that plaintiff bears the burden of"establishing the exis-
tence of a clearly established right," a legal question (citing McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 570
(7th Cir. 1995); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1209 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc))).
574. See, e.g., id.
575. See, e.g., Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1483 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plain-
tiff bears burden of showing that the law was clearly established when the defendant violated
the plaintiff's rights); Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he plaintiffs
burden in responding to a request forjudgment based on qualified immunity is to identify the
universe of statutory or decisional law from which the court can determine whether the right
allegedly violated was clearly established."), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 510 (1994); see also
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 233 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiff
"bears the burden of proving that the right which the defendants allegedly violated was clearly
established").
576. See, e.g., Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1988); Saldana v. Garza, 684
F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982).
577. See, e.g., Romero v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging plaintiff must both articulate clearly established right and show how defen-
dant's conduct violated that right), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1073 (1996); Blackwell v. Barton, 34
F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1994) (placing burden on plaintiff "to come forward with summary
judgment evidence sufficient to sustain a determination that [defendant's] actions violated
clearly established federal law"); Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law
and that such law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred."); Taylor v. Bow-
ers, 966 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that even when plaintiff alleges acts that violate
clearly established law, summaryjudgment is appropriate if plaintiff does not produce evidence
that defendant in fact committed those acts). One court has even suggested that the defendant
need only assert qualified immunity to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff to
"demonstrate that the unlawfulness of the conduct was 'apparent' in the light of pre-existing
law." Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 627 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). But see Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that it was
inappropriate for trial court to instructjury in a manner that seemed to heighten plaintiffs
burden of proof to establish that defendants "clearly" violated law). Some courts only require
plaintiff to meet this burden after the defendant has met the initial burden of showing that she
was engaged in an exercise of discretionary authority. See Rich, 841 F.2d at 1563-64; Saldana,
684 F.2d at 1164-65.
578. See, e.g., Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Since qualified immunity is
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facts presented without requiring any demonstration on the part of
the defendant, and in some cases requiring the plaintiff to submit
evidence supporting the inference of objective unreasonableness 7 9
Much of the analysis in the lower court opinions that have recently
modified summary judgment doctrine in the context of qualified
immunity has ignored the critical burden of persuasion, or has im-
plicitly assumed that it is borne by the plaintiff. For example, the en-
tire procedural structure in Crawford-El implicitly depends upon the
plaintiff bearing the ultimate burden of persuasion not only on the
underlying constitutional tort claim, but also on the qualified immu-
nity issue.5"° This must be the D.C. Circuit's assumption, because its
decision not only allocates the burden of persuasion, but also ele-
vates the evidentiary burden from the ordinary preponderance stan-
dard to a clear and convincing evidence standard.58' Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Ellis v. Wynalda effectively shifts the
burden of persuasion on qualified immunity to the plaintiff by re-
an affirmative defense that the defendants have the burden of raising in their answer and estab-
lishing at trial or on a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff, in order to state a claim of
constitutional violation, need not plead facts showing the absence of such a defense.")
(citations omitted); Guffey v. Wyatt, 18 F.3d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that defendant
bears burden of establishing that her behavior was reasonable, given the circumstances); Ma-
hers v. Harper, 12 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,
so defendants have the burden of pleading and proving the defense.");Eder, 975 F.2d at 1392
(stating that once plaintiff carries initial burden, defendants must prove their actions were rea-
sonable even though those actions may have been unconstitutional), rev'd on other grounds, 510
U.S. 510 (1994); Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the qualified immunity defense, as an affirmative defense, requires that burden of proof be
placed on the official asserting it).
579. See Orsatti v. NewJersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 1995) (asserting that
undisputed facts of record established the "objective reasonableness" of defendants' conduct);
Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 303 ("Couched in the terms of qualified immunity, however, we must ad-
dress one further level of reasonableness [beyond probable cause] and ask ourselves whether a
reasonable officer in Barton's position could believe that there was reasonable cause [to arrest
plaintiff]."); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that an officer should
be given qualified immunity if a "reasonable officer" under similar circumstances would have
perceived same need for use of deadly force). But seeShaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 801 (4th Cir.
1994) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that defendant lacked qualified immunity by show-
ing that defendant's conduct violated clearly established law and that a reasonable person
would have known that defendant's actions were unlawful); Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954,
958 (8th Cir. 1993) ("To demonstrate that the law is 'clearly established,' there must be a show-
ing that 'a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates' plaintiff's
rights." (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640)); Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 965-66
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding that summary judgment with respect to qualified immunity claim was
appropriate because no evidence was presented that would show that the officers' actions were
unreasonable); Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 1990) (assigning
to plaintiff burden of establishing that it was objectively unreasonable for defendants to believe
that they had probable cause to arrest).
580. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 821-23 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc),cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997).
581. Seeid.
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quiring the plaintiff to show that no reasonable jury could find for
the defendant on qualified immunity.
2
Independent of the normative question of whether the burden
should be allocated this way, students of qualified immunity should
be concerned about the unthinking manner in which this shift may
be taking place. The doctrinal and practical implications of these
decisions must be fully understood in light of the factual nature of
qualified immunity. If this factual component were acknowledged,
perhaps the allocation of these fundamental burdens would not so
confound the courts. "Burdens" are generally associated with obliga-
tions to produce evidence, rather than to persuade the court on a
matter of law. In order to clarify these important burdens, it is useful
to compare constitutional torts and qualified immunity to common
law torts and other affirmative defenses.
If a common law tort defendant moves for summary judgment on
the basis of the weakness of a plaintiffs evidence, she may argue that
no genuine fact issue exists concerning some essential element of the
plaintiffs claim. Suppose, for example, a defendant seeks summary
judgment on a battery claim and that she claims that no genuine is-
sue exists as to a material fact-say, whether a touching occurred.
The defendant may shift the burden of production to the plaintiff by
"showing" that the record is devoid of any genuine fact issue. 8 Be-
cause the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on all
elements of her claim, she would then, under Liberty Lobby, have the
burden of producing evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find that the defendant touched the plaintiff.
5 8 4
These burdens are substantially different in the context of an af-
firmative defense. Suppose the battery defendant in the above ex-
ample asserts a consent defense, and seeks summary judgment on
those grounds.85 The burden of persuasion at trial for the affirma-
tive defense of consent would be on the defendant.6 Accordingly,
on summary judgment, the defendant would have to demonstrate
582. SeeEllis, 999 F.2d at 246 n.2.
583. SeeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325 (1986).
584. SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
585. Under the common law, some dispute exists as to whether the plaintiff under torts
such as battery must affirmatively prove the lack of her consent, or whether consent constitutes
an affirmative defense, and therefore must be pled and proved by the defendant. Se DOBBS ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984). It is clear, however, that for some in-
tentional torts consent can be construed as an affirmative defense, as set forth in the example
in the text. See id. § 18 n.2 (noting that consent is an affirmative defense to trespass to land and
that defendant accordingly bears burden of proof).
586. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir. 1996) (allocating burden
of persuasion to defendant on affirmative defense of business necessity in age discrimination
case); seealsoDOBBSETAL., supra note 585, § 18 n.2.
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that even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff on the consent issue. 5"
Because the relevant burdens of persuasion are allocated differently,
the defendant's burden is much higher to achieve summary judg-
ment on an affirmative defense than it is simply to defeat the plain-
tiffs case-in-chief. Because most conventional affirmative defenses
generally involve a factual component, the burdens of persuasion
and the associated burdens on summary judgment would be similar
in other contexts as well.
Applying these burdens in the context of qualified immunity has
proven to be troublesome because the nature of the defense is not
entirely dependent upon historical fact. It seems meaningless to as-
sign an evidentiary burden to any party when the underlying issue is
the clarity of the constitutional rights asserted in the plaintiff's
claim. 5m If that is true, then what does it mean for a party to have the
burden of persuasion-an evidentiary standard-on a (supposedly)
purely legal question?
These questions are complicated, but crucial. Before courts can
properly assign the respective evidentiary burdens to the moving and
nonmoving parties on a summary judgment motion asserting quali-
fied immunity, they must ascertain who bears the burden of persua-
sion on the immunity defense. Furthermore, as with any qualified
immunity inquiry, the question cannot be answered in the abstract; it
must be related to some set of facts, whether the plaintiffs allega-
tions, the defendants' version of the facts after discovery, or the fact
finder's conclusions. Thus, the assignment of an evidentiary burden
may still be necessary to adjudicate the defense.
Assuming that an evidentiary burden could be assigned on quali-
fied immunity, it is worth conceptualizing what that burden would
look like, how it would be assigned, and how it would operate.5 9
587. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (BrennanJ., dissenting); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1114 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (describing how when party with burden of persuasion moves for
summaryjudgment, it must show that on all elements of its claim, no reasonable jury could find
for the nonmoving party (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428,
1438 (lIth Cir. 1991) (en banc))).
588. NAHMOD, supra note 54, § 8.19 ("As to the question of the existence of clearly settled
law, to speak of a burden of proof with its evidentiary emphasis appears misplaced.").
589. A comprehensive and normative analysis of the considerations that should affect the
allocation of the burden of persuasion on qualified immunity is beyond the scope and ambi-
tion of this Article. For a sampling of interesting accounts of how the law should assign bur-
dens of persuasion, see JAMES ET AL., supra note 423, § 7.16; Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading: An Essay onJuristic Immunity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 8-16 (1959) (explaining the funda-
mental considerations relevant to the allocation of pleading and persuasion burdens); Bruce L.
Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof 72 IND. LJ. 651 (1997) (developing economic model for op-
timal allocation of burden of proof designed to minimize both the costs of processing disputes
and the costs of erroneous outcomes); Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal
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First, of course, unlike with other conventional affirmative defenses,
the law could assign the burden of persuasion on qualified immunity
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff already bears the burden of persuasion
on the elements of the underlying constitutional tort. Thus, if she
somehow gets to trial, she must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that each element of her claim is true. If the burden of per-
suasion to overcome the defendant's qualified immunity claim also
lies with the plaintiff, she must now bear an additional evidentiary
burden.590 In addition to proving that the defendant violated her
constitutional rights, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant violated a clearly established con-
stitutional right.
What, in turn, would this entail? What additional facts, other than
those that she must already establish, could the plaintiff put before
the jury? A great deal of confusion would no doubt arise under such
a scenario. One problem is that the qualified immunity inquiry, as
presently constructed, is very closely related to an examination of the
merits of the plaintiff's claims. Thus, it remains unclear what facts, if
any, would be different in the plaintiffs case-in-chief as compared to
her "proof' on the qualified immunity defense. In the diagram be-
low, for example, it is difficult to conceptualize what facts the plaintiff
could prove that would move her case from category B
(unconstitutional, but reasonable, conduct) to category A




Even assuming one could sort out this complex evidentiary and
procedural mess, assignment of the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff would have serious legal ramifications. It is at least clear that
Burden, 1997 BYU L. REV. 1 (using economic analysis to explain law's allocation of pleading
and proof burdens as methods for minimizing social costs).
590. See, e.g., Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[O]nce the defendant
raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the defen-
dant's alleged conduct violated the law and that such law was clearly established when the al-
leged violation occurred." (citing Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991))).
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assigning the burden to the plaintiff would mean that she must prove
more than she would in order to prevail on the merits. Heightening
the evidentiary burden the plaintiff would have to bear at trial on
qualified immunity would, in essence, transform substantive constitu-
tional law, at least in constitutional tort cases; the heightened eviden-
tiary standard would essentially change the meaning of constitutional
law in the constitutional tort context. This covert transformation of
substantive constitutional law would both be unfair and create sub-
stantial inequalities in constitutional law enforcement. Moreover,
the alteration of substantive law in this manner would occur subver-
sively because it would be achieved at a sub-doctrinal level. The sub-
tle change occasioned by allocating the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff would not consciously be acknowledged in the substantive
constitutional law. Furthermore, putting the persuasion burden on
the plaintiff would make overcoming the immunity defense an ele-
ment of plaintiffs case-in-chief, which arguably conflicts with the
Court's holding in Gomez v. Toledo that qualified immunity is an af-
firmative defense.59'
Alternatively, the law could assign the burden of persuasion to the
defendant, the conventional allocation for affirmative defenses.
592
Here, too, courts would face substantial difficulty in precisely defin-
ing what the burden of persuasion at trial would look like. Under
one scenario, the defendant could bear the burden of persuading the
fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's
version of the facts is not true. But that characterization makes no
sense, because that would be the equivalent of shifting the burden of
persuasion on the merits to the defendant to disprove elements of
the plaintiffs claim. It would be unfair to assign the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant to simply defeat an element of the plaintiffs
claim, because that would be more than she would need to show in
order to win on the merits (which would require her merely to argue
that the plaintiff has not met her persuasion burden on that ele-
ment).
Another possibility is to assign the defendant the burden of per-
suading the fact finder that the facts are such that a reasonable offi-
591. Se Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). There are circumstances in which the
law places the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to overcome an affirmative defense, al-
though that is not the norm. See generally Sowle, supra note 195, at 400-01 (observing that in
areas of law involving affirmative defenses analogous to qualified immunity, Court usually
places burden of persuasion and burden of pleading on defendants).
592. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 417, § 5.20 (noting that burden of pleading usually
falls on party with burden of proof on that issue, which is generally the defendant on affirma-
tive defenses).
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cer could have been mistaken as to whether her conduct violated the
Constitution. As discussed above, this too would be intertwined with
the facts on the merits. It might be difficult to sort out which facts
are a part of the plaintiff's case-in-chief and which are associated with
the reasonableness defense. Thus, what the defendant must prove
would be a more subtle or nuanced factual issue. At the very least,
jury instructions would be confusing.
Indeed, this might present the jury with dueling burdens. Thejury
instructions, for example, might provide the following guidance:
If the plaintiff persuades you by a preponderance of the evidence
that each of her allegations is true, then you must return a verdict
for the plaintiff. If, however, the defendant persuades you by a
preponderance of the evidence that, on her version of the facts, a
reasonable official in her position might not have believed that her
conduct was unconstitutional, then you must make a factual find-
ing that her version of the facts is true and report that to the court.
At this point, if the jury found that the defendant had met her per-
suasion burden, it would report that finding to the judge, who would
have to direct a verdict for the defendant on qualified immunity. But
this scenario may not even make sense. If the jury must decide on
the defendant's set of facts, it still must do so with reference to some
legal standard. But by referencing the "reasonable official," the court
is directing the jury to make at least a quasi-legal determination.
There is surely no easy answer to any of these questions, but the
federal courts have done a woefully inadequate job of even identify-
ing the essential and foundational issues that must be resolved before
these various burdens can be sorted out. Until that occurs, the con-
fusion, and the corresponding administrative burdens, will continue.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY'S FACTUAL NATURE-THE CREATION OF
SECONDARY BURDENS
The principal pragmatic consequence of the doctrine's factually-
dependent analysis is an increased likelihood that constitutional tort
cases in which qualified immunity is asserted will involve a complex
factual analysis. As this Article has explained in greater detail above,
factual disputes under the law of qualified immunity are not unlikely,
given the open-ended reasonableness standard by which assertions of
the defense are to be evaluated.5 3 Accordingly, the possibility that
the immunity claim can be resolved at an early stage of the litigation
593. Seesupra notes 187-262 and accompanying text.
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becomes more remote. Even assuming that the defendant can es-
cape trial, substantial attention will have to be paid to the pretrial
litigation process, including discovery. Plaintiffs, defendants, and
trial courts are likely to expend substantial resources simply litigating
the qualified immunity defense-an elaborate sideshow, independ-
ent of the merits, that in many cases will do little to advance or accel-
erate resolution of the legal claims. More significant is the high
probability that the trial court will conclude that the factual issues
underlying qualified immunity claims raise genuine issues of material
fact. If that is true, then qualified immunity cases ought not to be
easily resolvable on summary judgment, and many cases should go to
trial.
Given that the acknowledged goal of qualified immunity is to
minimize the social costs of constitutional tort litigation, it would be
at best ironic if qualified immunity not only failed to advance this ob-
jective, but also generated independent social costs. Yet this appears
to be the case. The heavily factual nature of qualified immunity cre-
ates a phenomenon that can be called "secondary burdens"--the so-
cial costs specifically generated by the litigation of the qualified im-
munity defense.
Under the present system, even if the defendant prevails on a
qualified immunity claim at some point prior to trial, the factual
component of the immunity inquiry may mean that she already has
been subjected to much of the litigation burden attendant to a case
that was tried on the merits (other than the trial itself). As the Court
has acknowledged, at least some discovery, and perhaps fairly exten-
sive discovery, may be necessary to flesh out the precise nature of the
defendant's conduct.59' This will generate substantial litigation bur-
dens on defendants, whether they are vindicated prior to trial or not.
This process similarly taxes plaintiffs and the court system.
Moreover, if the defendant prevails on the immunity defense, it is
surely possible that she might have prevailed at a trial on the merits.
This may be true for two reasons. First, if the factual scenario is such
that it is not clear whether the defendant violated the plaintiff's
clearly established constitutional rights, it is one in which a jury
might conclude that no substantive violation of the Constitution has
occurred. After all, the cases in which qualified immunity is likely to
be meaningful are already the close ones. Second, qualified immu-
594. SeeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646-47 n.6 (1987). Indeed, some courts have
used special interrogatories to juries to find the relevant facts and then have applied the
"clearly established" law to those facts. See supra notes 454-55 (citing cases utilizing this ap-
proach).
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nity could, even if not resolvable prior to a trial, be asserted as a sub-
stantive defense to liability. 595
Therefore, it is not clear that the liability outcome fostered by im-
munity would necessarily be different from the outcome at trial in
many cases. This has two implications. First, concerns about fairness
and overdeterrence might still be accommodated at trial even if the
defendant and society bear some social costs prior to the ultimate
vindication on liability. Second, it is not even clear that the qualified
immunity defense saves substantial social costs. Assuming that the
defendant might prevail in many cases, whether on immunity
grounds or on the merits, the costs eliminated by resolving the case
prior to trial must be compared to the costs of trying the case. A
comparison of a system with and without immunity reveals that the
immunity phase of the pretrial litigation, however costily, is a substi-
tute for the costs of the trial. In other words, the pretrial litigation
costs caused by the invoking of the immunity defense may cancel out
the trial costs saved by that defense.
Although trials are certainly costly, the costs of litigating immunity
claims may also be quite significant. One scholar has noted anecdo-
tal evidence that federal district court judges perceive that defen-
dants use the qualified immunity interlocutory appeal process to pro-
tract litigation "that would otherwise be tried or settled relatively
quickly., 596 In opposing multiple interlocutory appeals in the Behrens
case, the plaintiff pointed out that the litigation of the first interlocu-
tory appeal on qualified immunity delayed the case for four years.597
While this, too, is anecdotal, it demonstrates the possibility that im-
munity litigation may be costly for all involved.
If the comparative costs of pursuing qualified immunity claims
(and bearing the associated costs of pretrial litigation) and going to
trial were borne only by official defendants, then assessing these costs
might be considerably less important. Rational defendants in such
cases could decide whether the benefits of asserting qualified immu-
nity at the pretrial stages would be outweighed by the additional costs
it imposes. As with the other costs of constitutional tort litigation,
however, these costs are not realized solely by defendants. Plaintiffs,
courts, and society are also saddled with additional costs that might
not otherwise exist in a world without qualified immunity.
595. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 653 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
596. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (1990).
597. See Brief for Respondent at 40, Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) (No. 94-1244).
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What is more, the previous discussion assumes that courts can ade-
quately resolve qualified immunity claims on summary judgment.
But the factual nature of qualified immunity also may generate ir-
resolvable genuine fact issues.59 Indeed, the Court's recent attention
to the details of interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity claims
suggests that trial courts may be denying a substantial percentage of
qualified immunity claims."
Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the practical effects of the fac-
tual component of qualified immunity must also examine cases at the
other end of the spectrum. If the defendant loses her qualified im-
munity claim, and the plaintiff ultimately prevails on the merits at
trial, the entire immunity portion of the litigation will have signifi-
cantly driven up the litigation costs, the plaintiff's attorneys' fees (for
which the defendant may well be liable) ,m and the resources that the
trial court has devoted to the case. Furthermore, in cases where the
defendant pursues multiple interlocutory appeals on her immunity
claim prior to the plaintiff's victory, the costs may be even more sub-
stantial. Thus, the Court may be exacerbating the social costs of im-
munity litigation by widening the availability of such appeals.r60
If this is all that qualified immunity accomplishes, the principal
policy rationale for its existence under the modern cases-the mini-
mization of the social costs of constitutional tort litigation-may itself
have been undermined. In other words, the elimination of qualified
immunity might actually lower the overall social costs of constitu-
tional tort litigation.
This is not to say that qualified immunity does not also substan-
tially limit some of the social costs of constitutional tort litigation.
Even in a case in which the defendant does not prevail on a qualified
immunity claim until years of discovery and summary judgment pro-
cedures have passed, she still has saved herself and the court the con-
siderable expense of a trial as well as the additional psychological
burden associated with the risk of liability whenever one goes to trial.
598. See Kinports, Unanswered Questions, supra note 28, at 647-48 n.203 (citing substantial
numbers of federal appellate cases in which a factual dispute precluded resolution of qualified
immunity by summaryjudgment).
599. As Professor Solimine points out, however, a substantial percentage of those claims
have been reversed. See Solimine, supra note 596, at 1190. Professor Solimine acknowledges
that the data on which this reversal rate was calculated should be viewed with some caution. See
id at 1190 n.137.
600. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (granting court discretion to award pre-
vailing party reasonable attorneys' fees).
601. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 321-22 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting
that additional appeals generated by qualified immunity cases will threaten federal appellate
system with overloaded dockets).
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The point is simply that a meaningful assessment of the costs saved
by qualified immunity must be measured against the costs imposed by
qualified immunity. If qualified immunity litigation generates sig-
nificant secondary burdens, those burdens should be evaluated rela-
tive to the putative savings promoted by the pretrial vetting of consti-
tutional tort claims. It would be useful, for example, to know the
overall costs of constitutional tort litigation presently, and compare
those to costs under a system that requires defendants to defend
cases on the merits.
Unfortunately, this is all speculation. Presently, there is no empiri-
cal foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity
doctrine or its critics. While the Court has consistently hypothesized
that significant social costs are engendered by § 1983 and Bivens liti-
gation against individual government officials, 62 it has never relied
on empirical data concerning the impact of constitutional tort litiga-
tion on officials' actual behavior.6s Similarly, while other commenta-
tors also have observed that qualified immunity litigation may gener-
ate substantial social costs, they have offered no supporting empirical
data either. °4 The Court itself has rarely questioned whether social
costs are created by the very procedure it has designed for limiting
those suits.6°5
Empirical research into the social costs of all aspects of constitu-
tional tort litigation would contribute meaningfully to the continuing
discourse about the appropriate scope of § 1983 and Bivens actions."
602. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
603. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting observations of commentators that
there is no empirical basis for any of the Court's underlying assumptions about the necessity of
qualified immunity). In contrast, the Court recently rejected a claim of absolute immunity for
court reporters on the ground that no empirical basis existed to suggest that a significant vol-
ume of vexatious and burdensome actions against court reporters would result in the absence
of such immunity. SeeAntoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,437 (1993).
604. See, e.g., Blum, User's Manual, supra note 14, at 189 (noting without empirical support
the costs of the qualified immunity defense and concluding that the costs of the defense out-
weigh its benefits); Burris, supra note 571, at 186 ("[The] true litigation explosion in Section
1983 is in immunity claims, not filings."); Kuhn, supra note 227, at 682 (noting that qualified
immunity "has become a complex and exploding aspect" of constitutional tort litigation, but
not citing empirical data).
605. The Court has, on occasion, recognized some social costs surrounding vindication of
the immunity defense. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (observing that inter-
locutory appeals for public official defendants may add social and institutional costs to the ad-
judication of constitutional tort claims).
606. Ted Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab have done the most important and comprehensive
empirical research on § 1983 litigation to date. SeeTheodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1987) (detailing empiri-
cal study of § 1983 litigation in the federal courts and concluding that claims that such litiga-
tion is overrunning the federal judiciary may be exaggerated). Although it is beyond the scope
of this Article to define the scope or methodology of such empirical examination, it is surely
worthwhile to at least mention some of the potential areas for empirical research and their cor-
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For example, whether one believes that the Court has engaged in ju-
dicial activism in crafting the qualified immunity doctrine 607 or that it
has legitimately interpreted congressional intent with reference to
common law,'" it seems that the future of the qualified immunity
doctrine ought to be based on some empirical foundation. Whether
this responsibility belongs to Congress or the federal courts, the first
step toward reforming the constitutional tort system should be the
acquisition of reliable data.
Examination of empirical data might also provide a better founda-
tion for normative debates about immunity. By definition, qualified
immunity creates a barrier to recovery for some meritorious claims.
It sacrifices the enforcement of constitutional values in those cases in
order to protect other values that are not formally based in the Con-
stitution: fairness, overdeterrence, and social costs. As a normative
matter, it would seem that there are substantial justifications for re-
quiring compelling reasons to overcome what some might consider
to be a presumption of constitutional enforcement.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the burdens of qualified immunity, draw-
ing on the multiple meanings of "burden" in this doctrinal context.
responding limitations. One basic issue would be the identification of potential sources for
data about the costs of constitutional tort litigation and, by comparison, what percentage of
those costs are attributable to the immunity component of the litigation. Researchers could
examine evidence of the resources spent by all players in constitutional tort cases, focusing on
relevant cost categories, such as plaintiffs' and defense attorneys' time, official defendants' time
spent on litigation, actual out-of-pocket costs, and judicial resources devoted to the case. It
might be difficult, however, to compile evidence of attorney or official defendants' time and
resources, given that time records might not be maintained or, if maintained, may be privi-
leged. Furthermore, the inquiry would have to factor out other variables that might cause
some types of constitutional tort cases to be more costly than others, such as complexity of the
legal or factual issues, the number of parties and witnesses involved, and the doctrinal source of
the underlying constitutional violation.
Alternatively, or as a supplement, researchers could look to reported decisions on quali-
fied immunity to assess whether significant percentages of cases are not resolvable because of
factual issues, and evaluate the average time from filing to resolution. But, of course, reported
decisions (and even unreported ones) do not reflect all of the information pertinent to this
inquiry. First, the information would be incomplete. Evaluation of judicial decisions would
not account for the unknown number of cases that are neverfiled because the qualified immu-
nity doctrine exists as an anticipated barrier to success. Second, some qualified immunity de-
terminations may not generate a written opinion, particularly if the basis for the denial of a
claim is the existence of a factual dispute. Rather, the court may resolve them in short, unre-
ported orders.
Finally, researchers could also look for anecdotal evidence about the social costs of quali-
fied immunity. Each of these sources has potential limitations.
607. Se Rudovsky, supra note 14, at 25 (arguing that judicial activism has characterized the
development of the qualified immunity doctrine).
608. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-65 (1992) (discussing common law roots of quali-
fied immunity doctrine).
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First, the Court has generated burdens on judges and practitioners
who must dissect this extraordinarily complex doctrine and apply it
sensibly in the litigation world. Second, the doctrine has created
secondary burdens on the federal courts by requiring detailed factual
inquiries in virtually all qualified immunity claims, thus belaboring
the resolution of claims and requiring doctrinal gymnastics in the ar-
ticulation of the appropriate legal standard and the application of
that standard to cases. Finally, the doctrine must somehow be fit into
the various summary judgment burdens-the burden of production
or highlighting, and the burden of persuasion-that are essential to
applying the qualified immunity standard and conventional summary
judgment law.
In examining the burdens of qualified immunity, this Article has
identified some important conceptual issues surrounding the quali-
fied immunity doctrine and its application. A proper understanding
of the factual component of qualified immunity should lead courts,
practitioners, policymakers, and litigators to a better comprehension
of how better to apply the doctrine, and perhaps how to modify it.
Before the legal system can make any significant progress toward re-
fining this burdensome doctrine, the Court must take the modest
step of acknowledging the paradox it created when it shaped the doc-
trine to require a substantially fact-based inquiry.
Finally, the burdens of qualified immunity should teach us some-
thing broader about how law is crafted. The story of qualified im-
munity's doctrinal development should be a sobering one. It shows
us that the law sometimes turns on itself because of our ambivalence
about its motivating forces, which in the case of qualified immunity
may also be internally contradictory ones. When the law follows such
a course, it is bound to generate ironies such as the creation of sec-
ondary burdens described above. This not only interferes with the
coherent development of legal doctrine, but also makes it extraordi-
narily difficult to assess possible reform in a meaningful and thought-
ful manner. Greater reflection on underlying principles and founda-
tional concerns can provide us with better grounding for evaluating
legal doctrine and theory.
[Vol. 47:1
